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Abstract 
Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are key providers of essential services in 
developing countries, where government capacity is often limited. Despite their important 
role in socio-economic development and poverty reduction, NGOs in developing countries 
tend to be reliant on either a few foreign donors or on local communities’ contributions. In 
addition to the short contract periods and associated project risks, foreign funding is 
challenging and onerous as a result of information asymmetries and lack of transparency. 
Only a minority of larger and well-established NGOs can access reliable funding from 
international donors, whilst the remaining NGOs are financially vulnerable and struggle to 
survive. This is of grave concern to the societies within which these organisations operate as 
it can lead to the interruption of the delivery of critical services to beneficiaries.  
There are a number of studies on the financial vulnerability and associated coping strategies 
of NGOs in developed countries, but not in developing countries. This research aims to 
address this gap in the literature by investigating the nature of financial vulnerability and 
exploring the effective coping mechanisms implemented by NGOs in such contexts to deal 
with financial challenges and to ensure sustainability of the organisation and its programmes. 
To achieve the stated objective, the research investigates the financial vulnerability and 
stability of NGOs, focusing on the country case study of Uganda. The research adopts an 
empirical approach, using methodologies that have previously been used for developed 
countries to investigate the possible relationship between an organisation’s characteristics and 
its financial vulnerability. It subsequently focuses more narrowly but also more in depth on 
the subsample of NGOs in Uganda that have experienced a large decrease in revenue, 
applying a comparative technique that respects the organisations’ heterogeneity and allows 
testing for conditional relationships between different organisational factors (i.e. conditions 
that can mitigate the impact of financial vulnerability on programme expenditures). Finally, 
the research applies a qualitative, interpretive approach in order to gain a better understanding 
of the preliminary findings and the funding environment of Ugandan NGOs. It draws from 35 
in-depth interviews with Ugandan NGO managers conducted during 2016. The respondents 
provide valuable insights that help to explain financial decisions and outline the coping 
strategies of NGOs to ensure financial survival and safeguard their commitment to their 
mission and to service delivery.  
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Findings from the research indicate that financial vulnerability is a persistent and prevalent 
problem that affects the majority of local NGOs in Uganda as a consequence of uncertainty 
of funding flows. However, the way an organisation is affected depends on its expenditure 
and financial structure. A large variety of proposed coping strategies amongst organisations 
were identified. NGOs in Uganda have been proactive and innovative in exploring alternative 
funding sources to protect themselves against financial risks, especially those related to 
dependence on foreign funding.  
The lessons learnt from this research are useful both for NGO managers who are concerned 
about financial risk and vulnerability, but also more broadly for the community of 
development practitioners. The recommendations can assist NGOs to sustain their 
programmes on the ground and improve the financial stability of the NGO sector. This 
research contributes to the academic dialogue on financial vulnerability by providing a 
credible voice to NGOs, explaining their fears and their challenges. Further research is 
recommended to investigate the financial vulnerability of NGOs in other country contexts.  
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KEY DEFINITIONS AND TERMINOLOGY 
Definitions of the key concepts used in this research are provided below.  
 A nonprofit organisation (NPO) is part of the nonprofit sector. This is because the sector is 
neither a part of the government nor of the private sector (Anheier & Ben-Ner, 2003, p. 4). 
The NPO sector includes national, regional and international organisations, such as NGOs 
and foundations. The form of an NPO is generally defined through the non-distribution 
constraint as organisations in the nonprofit sector do not distribute the financial surplus (i.e. 
earnings, profits or dividends) from operations to the organisation’s stakeholders (Hansmann, 
1980; Anheier & Ben-Ner, 2003). It should be noted that an NPO is not barred from 
generating revenue (or a surplus), but the revenue should be retained and used to support the 
organisation’s mission.  
 An non-governmental organisation (NGO) (hereafter also refer to as ‘organisation’) is a 
legally constituted private voluntary grouping of individuals or associations established to 
provide services to communities and to increase citizen participation in policy-making 
processes and development issues. An NGO can be local, national or international depending 
on its scope of operation and legal status. Another differentiating factor within the NGO 
sector is the way they operate, which can be either as an ‘intermediary‘ if it works between 
community level and other level of society (such as donors and governments) or as a 
membership-based organisation delivering the services directly to its members. NGOs are 
included among NPOs.  
 A community-based organisation (CBO) is an organisation that operates at local level (or 
sub-county level) to improve the quality of life of beneficiary communities. CBOs are 
typically smaller (in terms of size and resources) than NGOs and constituted by local 
members – community individuals who are often beneficiaries. 
 An international non-governmental organisation (INGO) is a non-governmental 
organisation controlled and governed by a foreign country, but operating in Uganda under a 
certificate of registration.  
 A fundraising strategy is a structured plan, the purpose of which is to obtain the necessary 
resources to implement the organisation’s mission and objectives. The fundraising plan 
outlines the activities of the organisation (products and services) in a coordinated and 
integrated way over a certain period of time. 
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 A donor is a local or foreign individual or entity, including development banks, multilateral 
and bilateral institutions, state and federal agencies, that contributes directly or indirectly, 
financially or in kind (i.e. goods), for programmes run by NGOs to support their goals and 
missions. 
 Grants are non-repayable funds disbursed by some institution (i.e. government, foundation, 
or international NGO) to a recipient NPO. The process usually starts with the submission of a 
proposal. After approval of the proposal and the signing of the contract or agreement, the 
grant institution disburses the funds. Most grants require some level of compliance and 
reporting to the grant provider. The types of requirements and conditions, however, can vary 
among institutions.  
 Financial vulnerability (hereafter referred to as ‘vulnerability’) is defined as a situation 
where an NGO does not have a sustainable (i.e. continuous and reliable or secure) revenue 
stream. In Chapters 2 and 3 financial vulnerability is defined as a decrease in revenue or 
decrease in expenditure based on the typical operationalisation of the concept for quantitative 
analysis. In Chapter 4 the concept takes a broader meaning that includes uncertainty of 
funding flows, financial risk and financial distress that threatens the continuation of 
programmes and the survival of the organisation. 
 Financial volatility is defined as the fluctuation of revenue streams. 
 Sustainability is the ability of an organisation to fulfil its mission and to serve its 
stakeholders over time. Three elements of sustainability are considered: financial 
sustainability, organisational sustainability and programme sustainability. Financial 
sustainability refers to the ability of the organisation to generate sufficient financial resources 
to fund its project activities and operations. Organisational sustainability refers to the 
capacity of the organisation to make arrangements to continue providing a framework 
through which services can be delivered over time, including partnerships with government, 
the private sector and other organisations. Programme sustainability refers to the continuation 
of service delivery after the end of the projects. 
 Beneficiaries are individuals or organisations that benefit from the interventions of NGOs 
(i.e. activities) and therefore experience a change of state in their lives.  
 Stakeholders are individuals, groups, institutions or governments with an interest or concern 
in an NGO’s work.  
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 Coping mechanisms are the means that an organisation uses and adopts in order to manage 
external or internal challenges. 
 Organisational capacity includes internal elements and internal processes (quality and 
standards), such as governance, leadership and management performance, human resources 
structure and skills/professionalisation, organisation logistics and processes, financial 
management and internal policies, infrastructure, public and external relations, networks and 
partnerships, systems of information and communication technologies, information and 
knowledge management (documentation) and resource mobilisation.  
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Your work is going to fill a large part of your life, and the only way to be truly 
satisfied is to do what you believe is great work. And the only way to do great 
work is to love what you do. If you haven’t found it yet, keep looking. Don’t 
settle. As with all matters of the heart, you’ll know when you find it. And, like 
any great relationship, it just gets better and better as the years roll on. So keep 
looking until you find it. Don’t settle. 
(Steve Jobs
1
) 
 
  
                                                             
1 https://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/steve_jobs_416859 
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
1.1. INTRODUCTION 
The research investigates the financial vulnerability and financial decisions of non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) in developing countries, with a specific focus on 
Ugandan NGOs. The concept of financial vulnerability is central to this thesis. The research 
structure of the PhD allowed me to consider financial vulnerability from a variety of 
perspectives and employing different metodologies: in Chapters 2 and 3 it was 
operationalised as a decrease in revenue. In Chapter 4, although the same definition of the 
concept was used as a sampling criterion to select an initial group of participants, financial 
vulnerability was explored inductively and could attract a much wider operational meaning 
associated with the vulnerability of NGOs on the ground. The concept ‘financial decisions’ 
includes any actions undertaken by NGO managers to overcome or mitigate the impact of 
financial vulnerability, and includes short-term coping decisions and longer-term strategic 
changes. 
NGOs represent a highly diverse range of organisations, the main purpose of which is to 
provide public goods and services to disadvantaged communities. In order to pursue their 
mission and organisational commitments, NGOs in developing countries rely mostly on 
donor funding. Yet NGOs in developing countries often depend on a few highly volatile 
foreign funding sources. This is partly attributable to limited local resources because of low-
income economies which restrict both the ability to raise revenue from beneficiary 
communities and potential support through government contributions. 
The funding situation for NGOs in developing countries has deteriorated since the 2008 
global economic crisis. The available funding has been reduced and is granted over shorter 
periods. As a result, some NGOs have not had their projects renewed, because of either 
changing donor policies or changing strategies. Uganda, for instance, received a great deal of 
funding for HIV/AIDS projects, but the progress of the disease is now under control and 
donors have thus diverted the available funding to other countries or other development areas. 
Donor requirements have also tightened (USAID, 2010; USAID, 2011). Specifically, NGOs 
are required to apply in partnership with others and to contribute pro rata to the project, and 
restrictions on the use of funds have tightened (i.e. direct project implementation), all of 
which impede organisations’ ability to grow, develop and execute projects. Donor funding 
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has therefore become increasingly challenging, especially for relatively small and young 
organisations with few international links. While the inequality between the vulnerability of 
local and international NGOs is an important aspect, the main focus of this study is to explore 
the reasons behind the financial vulnerability of local NGOs as well as possible solutions to 
their vulnerability. In considering solutions, we are mindful that much of the financial 
vulnerability is structural and due to the power imbalances between donors and aid recipients. 
And it is acknowledge that space for innovation around more sustainable funding is achieved 
only because some donors are willing to create such space.   
The impetus for this research is the concern about the impact of financial vulnerability on the 
functioning of NGOs and the communities of their beneficiaries in developing countries, and 
the way donor conditions and requirements affect organisations’ capacity and ability to 
effectively implement projects on the ground. 
To understand the financial challenges, as well as the manner in which Ugandan NGOs 
respond to those challenges and the kind of strategies that can be implemented to ensure 
organisational and programme sustainability, this research investigated the nature of financial 
vulnerability, the responses of Ugandan NGOs to their own financial vulnerability, and the 
extent to which such responses can effectively encourage the sustainability of the 
organisation and their programmes. It is equally important, however, to understand the 
environmental contexts within which NGOs function.  
1.2. PERSONAL MOTIVATION 
My professional background has been that of manager of the Aga Khan Foundation in both 
Portugal and Mozambique. When I became interested in the subject of development finance, 
I read Easterly’s The Elusive Quest for Growth: Economists’ Adventures and Misadventures 
in the Tropics (2001). This book provides many examples of unsuccessful implementation of 
foreign aid programmes, which did not deliver as promised. The failure of these programmes 
was mainly the result of the lack of pragmatism and a clear understanding of the 
circumstances on the ground. Since then I started asking questions about why this happened 
and how aid could be channelled to be used more effectively. 
Easterly’s points became clear and real to me when I moved from the developed country 
context of Portugal to the developing country context of Mozambique. This was particularly 
the case in terms of the way in which programme funds were managed, the types of 
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restrictions imposed by donors and the mechanisms of monitoring and evaluation used which 
did not really match the conditions on the ground.  
This clear perception of the two different contextual realities was further underlined when I 
read studies on the financial vulnerability of NGOs and how this can be effectively mitigated 
through the implementation of a uniform set of organisational management practices. I 
increasingly questioned this perspective, which neglected to take the specific context into 
account. My questions started about the way that the authors of those studies defined 
financial vulnerability. Some authors defined it as the probability that an organisation would 
decrease programme expenditure (Tuckman & Chang, 1991). Others measured financial 
vulnerability as a decrease in equity balances as a proportion of total revenue (Trussel & 
Greenlee, 2001; Trussel, 2002) or a decrease in total revenue larger than 25 percent of total 
revenue (Keating, Fisher, Gordon & Greenlee, 2005). However, in my experience financial 
vulnerability is not well captured by these ex post and retrospective financial ratios. There 
may be a decrease in these expenditures that was based on a strategic decision and not driven 
by financial need. For instance, an organisation may show a reduction in programme 
expenditure as a result of the termination of projects or as projects wind down and have fewer 
financial needs in their final phases. This poses a related question about the real meaning of 
financial vulnerability, both on a conceptual and empirical level.  
The other issue that raised my interest within the literature is related to the strategies that 
could be used to mitigate financial risks and to decrease financial vulnerability. Considering 
that the bulk of the literature focuses on developed countries, the empirical evidence fails to 
represent the reality of developing countries. This raises questions about whether some of 
those strategies highlighted to mitigate financial risk can really be implemented in a 
developing country context, or whether they can have any impact on improving the financial 
position of NGOs in developing countries. For example, whereas widening the revenue base 
through revenue-generating activities can be effective in a developed country context, where 
large financial contributions can be obtained, in low-income communities local funding 
opportunities are much more limited. Another interesting issue that was brought to my 
attention relates to the strategy of building institutional capacity (Bowman, Keating & Hager, 
2006; Calabrese, 2012). Even though I agree with the importance of this strategy to secure 
the financial sustainability of an organisation, it is not always possible to sustainably build 
capacity, regardless of organisational size. For example, finding qualified staff is a problem 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
6 
 
 
for organisations that operate in remote areas. This fact raised a further question related to 
how NGOs respond to such constraints. 
There are, therefore, two personal motivations that drove me to conduct this research. The 
first is my own professional experience with the frustrations of financial vulnerability and 
financial decisions within a developing country NGO, and the second is my personal interest 
in helping to identify coping mechanisms (i.e. strategies) that can contribute to solving or 
mitigating some of the financial problems and challenges faced by NGOs.  
1.3. RATIONALE  
This section explains the reasons for conducting this research by locating it within the 
existing body of knowledge. The following premises underlie the research: 
- The degree of financial vulnerability in developing countries is not only considerably 
higher, but such vulnerability impacts on society much more significantly than in 
developed countries; 
- There is a lack of transparency on how and why donor funding is allocated because of 
the lack of reliable and accurate data available to effectively assess NGOs in developing 
countries. This contributes towards aggravating the power imbalance between donors 
and NGOs based in developing countries;  
- Only a minority of larger NGOs in developing countries can access reliable donor 
funding. The remaining organisations, mostly small and local NGOs, are financially 
vulnerable. 
1.3.1. Importance of defining the problem of financial vulnerability  
Many governments in developing countries face severe financial and managerial constraints, 
which limit their capacity to provide critical social and economic services such as food, 
medicine and education (Edwards & Hulme, 1996; Burger & Owens, 2013). The origins of 
these constraints are multidimensional, but the most seriously binding constraint is often the 
small tax base available to fund public goods and services (Martens, 2002). Consequently, 
NGOs play a crucial role in such contexts. They do not provide additional choices or cater for 
minority preferences – more often they are the only providers of public goods and fill the gap 
attributable to government constraints. Despite this important role of NGOs in developing 
countries, they often have to rely on short- to medium-term project-based contract funding 
from foreign donors. 
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The research, therefore, argues that financial vulnerability in developing countries is different 
from that in developed countries: not only is the extent of financial vulnerability considerably 
higher in developing countries, but also the nature of it. Such vulnerability impacts on society 
much more deeply, potentially interrupting the provision of critical services such as HIV 
treatment, orphan care, and medical treatment in remote areas. For this reason it is important 
to understand the problem of financial vulnerability of NGOs in developing countries and to 
identify factors that adversely affect their financially stability.  
1.3.2. Importance of finding appropriate tools to assess NGOs 
According to Burger and Owens (2013), donors do not allocate funding in an effective way, 
but rather based on habit. Donors also favour NGOs with higher-quality proposals and more 
observable outputs (Easterly, 2001). The ineffectiveness of mechanisms of funding allocation 
has been widely attributed to the lack of reliable and accurate data, inappropriate tools of 
evaluation, and the existence of information asymmetries between donors and organisations
2
 
(Martens, 2002; Burger & Owens, 2013). It is therefore difficult to effectively assess how 
organisations work, especially when they operate in remote areas and the target beneficiaries 
have little space to provide feedback on services delivered. In fact, donors are usually 
unfamiliar with local conditions and only rarely visit the project sites (Easterly, 2001). 
Additionally, donors impose a number of restrictions (such as conditions related to 
submission and printing of frequent and detailed reports) to ensure effectiveness of their 
contributions as a result of the information asymmetries. Eventually, these conditions often 
cause more harm than good, especially for small organisations that do not have the capacity 
to comply effectively (Elbers & Arts, 2011; AbouAssi, 2013).  
This research argues that the existence of information asymmetry and the lack of 
transparency of NGO performance add further uncertainty to the funding environment. This 
may plausibly intensify the power imbalance in favour of the donors as it contributes to the 
lack of transparency and accountability to the donor community. The power imbalance 
between donors and NGOs is not explicitly studied in this research, partly because it is 
beyond the scope of the study and partly because there is not enough reliable data available 
                                                             
2 NGOs often respond and act strategically in the ways that donors would like in order to secure funding (Balser 
& McClusky, 2005; Van Puyvelde, Caers, Du Bois & Jegers, 2012). 
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on the subject; yet it is at the heart of this research as many of the concerns around the 
financial vulnerability of NGOs are rooted in the power imbalance between donors and 
NGOs.  
1.3.3. Importance of identifying differences in patterns of financial vulnerability  
Studies by Fafchamps and Owens (2009) and Burger and Owens (2013) observe differences 
in patterns of survival between two groups of organisations according to their different 
funding sources, i.e. donor-funded and community-funded. Donor-funded NGOs were found 
to be older, larger and more sustainable than community-funded NGOs and therefore they are 
more likely to survive. Similarly, Foster and Fine (2007) and Chikoto and Neely (2013) find 
that organisations that rely on private contributions experience higher average income 
volatility and therefore show higher financial vulnerability. NGOs in developing countries 
rely mostly on external funding, but there is evidence that only a minority of larger 
organisations can access reliable donor funding (Fowler, 2016). The remaining organisations, 
mostly small and locally supported, are unable to access these grants and are financially 
vulnerable as a result. Eventually, organisations struggle to survive financially and to 
continue delivering services.  
Another factor of relevance, with regard to the level of financial vulnerability and the way 
NGOs are able to cope with financial challenges, is the type of NGO organisation. For 
instance, extant literature addresses the uneven access to funding between international non-
governmental organisations (INGOs) and their local counterparts (Elbers & Schulpen, 2013; 
Fowler, 2016).
3
 This is especially true for southern NGOs where most are funded by 
international donors from northern NGOs (CIVICUS, 2015). INGOs are usually larger and 
often in a better position to bid for donor contracts than small local NGOs. INGOs have 
stronger organisational networks and preferable contacts with official donors back home, 
more visibility, better records and reporting systems, which in turn results in stronger donor 
applications (Fowler, 2016). Fowler (2016) also points out the degree to which INGOs are 
better able to cope with financial uncertainty, for example by bridging cash-flow gaps, by 
cross-financing from other sources of funding (e.g. headquarters) when there are delays in 
payments. 
                                                             
3 Also available: http://civicus.org/images/SOCS2015_ESSAY8_NGOsAndAid.pdf. 
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This research acknowledges these findings about structural differences within the NGO 
sector and therefore includes a wide spectrum of organisations in the analysis in terms of the 
NGO type, size, funding structure and subsector. 
1.4. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
NGOs play a crucial role in developing countries by providing essential services, which 
means that interruptions can be extremely harmful for development as communities do not 
have alternative ways of obtaining those services. Yet NGOs in developing countries often 
depend on uncertain funding flows mainly from foreign donors and are thus financially 
vulnerable. Furthermore, access to donor funding and compliance with the associated 
requirements became more problematic after the global economic crisis of 2008, especially 
for relatively small and young organisations.  
The problem of this research, therefore, relates to the specific nature of financial vulnerability 
of NGOs in developing countries, the responses of Ugandan NGOs to their own financial 
vulnerability, and the extent to which such responses can effectively encourage the 
sustainability of the organisations and their programmes. 
1.5. PURPOSE OF THE RESEARCH 
Given the research problem outlined in the previous section, the overriding purpose of this 
research is twofold: firstly, to investigate the nature and correlates of the financial 
vulnerability of NGOs in Uganda, and secondly, to explore the financial decisions and 
strategies implemented by NGO managers to deal with financial challenges. Because of the 
lack of representative panel data, including financial data for developing countries, this 
research can also be useful for other developing countries. The research analysed financial 
data for a sample of Ugandan NGOs for the years 2000, 2001, 2006, 2007 and 2016. The 
analysis documents factors involved in financial vulnerability as well as current strategies and 
coping mechanisms that contribute towards sustaining the organisations and their 
programmes in developing countries. Based on the existing literature, the study examines to 
what extent the mechanisms proposed in the literature that is focused on developed countries 
can be implemented by NGOs in developing countries and also what other steps are taken by 
NGOs in developing countries that are not mentioned in the literature.  
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1.6. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Following the statement of purpose and the debates about financial vulnerability and financial 
decisions of NGOs managers, the research was driven by the following questions and sub-
questions, which frame the subsequent chapters.  
In Chapter 2, financial vulnerability as based on current literature is examined, and the 
following question is asked: 
 What are the factors correlated with financial vulnerability of NGOs in developing 
countries and how does the significance of these correlates change across types of 
NGOs? 
In Chapter 3, the conditions that potentially explain the ability of NGO managers to make 
decisions in order to mitigate the impact of financial vulnerability are examined. The 
following question is asked: 
 What are the institutional conditions that enable organisations to mitigate the impact 
of a decrease in revenue on programmes? 
Lastly, drawing from the findings of the previous chapters, in Chapter 4 the aim is to 
understand the financial decisions and strategies of NGOs from the perspectives of 
practitioners and based on their experiences or perceptions of being vulnerable. This presents 
an ex ante and more subjective perspective on financial vulnerability. 
1.7. RESEARCH LAYOUT  
This section provides an overview of the structure of the research. The research is organised 
as three self-contained studies focusing on specific research sub-questions which relate to the 
core research questions (see Section 1.6). Each of these studies corresponds to one of the 
subsequent chapters. Each chapter commences with a review of the literature related to the 
topic being studied as well as a short description of the data being analysed. Consequently, 
there is some overlap in the contents of these chapters.  
Chapter 1 presents an overall introduction to the research topic by positioning the research in 
the current body of knowledge. Specifically, this chapter provides a personal motivation and 
underlying rationale. It includes the statement of the problem and the purpose of the research, 
outlines the research questions and how they were addressed, and provides outlines of the 
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chapters of the thesis. The chapter also clarifies key definitions and terminology and 
concludes with a contextualisation of the Ugandan NGO sector.  
Chapter 2 addresses the questions on how to measure financial vulnerability and what type of 
NGOs experience more fluctuations in their revenue by exploring the determinants of 
financial vulnerability and the differences between different types of NGOs. The chapter is 
mainly based on the work of Greenlee and Trussel (2000) and Tuckman and Chang (1991). It 
attempts to measure financial vulnerability by analysing determinants of financial 
vulnerability of NGOs in a developing country context. This chapter expands the existing 
literature on the topic by including additional variables that are more appropriate to the 
context of developing countries. It also explores differences between donor-funded NGOs 
and community-funded NGOs, based on the premise that these divergent funding models are 
associated with different sets of risks and vulnerabilities. 
Chapter 3 builds on the preceding chapter and the literature related to strategies that help 
NGOs to deal with financial vulnerability. It addresses the question of what features and 
conditions can mitigate the impact of a decrease in revenue on NGO programmes by 
examining patterns of revenue fluctuations and organisational features, and the conditions 
that are positively associated with the maintenance of programme expenditure (i.e. that can 
prevent the negative impact of a reduction in revenue on the work of NGOs). In this chapter it 
is assumed that as a result of a large decrease of revenue as a proxy of financial vulnerability, 
NGOs are forced to decrease their programme expenditure.  
Chapter 4 investigates answers to questions related to how NGOs respond to financial 
uncertainty, to what extent the use of specific strategies mitigates the impact of financial 
vulnerability on the organisation and its programmes, and how NGOs protect themselves 
against future financial risks. It draws on the findings from the previous chapters and 
interviews with Ugandan practitioners. From the field work it became evident that there are 
broader issues about the financing of NGOs and strategies that can be more effectively 
implemented than may be derived from the existing literature. This chapter focuses on 
understanding the environmental context and financial vulnerability of the NGO sector and 
makes sense of the experiences of Ugandan NGOs. Specifically, it explores the sources of 
financial difficulties to understand in depth the actual impact of financial problems on NGO 
operations, and examines possible and effective strategies to deal with financial vulnerability. 
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This chapter also provides valuable insights into the new funding trends and the current 
challenges for NGO sustainability in developing countries.  
Figure 1.7.1 below presents a diagrammatic roadmap of the whole research project. It serves 
as a summary of the contents of each chapter and illustrates the logic of the layout of the 
chapters. 
Figure 1.7.1: Diagrammatic roadmap of the research 
 
1.8. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
In this section, the methodology used to accomplish the research purpose is addressed. The 
research applies both quantitative (Chapters 2 and 3) and qualitative (Chapter 4) analysis in 
order to strengthen and check the results obtained.  
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In Chapter 2 a Linear Probability Model is applied. It uses a panel data set of 295 NGOs in 
Uganda surveyed in 2000 and 2001 and in 2006 and 2007.
4
 The questionnaires in both studies 
included the same questions about organisational assets, revenue, expenditure, networks and 
leadership characteristics, governance, activities, funding sources, target groups, staff, grants 
and donor requirements.  
In Chapter 3, the conditions that might help NGO managers to make decisions in order to 
mitigate the impact of financial vulnerability were analysed. The sample used in the previous 
chapter was narrowed down from 295 NGOs down to 22 NGOs, which were selected based 
on their experience of a reduction in their revenues between 2000 and 2001. Qualitative 
comparative analysis (QCA) was used to identify the conditions present that related to the 
ability of NGOs to maintain programme expenditure. The method is based on the assumption 
that the ability of an NGO to safeguard programme expenditures when faced with a decrease 
in revenue, can have different explanations depending on the existence (or absence) of 
specific conditions.  
The analysis of the secondary data was supplemented with interviews with Ugandan NGO 
managers in 2016. The purpose of the field work was, firstly, to gain a deeper understanding 
of the differences encountered in relation to the findings of Chapter 2 and 3 and related 
literature and to address some of the data limitations (e.g. actual reasons for the decrease in 
revenue and consequently the actual impact on the programme delivery); and secondly, to 
gain deeper insight into the current financial strategies of NGOs and to what extent they can 
be implemented in a developing country such as Uganda. Thirty-five in-depth interviews 
were conducted with a sample of Ugandan NGO practitioners. The sample for this study was 
obtained in two ways. A core sample of 15 NGOs was purposively selected from the panel 
survey used in Chapters 2 and 3 based on the criterion that they have experienced a big 
reduction in their revenue. The sample was then expanded through referrals, i.e. snowball 
sampling, by the initial participating NGOs to other NGOs that could make valuable 
contributions. The contributions of the participants’ NGOs and the identification of specific 
                                                             
4 In the 2008 survey (including 2006 and 2007) the researchers interviewed the NGOs that were surveyed in the 
first wave (during 2000 and 2001). They were very precise in classifying each organisation and noting actual 
changes to their structures, finances and activities. 
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conditions or combinations of conditions were fed into the subsequent Chapter 4 on the 
strategies that can be successfully implemented to protect against financial vulnerability. 
In Chapter 4, practitioner interviews and thematic content analysis (Creswell, 2013) were 
used. This method is particularly suitable because of the lack of reliable secondary data and 
since existing theories do not entirely apply to NGOs in developing countries, because they 
are focused more on NGOs in developed countries.  
Finally, Chapter 5 offers a conclusion by consolidating the main research findings from each 
of the previous chapters and relating them to the existing literature. Based on the conclusions, 
the chapter offers recommendations for practice. The chapter also acknowledges the 
limitations of the research and the factors that limited the methodology used. Finally, it 
outlines the importance of the research to practice. 
1.9. BACKGROUND: THE UGANDAN NGO SECTOR 
Any NGO operates within a context; this is relevant to be able to understand the specific 
situation of the Ugandan NGOs and the way in which they operate. It is also important to 
identify the variables that will help to strengthen the performance of NGOs to enable them to 
meet their mission in a sustainable way.  
The subsequent chapters should be understood in the light of the context outlined below.  
1.9.1.  Country context 
1.9.1.1. Political environment  
Uganda became a multiparty democracy after 2005. This created an opportunity for NGOs 
whose activities focused on advocacy and human rights. It also enabled a more diverse sector 
because the state no longer regards NGOs as a political threat, since political opposition in 
the form of several political parties was now considered legitimate. In addition, the NGO Act 
2016
5
 protects legitimate NGO activity that contributes towards the strengthening of the 
political process and democratisation by promoting civic education, human rights protection 
and lobbying related to policy and other public issues, particularly those which concerns 
neglected groups.  
                                                             
5 Available from: https://www.ulii.org/node/25931. 
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NGOs generally work quite closely with the Ugandan government or its agencies. Some 
policy documents, such as the National Development Plan (NDPI from 2010/11–2014/15 and 
NDPII 2015/16–2019/20) and the Karamoja Integrated Development Program (2005–2008), 
acknowledge the important contribution of NGOs to socio-economic development. This is 
reflected in the NGO policy (2010), whose main purpose is to provide a framework under 
which the government and NGOs work together to promote service delivery, advocacy and 
empowerment. Despite the fact that the Ugandan government recognises NGOs as important 
delivery mechanisms of services, cases of state funding of sub-contractors under the Public-
Private Partnership initiative remain rare.  
Three key political situations that affected the financial sustainability of Ugandan NGOs 
during the period 2000 to 2016 were: firstly, the Anti-Homosexuality Bill that was signed 
into law by the Parliament of Uganda in December 2013
6
 which negatively affected 
contributions towards human rights initiatives; secondly, the elections in 2011 and 2016, 
which shifted donor priorities towards NGOs that focused on advocacy and civic education in 
order to ensure fair and transparent elections (USAID, 2011; USAID, 2015); and thirdly, the 
reality that Uganda is the largest host country for refugees in Africa (the third largest in the 
world), receiving on average 2,000 displaced people per day in 2016, mainly from South 
Sudan (Mail & Guardian, 2017
7
). The country provides emergency relief and other services 
such as education and health for which it receives funding from more than 50 aid donors. The 
flow of refugees is likely to continue to increase, as is the funding for emergency relief. 
1.9.1.2. Economic and demographic environment 
According to the World Bank and the Government of Uganda (2015), the Ugandan economy 
grew at an average of 7 percent per year from 2000 to 2010. After that the GDP growth rate 
was 3.3 percent in 2013/14, 5 percent in 2014/15 and 4.6 percent in 2015/16 (according to the 
same memorandum). This was the result of a stable macroeconomic environment, high export 
growth, high foreign direct investment and increased private investment. However, according 
                                                             
6
 It was recalled by the Constitutional Court in 2014. 
7 Available from: https://mg.co.za/article/2017-06-20-crisis-and-hope-in-uganda. 
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to the World Bank’s classification for 2016, Uganda is still a low-income economy with GNI 
per capita (PPP) of $1.82 in 2016.
8
 
This relatively strong economic growth performance was accompanied by a decline in 
poverty rates (from 64.1 percent in 2000 to 41.5 percent in 2010 and 34.6 in 2015), using the 
international poverty line of $1.90 per day (2011 PPP)) (World Bank, 2015). Although the 
proportion of the population living below the poverty level declined, the absolute numbers 
increased as a result of the larger population size. In addition, income inequalities increased, 
with the Gini coefficient rising from 0.37 in 1992/3 to 0.43 in 2009/10 and 0.4 in 2012/13 
(UBOS, 2013),
9
 especially in urban areas.  
Uganda’s economic structure has changed over the past three decades, with a gradual shift 
from the agriculture sector to the manufacturing and services sector. Coffee and cotton are 
the main export products, accounting for almost 40 percent of total exports, followed by 
manufactured products (24 percent). The country is about to become an oil-producing 
country, which is expected to have a positive impact on the country’s fiscal performance and 
socio-economic development, as a result of which the country will attract foreign direct 
investment towards infrastructure development (World Bank and the Government of Uganda, 
2015). 
This economic growth has not been able to absorb the growing labour force.
10
 
Unemployment among the youth stood at more than 60 percent in Uganda in 2015. 
According to a study undertaken by Action Aid Uganda (AAU), the Ugandan NGO National 
NGO Forum and Development Research Training (DRT) entitled “Lost Opportunities” 
(2013), the main causes of this were low levels of employable skills,
11
 a conservative and 
risk-averse financial sector, which limits the opportunities for youths to access to financial 
                                                             
8 Available from: 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/Views/Reports/ReportWidgetCustom.aspx?Report_Name=CountryProfile&
Id=b450fd57&tbar=y&dd=y&inf=n&zm=n&country=UGA. 
9 Available from: http://www.ubos.org/publications/statistical-abstract/. 
10 Activists from civil society have pointed at the cultural issues created by the neoliberal economic reforms in 
the 1990s and early 2000s from the IMF and the World Bank that favoured the multinational and large business 
corporations, while negatively affecting small enterprises and the participation of young people. 
11 The state of Uganda population report of 2014 refers to the educational system as being a provider of job 
seekers rather than job creators, because academic qualifications (i.e. passing exams and acquiring certificates) 
do not necessarily mean the individual has learned skills to be employed. Available from: 
http://npcsec.go.ug/resources/reports/.  
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resources, and cultural attitudes such as gender discrimination. Such trends resulted in an 
educated and young labour force that was unemployed and prone to becoming vulnerable to 
marginalisation, crime and delinquency.  
The demographic profile of the Ugandan population is characterised by a high fertility rate, 
high child and youth dependency (under 15 years old), and a young unemployed population 
(between 15–34 years). The high fertility rate together with a decline in the mortality rate12 
translates into a scenario whereby the country has the youngest and most rapidly growing 
population in the world, increasing at a rate of 3.3 percent (World Bank, 2011).
13
 The fertility 
rate is high because of cultural traditions (widow inheritance and reluctance to use 
contraception), early child-bearing, marriage at a young age, and high school dropout rates 
for the girls, especially in rural areas. 
Despite the rapid economic growth, the country’s population remains poor, with increased 
social and economic inequality. The vulnerability of the employment situation of young 
people poses enormous challenges to social development as well as to the role of NGOs in 
this regard.  
1.9.2. Developments in the Ugandan NGO sector  
1.9.2.1. Evolution and structure of the Ugandan NGO sector 
The Ugandan nonprofit sector is relatively large and active in comparison to that of other 
developing countries because of the country’s deep tradition of communal activity. Since 
colonial times Catholic and Protestant missionaries have been well established and they have 
provided services such as schools and hospitals. Muslim communities also started their own 
development projects after many Indians moved to East Africa (Salamon & Sokolowski, 
2003). The sector expanded most rapidly from late 1980s upon a return to political stability 
under the new regime of Yoweri Museveni, after the despotic military government of Idi 
Amin (Nyangabyaki et al., 2004).  
                                                             
12 The decrease in the mortality rate is an aspect of the decrease in the infant and child mortality rates.  
13 Available from: 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/Views/Reports/ReportWidgetCustom.aspx?Report_Name=CountryProfile&
Id=b450fd57&tbar=y&dd=y&inf=n&zm=n&country=UGA. 
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NGOs grew rapidly in terms of numbers and as important role players in service delivery and 
advocates for policy change (Dicklich, 1998). Until 2007 the country was faced with a rising 
HIV/AIDS pandemic, which attracted large amounts of international funding (Wallace et al., 
2006, p. 79). The sector also grew as the country adopted structural adjustment programmes, 
which resulted in a reduction of public spending and in the employment of public sector 
employees, as a result of which people decided to move to the nonprofit sector.
14
 The 
increase in the number of NGOs was partially a consequence of corruption that affected 
public service delivery, the desire to reduce poverty and concerns about national governance 
(Wallace et al., 2004; Wallace et al., 2006, p. 25). A large increase of aid in response to 
positive political changes in recipient countries, such as the end of dictatorial regimes, was a 
common occurrence. The period from the 1980s to 2007 was marked by a relaxed approach 
from donors, where many local NGOs were formed to take advantage of available funding 
(USAID, 2009). However, the new local NGOs were inexperienced and lacked capacity. 
According to a USAID report (2009), there were approximately 200 NGOs in 1986, while 
8,385 NGOs were registered in 2009, which reflected a dramatic expansion.
15
  
Since 2008 the sector has witnessed a tremendous change in the relationship between donors 
and local NGOs. The competition for funding increased steadily as the mechanisms of 
financial support became more stringent as a consequence of the global financial economic 
crisis and changes in donor funding mechanisms – for example, the creation of a basket of 
funds usually made available by a consortium of donors for specific purposes and the 
reluctance to support organisational capacity (USAID, 2009; Wallace et al., 2006). According 
to the latest USAID Sustainability Index (2015), approximately 13,000 NGOs were registered 
in Uganda at the end of 2015, i.e. an increase of 55 percent between 2009 and 2015.
16
 
The sector was initially dominated by international organisations driven by traditional service 
delivery and humanitarian interests, supporting ‘civil society’ through capacity building and 
                                                             
14 For instance, considerably more aid was provided to Mozambique at the end of its civil war (mid-1990s) 
(Bulíř & Hamann, 2003). 
15 According to USAID (2015), the statistics are underestimated as less than 30 percent of NGOs were 
registered. 
16 The figures may not capture the real number of organisations operating in the country, as some of them work 
without registering. According to Makara (2000), the registration process under the NGO Registration Act Cap 
113 is difficult and onerous. 
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disseminating religiously focused ideas (Cannon, 1996; Wallace et al., 2004; Barr, 
Fafchamps & Owens, 2005). NGOs have, however, increasingly expanded their roles to 
advocacy and awareness activities, facilitating processes to engender more responsible 
government action to deliver services and check whether policies are being implemented, and 
protection of the environment (Wallace et al., 2006).  
According to the NGO Forum (2017), which assessed the current state of the nonprofit sector 
in Uganda, the majority of NGOs are Ugandan origin (52 percent of NGOs are national and 
35 percent are district networks), while only 2.4 percent are international organisations. More 
than 85 percent of the organisations are registered with the NGO Board. Most of the 
organisations are involved in service delivery, such as children and youth services (60 
percent), education (56 percent), health (44 percent), agriculture and rural livelihoods (42 
percent), water and sanitation (35 percent), women empowerment (51 percent), and half are 
engaged in advocacy work (50 percent).  
The majority of NGOs in Uganda are small community-based operators (NGO Policy, 2010). 
NGOs are mostly local and concentrated in the Central and Southern regions (including 
Kampala): about a quarter work in the Eastern region, a fifth in the Western region and the 
rest operate in the North, which is Uganda’s poorest region (Wallace et al., 2004; Burger & 
Owens, 2008). The Northern and Eastern areas have been politically more unstable and the 
dire humanitarian concerns of these regions have prompted the influx of international and 
better-resourced NGOs, which involve themselves in post-conflict rehabilitation and poverty 
eradication through agricultural, health and educational programmes. The Central and 
Southern regions have attracted a greater range of interventions from more diverse local 
NGOs. These organisations operate more fully in community development, lobbying and 
advocacy, focusing on local-level human rights issues, government transparency and public 
debt relief (Wallace et al., 2004). 
NGOs in Uganda can be distinguished from those of other African countries for their high 
level of activity, the close relationship between CBOs and local communities, and the 
increased initiatives that have resulted in the formation of networks or umbrella organisations 
(e.g. Uganda NGO Forum, Uganda National Association of AIDS Service Organisations 
(UNASO), and Development Network of Indigenous Voluntary Associations (DENIVA)) 
that facilitate NGOs’ work (e.g. training and providing support service) (USAID, 2015). 
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1.9.2.2. Funding structure and funding trends 
Regarding funding structure, more than 25 percent of NGOs receive less than 3,000 US 
dollars and only 7 percent receive more than 3 million US dollars per year (NGO Forum, 
2017). The Ugandan NGO sector is also characterised by a high concentration of funding 
among a few NGOs and little funding for the majority of NGOs (Barr, Fafchamps & Owens, 
2005). International NGOs and bilateral donors are the primary source of NGO funds, and 
account for more than 90 percent of sectoral revenue (USAID, 2013). Funding for local 
NGOs is limited and comes from membership fees and subscriptions fees, donations and 
government support (Wallace et al., 2006, p. 78). 
The heavy reliance on donor funding renders NGOs financially vulnerable, which leads them 
to seek other source of funding, such as income from business activities
17
. However, the 
fraction of revenue from business activities is relatively small when compared to the situation 
in other countries. Regarding government contributions, it is very rare that organisations 
receive funding from the Ugandan government either through sub-contracts or other types of 
partnerships. The most common situation is complementary support, such as the use of health 
and education facilities for activities. The remaining funds come from membership 
contributions and annual subscriptions (NGO Forum, 2017).  
Donor funding to Ugandan NGOs has decreased as a consequence of the global financial 
crisis in 2008 and changes to development policies of donors (Wallace et al., 2006, p. 80; 
USAID, 2010; USAID, 2011). Another reason for the decrease of funding to Ugandan NGOs 
was the restored peace in the Northern region that shifted funding for humanitarian relief 
towards other countries. However, support from the international community is expected to 
slowly increase, because the country is receiving a mass influx of refugees from South 
Sudan.
18
 The manner in which international donors dispense funds to NGOs also changed; 
they moved away from supporting NGOs directly to creating a basket of multi-donor funds 
(e.g. Democratic Governance Facility and Civil Society Fund), where NGOs have to join a 
consortium to apply (Wallace et al., 2006, p. 80). Another requirement relates to the matching 
                                                             
17 Uganda National NGO Forum (2013). Available from: http://ngoforum.or.ug/wp-
content/uploads/downloads/2014/01/Final-Capacity-Development-Report-submitted-by-HURINET.pdf. 
18 New Vision (July 12, 2017). Available from: http://www.newvision.co.ug/new_vision/news/1449103/uganda-
ranks-refugee-hosting-nations-world. 
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funding principle, according to which NGOs have to match the funding of the donor by 
contributing pro rata to the project. Increased competition within the sector because of the 
decrease in the number of donors (as a result of the basket of funding), together with the 
establishment of a minimum contribution of the matching grant, are especially harmful for 
the majority of small and local NGOs with weak capacity in terms of resources (financial and 
non-financial). As a result, funding reaches only a small number of larger organisations 
(USAID, 2014).  
However, it is worth noting that because of the constraints of the current funding 
mechanisms, the Ugandan NGOs have been particularly successful in comparison to other 
African countries in exploring new and creative ways of generating revenue, including 
income-generating activities. These initiatives have contributed to their financial viability by 
covering part of the operational costs (USAID, 2014). In addition, a larger number of NGOs 
rely on volunteers and part-time staff as they are unable to pay competitive salaries. Thus, the 
sector suffers from high staff turnover (USAID, 2010).  
1.9.3. Legal environment and self-regulation  
There is legislation, stipulating specific requirements, to regulate the sector. It confers legal 
existence on NGOs in Uganda and thereby facilitates NGOs to engage with other 
development players. The NGO legislation also provides for government oversight and 
support to the NGOs and CBOs via the NGO Registration Board that operates under the 
auspices of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
19
  
Finally, the NGO Act (as amended in 2006) also governs the NGO sector. It is important to 
note regulation 13, which states that “an organisation shall (…) not make any direct contact 
with the people in their area of operation in Uganda unless it has given seven days’ notice in 
writing of its intention to the local councils and Resident District Commissioners of the area”; 
in other words, NGOs have to give seven days’ notice to the government officials before 
                                                             
19 There has been a long debate around the location of NGO Board in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, whose 
mandate is specific and has little to do with NGO sector. For further information consult NGO Memorandum for 
the Review of the NGO Act CAP 113 (as amended in 2006). 
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accessing communities.
20
 Moreover, the operational scope for NGOs remains subject to 
government discretion.  
The registration process entails multiple endorsement stages and multiple requirements, 
which makes it extremely laborious and bureaucratic; letters and approvals are required from 
Local Council (LC) I, II and III, from the Resident District Commissioner (RDC) and 
sometimes from the District Internal Security Office (DISO). In addition, applicants have to 
provide letters from sureties, a constitution and work plan, among other things. 
Notwithstanding this, the NGO Board has been incapable of monitoring the growing NGO 
sector because of inadequate staff and finances.  
The NGO Act requires all NGOs to submit annual returns (including audit reports) to the 
NGO Registration Board, among other reporting requirements to a wide range of bodies at 
the national and sub-national level. This has been a challenge, because of the low capacity of 
some NGOs and of the NGO Board to verify and make use of these reports. INGOs face 
another challenge regarding access to funding locally through district government. The 
government requires INGOs to disclose information about programmes and declare their 
revenues, while local NGOs are only required to mobilise local resources in future (Wallace 
et al., 2006, p. 81). 
With regard to tax benefits, not all NGOs qualify for tax exemptions, which are in any case 
difficult to access i.e. the exemptions are difficult to gain because of the large number of 
bureaucratic procedures. Moreover, there is no tax benefit to individuals and the corporate 
sector through the corporate social responsibility requirement that would incentivise private 
companies and the public in general to remit a certain percentage of their revenue to charity, 
or to organisations that would support the work of NGOs. NGOs are generally allowed to 
engage in any legitimate fundraising activity including campaigns, fundraising events and 
financial investments.  
                                                             
20 Currently under NGO Act 2016, section 44 states that “an organisation shall not carry out activities in any 
part of the country, unless it has received the approval of the DNMC and Local Government of that area and has 
signed a memorandum of understanding with the Local Government to that effect” but, in addition also has “a 
memorandum of understanding with its donors, sponsors, affiliates, local and foreign partners, if any, specifying 
the terms and conditions of ownership, employment, resources mobilised for the organisation and any other 
relevant matter.” 
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There is a self-regulating instrument, the NGO Quality Assurance Certification Mechanism 
(QuAM), launched in 2006, that is intended to promote accountability and transparency 
among NGOs. It provides generally accepted ethical standards and operational norms such as 
policies and procedures for good internal governance of NGOs. Through their certification, 
NGOs seek to improve their internal governance and capacity, and to enhance their 
credibility among constituents, donors and government. Organisations are increasingly 
prepared (USAID, 2014, p. 184) to adhere to QuAM on a voluntary basis to demonstrate their 
capacity, legitimacy and integrity.  
According to Africa NGO Sustainability Index, 2015,
21
 the main challenges faced by NGOs 
to achieve sustainability are: i) the financial viability of the sector; ii) the legal environment; 
and iii) weak infrastructural support to the NGO sector. In practice, the NGO sector remains 
heavily dependent on external funding, with some of them relying on foreign donors for more 
than 95 percent of total revenue (NGO Memorandum, 2012; Uganda National NGO Forum, 
2013; Wallace et al., 2006). The Ugandan NGOs still show weak organisational capacity as a 
result of their low financial viability, especially to attract and retain qualified staff.
22
 In 
addition, many Ugandan NGOs, especially small organisations, do not maintain proper 
accounts or have audited financial statements because of a lack of funding and a poor 
understanding of proper financial management principles by staff and auditors.  
1.10. SPECIAL NOTE: RESEARCH PUBLICATIONS AND 
PRESENTATIONS AT CONFERENCES AND SEMINARS 
By the time of writing this dissertation, each of the components (i.e. chapters) of the work 
contained herein has been presented at conferences and seminars, and as such the work has 
benefited from informal peer review and feedback. The papers were presented and written by 
me but I included my supervisor as a co-author in the first working paper.  
Chapter 2 was presented as a paper entitled “Financial Vulnerability an empirical study of 
Ugandan NGOs” at the 5th CIRIEC International Research Conference on Social Economy in 
                                                             
21 
Available from: https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866/2015_Africa_CSOSI.pdf.  
22
 Uganda National NGO Forum (2013). Available from: http://ngoforum.or.ug/wp-
content/uploads/downloads/2014/01/Final-Capacity-Development-Report-submitted-by-HURINET.pdf.  
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2015. The paper is a published working paper with Ronelle Burger, in CIRIEC’s series of 
working paper (no. 2015/15).
23
 
Chapter 3 was presented as a paper entitled “Examining how Ugandan NGOs respond to a 
reduction in revenue”, at the International Society for Third-Sector Research (ISTR) PhD 
Seminar, at ERSTA SÖNDAL University College (Sweden), in 2016. The main purpose of 
this presentation was to receive methodological advice in order to analyse the available data.  
Chapter 4 was presented as a paper entitled “Looking back, looking forward: lessons learnt 
from Ugandan NGOs” at the following conferences during 2017: 
- Conference of the Association for Research on Civil Society in Africa (AROCSA) in 
Johannesburg; 
- Biennial Conference of the Economic Society of South Africa (ESSA) in 
Grahamstown; and 
- Global Development Finance Conference provided by Africa Growth Institute in 
Cape Town. 
  
                                                             
23 Available from: http://www.ciriec.ulg.ac.be/en/publications/wp/.  
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CHAPTER 2  
FINANCIAL VULNERABILITY: AN EMPIRICAL 
STUDY OF UGANDAN NGOs
24
 
Abstract 
Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) pursue wide-ranging and very diverse projects and 
they have become more vital than ever for developing countries. They raise public awareness 
of human rights, promote the development of democratic institutions and seek to improve the 
well-being of communities by being increasingly engaged in different aspects of socio-
economic development, such as health and education.  
However, most local NGOs are dependent upon their external environment, especially the 
financial resource environment. The financial situation of most organisations is negatively 
affected by constraints to credit, and their inability to raise their own capital and to engage in 
profit-making activities, which renders them financially vulnerable. The more financially 
vulnerable an NGO is, the more difficult it is to pursue long- and medium-term organisational 
commitments and goals. This may even result in decreased, interrupted or terminated 
programmes.  
This study adapts the methodologies that have previously been used for developed countries 
to predict financial vulnerability in developing countries. It contributes to the body of 
empirical literature on development finance by investigating alternative proxies to assess the 
financial vulnerability of the NGO sector, including donor conditions, endowments 
(investment funds or equity) and savings. It adopts an empirical approach and examines a 
selection of studies on the financial vulnerability of NGOs, using data from 295 NGOs in 
Uganda to explore the possible relationship between organisational characteristics and 
financial vulnerability. 
The study confirms the results of previous studies. The analysis shows that revenue 
concentration and the presence of assets are significant correlates of financial vulnerability.  
                                                             
24 This chapter is an adapted version of a published working paper, Silva, B. & Burger, R. (2015). “Financial 
vulnerability: an empirical study of Ugandan NGOs”. CIRIEC-Université de Liège, Working paper (WP15/15). 
Available from: http://www.ciriec.ulg.ac.be/en/publications/wp/. 
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2.1.  INTRODUCTION 
The objectives of NGOs, particularly in developing countries, are wide ranging and very 
diverse, but most pursue long-term goals that seek to improve the well-being of communities, 
such as the delivery of social goods (e.g. health and education). They promote the 
development of democratic institutions through awareness training and advocacy work. They 
place issues of human rights and poverty alleviation on the global agenda and put pressure on 
nation states to take appropriate action. Therefore, NGOs are widely recognised for their 
contribution to development initiatives and poverty reduction, especially in the poorest 
countries of the world and in fragile states where government capacity is often very weak.  
However, the NGO sector in general suffers from high volatility
25
 and uncertainty of income 
flows, which exposes it to financial vulnerability. This is important since it may constrain 
organisations from achieving organisational goals, such as strengthening the capacity of 
community health services and other community institutions, enhancing food security in rural 
communities and promoting gender equality. This is a concern for all relevant stakeholders of 
NGOs (donors, governments and individuals) as it can force them to scale down or even 
interrupt the provision of programme services during times of financial distress. This 
situation is aggravated by the inadequate buffering of NGOs against financial difficulties as a 
result of their difficulty in gaining access to credit, their inability to raise capital and to 
engage in profit-making activities.  
Most of the literature on financial vulnerability and the related assessment of financial risk 
tends to focus on the for-profit sector. Studies have found a statistically significant 
relationship between financial distress and some accounting indicators, as well as between 
financial distress and organisational size. In a similar way, this study addresses NGOs’ 
susceptibility to financial vulnerability from an internal perspective by examining internal 
factors that are associated with vulnerability and may help to anticipate distress. Specifically, 
it addresses the question of what are the factors correlated with financial vulnerability of 
NGOs in developing countries and how the significance of correlates may vary across types 
of NGOs. 
                                                             
25 Financial volatility refers to the degree of variation of income over time. The concept is associated with the 
unstable nature of funding flows.  
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It contributes to the literature on development finance by specifically focusing on NGOs in 
developing countries and it expands the set of indicators that can be considered to assess 
financial vulnerability by incorporating the unique attributes of the NGO sector in developing 
countries. It proposes that in addition to the standard measures used for developed country 
analysis, the set of indicators in the case of developing countries should be expanded to 
include rigid institutional arrangements that inhibit NGO flexibility, such as donor conditions 
(e.g. time frame of expenditures), the existence of physical assets (e.g. land and buildings) 
and access to financial services. It compares the flexibility of different sources of NGO 
income and explores the relationship between vulnerability and organisational characteristics, 
including size, asset holdings and donor conditions.  
The study is based on the work of Greenlee and Trussel (2000) and Tuckman and Chang 
(1991). It employs accounting ratios indicated in Tuckman and Chang (1991) to consider the 
likelihood of financial distress, but also draws upon the expanded analyses in Trussel and 
Greenlee (2004) and Trussel (2002) in which they include additional control variables, such 
as organisational size, sector and debt ratio in recognition of organisational heterogeneity.  
Using panel data collected from Uganda’s NGO sector in 2002 and in 2008, this chapter 
applies a Linear Probability Model to predict financial vulnerability. It distinguishes between 
donor-funded and community-funded NGOs, based on the premise that these divergent 
funding models are associated with different sets of risks and vulnerabilities. The model 
relies on accounting ratios and institutional features, such as the possession of assets, budget 
flexibility and dependence on external sources of finance. 
The chapter is structured as follows: Section 2.2 presents an overview of relevant literature; 
Section 2.3 describes the data and methodology and gives an outline of the empirical 
approach; Sections 2.4 and 2.5 present the descriptive and econometric analysis respectively, 
while Section 2.6 offers a conclusion.  
2.2.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
The aim of the review is to gain insight into the factors that cause NGOs to be financially 
vulnerable. It relies mainly on relevant studies that used datasets from developed countries, 
particularly from the National Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS) (USA). Greenlee and 
Trussel (2000) considered a sample of approximately 7,000 NGOs (for the period 1992 to 
1995) from the IRS Statistics of Income dataset. Trussel (2002) used the IRS Core Files 
database and considered a sample of 94,000 NGOs for the period 1997–1999. Keating, 
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Fisher, Gordon and Greenlee (2005) cover approximately 290,000 organisations during the 
period of economic contraction 1998–2000.  
2.2.1.  Defining financial vulnerability 
Previous studies have used multiple measures of financial vulnerability, and have considered 
different cut-off percentages or periods. Tuckman and Chang
26
 (1991) defined financial 
vulnerability as the probability that an organisation would “cut back its service offerings 
immediately” for three consecutive years when it faces adverse economic conditions or when 
donors interrupt funding. Greenlee and Trussel (2000) viewed NGOs as financially 
vulnerable if they had a reduction in programme expenses (as a proportion of total revenues) 
during three consecutive years. Keating et al. (2005) considered a drop larger than 25 percent 
in programme expenses in a year. Later, Andrés-Alonso et al. (2015) used 20 percent 
reduction in programme expenditure over three years. Other studies on NGOs have adopted a 
definition of financial vulnerability as a decrease in the equity balance as a proportion of total 
revenue. Some authors considered a decrease of 20 percent in net assets over 3 years (Trussel 
& Greenlee, 2004; Trussel, 2002; Andrés-Alonso et al., 2015), while others used a cut-off of 
25 percent reduction in net assets in a year (Keating, Fisher, Gordon & Greenlee, 2005). 
Trussel and Greenlee (2004) used a cut-off of 50 percent reduction in net assets over three 
years. Another common measure in the literature is the reduction in total revenues. Keating et 
al. (2005) considered a decrease in total revenue larger than 25 percent in a year as an 
indicator of vulnerability.  
2.2.2.  Factors related to financial vulnerability 
Financial vulnerability of an NGO is caused by external as well as internal factors. External 
factors relate to economic shocks, cutting off of donor funds and delays in the receipt of 
funds
27
 (factors which may be interrelated). Many organisations, irrespective of size, face 
problems to obtain funds as predicted and need to change their plans of action or use 
alternative financial sources to cover expenditure. Bulíř and Hamann (2003) claim that 
uncertainty about aid disbursement, even when donors are generally committed, is high. The 
                                                             
26 Also adopted by Greenlee and Trussel (2000).  
27 The kinds of economic shocks that can affect the revenue of NGOs are: a decrease of amount donated by the 
corporate sector and the general public (as their own incomes decline during adverse economic conditions); a 
reduction of NGOs’ endowment portfolios; and a decrease in government budget funds. 
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authors also examined the causes of financial aid volatility in relation to aid dependency, 
considering each category of aid, and concluded that the relative volatility of aid flow 
increases with the degree of aid dependency. This is in line with a recent study by Prentice 
(2016) in which the author highlighted the importance of considering environmental variables 
such as household income when assessing financial vulnerability of NGOs in addition to 
organisation specific financial measures (intra-organisation factors). While such a wider lens 
is useful and commendable, the required data for such an analysis is not available. The 
analysis of environmental context as a relevant influence in the study of financial 
vulnerability will be explored in Chapter 4 using a qualitative approach. Additionally, it can 
be argued that while environmental factors should be taken into account for strategic 
planning, NGOs should focus most of their energy on internal and controllable factors to 
have a more sustainable financial position. Organisational characteristics, such as access to 
alternative sources of funds and years of experience, can reduce the impact of financial stress.  
The general objective of the study was therefore limited to ascertaining the factors resulting 
in financial vulnerability within NGOs. Specifically, it sought to identify and examine the 
factors that affect the financial sustainability and stability of NGOs in Uganda.  
2.2.2.1. Instability of revenue streams 
As previously mentioned, NGOs are dependent on their external environment, especially to 
finance required for project expenditures (Nunnenkamp, Öhler & Schwörer, 2013). In 
general, they rely on a variety of funding sources: grants and contracts from governments, 
international and philanthropic agencies; and donations from private donors and corporations. 
Unlike the profit sector, NGOs may find it difficult to raise the required finance. As there are 
no private owners, they do not have access to equity capital (Rose-Ackerman, 1986; 
Bowman, 2002). However, NGOs can generate (equity) funds from charitable contributions 
(Froelich, 1999; Gentry 2002). Debt finance is also limited because NGOs possess fewer 
assets to provide as collateral (Rose-Ackerman, 1986). 
The financial structure of an NGO is related to its sources of funds and determines its risk 
profile, which might affect its capacity and management of programmes. Yan, Denison and 
Butler (2009, p. 48) confirmed that the financial structure of NGOs “plays a crucial role in 
their sustainability and development”. Froelich (1999) advocated for an optimal combination 
of revenue sources to minimise financial risk (i.e. uncertainty in terms of the expected 
amount and time of receiving those funds). This is in accordance with the financial portfolio 
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theory, relating to the selection of the best portfolio combination of funding sources, with 
different degrees of volatility (Carroll & Stater, 2009; Anheier & Ben-Ner, 2003, p. 293). 
Chang and Tuckman (1994) and more recently Carroll and Stater (2009) confirmed this 
result, showing that NGOs are able to decrease revenue volatility and hence their financial 
vulnerability through portfolio diversification.  
The resource dependence theory highlights this concern about relying on only a few revenue 
sources. Organisations are accordingly encouraged to reduce their funding dependence on 
only a few sources and so reduce the risk associated with uncertainty of funding by 
diversifying their revenue base (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Chang & Tuckman, 1994). In 
similar vein, Bulíř and Hamann (2003) examined financial aid volatility and aid dependency, 
and concluded that the relative volatility of aid flows increases with the degree of aid 
dependence. Foster and Fine (2007) support a more moderate view: that an NGO should 
gradually shift from relying on a few sources (or on one single and dominant type of funding 
source, such as government grants) to a greater diversity of funding sources, especially within 
funding sources (e.g. by receiving funds from different levels of government). 
In contrast, Chikoto and Neely (2013) refuted these theories by stating that revenue 
concentration and reliance on a few stable sources of finance enhance growth through 
providing greater financial stability. These studies investigate the variability of four different 
sources of funds: donations from individuals and corporations, grants and contracts from 
agencies
28
 and governments, commercial activities (e.g. selling goods and services, fees for 
programme services), and investment income from endowments. They found that 
organisations that relied on private contributions/donations experience higher average income 
volatility and show higher financial vulnerability resulting from resource dependency (e.g. 
when the main source of funds is commercial activities) (Carroll & Stater, 2009), and that 
organisations that relied on government grants tend to experience greater stability in their 
revenue flows (Froelich, 1999).  
Another way of stabilising revenue streams is through borrowing. Yan, Denison and Butler 
(2009) studied the factors that determine the revenue structure and borrowing decisions of 
                                                             
28 The agencies concept includes international governmental organisations (e.g. World Bank and United 
Nations), foundations (e.g. Ford Foundation) and other national and local nonprofit organisations. 
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NGOs. They claimed that organisations with a low degree of fund concentration, as well as 
those with financial support from governments, are more likely to issue debt. This supports 
the notion that NGOs with more government funding are in a stronger financial position and 
have higher debt capacities to raise long-term loans. Bowman’s (2002) study confirmed that 
well-endowed NGOs issue more debt relative to the value of their physical assets. These 
findings are consistent with the static trade-off theory of capital structure, where managers 
balance the cost of financial distress (including the risk of collapse) and tax savings 
benefits.
29
 In other instances, NGOs can borrow through tax-exempt debt contracts where 
lenders do not pay taxes on interest on loans to NGOs. This benefit is attractive and 
encourages NGOs to use debt as a way to increase the amount of revenue (Boris & Steuerle, 
1999; Gentry, 2002). However, donors may restrict the use of the donated assets as collateral 
(Yan, Denison & Butler, 2009).
30
  
Bowman (2002) also found that community support is negatively related to leverage ratio,
31
 
which shows that donations reduce the need to borrow. Hence, equity financing is preferred 
to debt financing. His findings are consistent with the pecking order theory as organisations 
always prefer to use equity finance sources (such as retained earnings) to borrowing or asset 
conversion (Bowman, 2002).  
2.2.2.2. Flexibility versus conditionality of funds and administration costs 
Different types and sources of funds often differ in terms of donor conditionalities and the 
extent of flexibility in the use of funds. The problem is often not the scarcity of funds or the 
number of sources of funds, but rather the possibility (or not) of re-allocating funds to other 
projects. This relates to the fungibility of funds. Agencies, particularly donors, often impose 
stringent rules and accounting practices (for example, monitoring of budget expenditure and 
reporting standards) because of problems of asymmetric information and associated 
difficulties with assessing the performance and programme effectiveness of NGOs. A factor 
highlighted by Chikoto and Neely (2013) is the level of flexibility from providers as the fund 
                                                             
29 NGOs are often exempt from corporate income tax, property tax, sales and value-added taxes, on either their 
primary activities or their commercial activities, as they assist governments in the provision of social services 
and the delivery of public goods (Anheier & Ben-Ner, 2003).  
30 These studies were unable to separate tax-exempt debt from taxable debt. 
31 The financial leverage is the extent to which a firm relies on debt financing. The more debt an organisation 
has, the less likely it is that the organisation is receiving community funds. 
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balance may be restricted to specific budget lines, limiting management discretion and the 
financial capacity of the organisation. It is particularly important in donor funding, where 
conditionalities are set a priori and often leave little space for modification.
32
 This increases 
not only the administration costs of NGOs by creating a need for more skilled workers and 
leading to greater bureaucratisation (e.g. government funds) (Froelich, 1999), but it increases 
the financial vulnerability of NGOs whenever disbursements are conditional to the fulfilment 
of these requirements (Bulíř & Hamann, 2003; Burger & Owens, 2013). Stiglitz (2002) 
claimed that many conditions, even well-intentioned ones, undermine the central purpose of 
aid. He explained that in several studies of World Bank intervention, the extent of 
conditionalities did not “ensure that money was well spent” (Stiglitz, 2002, p.46) and that 
loans would be repaid. He argued that counterproductive conditions are the reasons for the 
failure of conditionality. 
A measure that can capture the degree of ‘rigidity versus flexibility’ of donor funds could be 
the number and frequency of required reports that the NGO needs to submit to the donor.
33
 
Reporting requirements are linked to the monitoring of budget expenditure and activity plans, 
and whenever there is a discrepancy between the budgeted and actual figures, organisations 
are required to explain the difference. Concentration of revenue sources alone, however, is 
not the main problem. A high concentration of revenue sources together with great flexibility 
in allocating funds may still leave an organisation less financially vulnerable to shocks 
compared to an agency with highly diversified income resources but with rigid donor budget 
and reporting standards. 
The proportion of total expenditure allocated to overheads is another critical donor constraint 
faced by NGOs. Overheads are administrative costs or operational costs and fundraising 
expenses. Donors consider these costs as an indicator of organisational inefficiency and 
prefer to rather fund direct programme activities (Trussel & Parsons, 2007; Tinkelman & 
Mankaney, 2007; Ashley & Faulk, 2010; Nunnenkamp, Öhler & Schwörer, 2013). Tinkelman 
and Mankaney (2007) define these costs as the ‘price’ of output, or the cost of obtaining a 
                                                             
32 Barr, Fafchamps and Owens (2004) mentioned in their study on governance of NGOs in Uganda that the costs 
of monitoring and reporting are onerous and information was either not available or reliable at the time when 
requested. 
33 The level of written reporting is associated with tight budgeting controls and higher level of accountability on 
funds to donors (Ebrahim, 2005).  
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dollar’s worth of the programme output. Nunnenkamp and Öhler (2012) use the terms 
‘efficiency price’ as overheads are regarded as unproductive expenditures. Nunnenkamp, 
Öhler and Schwörer (2013) showed that higher administrative expenditure increases financial 
vulnerability and therefore the probability of non-survival for NGOs, particularly in the case 
of public funding.  
In contrast, other authors (Tuckman & Chang, 1991; Greenlee & Trussel, 2000; Trussel & 
Greenlee, 2004; Trussel, 2002) claimed that the existence of considerable administration 
costs increases financial flexibility, which decreases financial vulnerability. This is possible 
through the reduction of administrative expenses to release funds for programme activities. 
This enables NGOs to continue delivering programme services.  
On the other hand, Chikoto and Neely (2013) argue that these types of costs are important 
drivers of growth in the capacity of NGOs, helping them to comply with donor conditions,
34
 
such as meeting monitoring and reporting requirements.  
If overhead costs are reduced, this can have a negative impact on programme services as their 
main function is to provide supporting and facilitating mechanisms. The impact of cutting 
these costs could even outweigh the decrease of programme expenditure. Szper and Prakash 
(2011) show that pressure to reduce overhead expenditures below a certain threshold “may be 
counterproductive”. Nunnenkamp, Öhler and Schwörer (2013) support the idea of setting 
ceilings as well as floors on these cost ratios.  
The fundraising variable is a proxy for the amount spent to provide information about the 
organisation’s mission and its operations to potential donors (i.e. it reveals the cost of 
generating information) (Trussel & Parsons, 2007). Tinkelman and Mankaney (2007) state 
that this type of cost can have a direct positive impact on donations, as it creates awareness of 
and gives publicity to the work of NGOs. However, it also may have a negative and long-
term indirect impact on the perceived ‘price’ of output. Research on the impact of fundraising 
costs on revenue shows a positive and statistically significant relationship between the growth 
of NGOs (measured as an increase in total revenue) and fundraising expenditures (Chikoto, 
Neely & Gordon, 2013). 
                                                             
34 These conditions are also referred to as “requirements” and “conditionality” (Stiglitz, 2002). 
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2.2.2.3. Accounting variables  
Typically, accounting variables are used to predict the financial vulnerability of an 
organisation, whether for profit or not for profit. The equity ratio is measured by net assets 
divided by total revenue (Tuckman & Chang, 1991; Greenlee & Trussel, 2000) or the total 
liabilities divided by net assets (Ohlson, 1980; Trussel, 2002). The use of such a ratio can 
highlight a potential liquidity problem, because some assets, particularly capital items, cannot 
easily and quickly be converted into liquid funds. Capital items are usually purchased with 
donor funds and, even when they are under the control of NGOs (and depreciated every fiscal 
year), they belong to donors, and only after the completion of projects and with special 
approval can they be disposed of or sold. These items, therefore, do not really serve as a 
resource that NGOs can quickly use to address immediate financial vulnerability. 
Another accounting variable that can predict financial vulnerability is the surplus margin. 
This is calculated as net income (i.e. revenue minus expenditure) divided by total revenue. It 
measures the cash flow position of NGOs. Some authors (Chang & Tuckman, 1994; Greenlee 
& Trussel, 2000; Trussel, 2002) agree that surplus margins (i.e. operational margins) work as 
a buffer against financial vulnerability and are important financial resources to stimulate the 
growth of organisations. However, in the context of NGOs in developing countries, with 
strict budgets and where organisations aim to provide public benefit and maximise social 
welfare rather than profits, surplus margins are not expected to play a significant role.  
Previous studies (Tuckman & Chang, 1991; Greenlee & Trussel, 2000; Trussel & Greenlee, 
2004; Trussel, 2002; Tevel, Katz & Brock, 2015) found that the accounting variables equity 
balance, revenue concentration, surplus margin and administrative costs, are reliably 
associated with financial distress. In a recent study Tevel, Katz and Brock (2015) examined 
the validity of the existing models used by Tuckman and Chang (1991), Ohlson (1980) and 
rating agencies of NGOs, using a sample of performing arts organisations. It was found that 
Tuckman and Chang (1991), who relied on these parameters, provided the best prediction of 
financial vulnerability compared to the others. However, later Keating et al. (2005) compared 
the models used to predict bankruptcy in the business sector (Ohlson, 1980 and Altman, 
1968) with the model used by Tuckman and Chang (1991) to predict financial distress in the 
nonprofit sector and concluded that none of the models can successfully preditct financial 
vulnerability. The explanatory variables were either not statistically significant or were 
characterised by an unexpected predicted signal of estimated coefficient. Therefore, 
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accounting indicators have value and should be taken into consideration, but they also have 
their limitations (Szper & Prakash, 2011).  
Another important limitation of accounting ratios is the institutional space within which 
NGOs operate. Different institutions may interpret the ratios differently. NGOs need to 
negotiate with and report to both state institutions and market institutions with different and 
sometimes conflicting expectations, and they respond and strategically act (i.e. shape their 
performance) in the ways that donors would like in order to manage good relationships 
(Balser & McClusky, 2005; Van Puyvelde, Caers, Du Bois & Jegers, 2012; Nunnenkamp, 
Öhler & Schwörer, 2013).
35
  
2.2.2.4. Size and years of experience 
Intrinsic features of NGOs, such as size (measured by number of employees and volunteers, 
by value of assets or by amount of annual revenue), stage of development (i.e. start up, 
regular operations, growth) and years of experience are other important correlates of financial 
stability (Fafchamps & Owens, 2009; Trussel & Greenlee, 2004; Trussel, 2002).  
The size of an organisation is an institutional factor that reflects its reputation and should be 
considered when analysing levels of financial vulnerability (Trussel & Parsons, 2007). 
Underlying theories are the ‘liability of smallness’ (Hager et al., 1996) and the ‘liability of 
newness’ (Stinchcombe & March 1965). According to the former, small organisations are less 
able to benefit from economies of scale and also lack supportive networks, whilst the latter 
relates to a lack of organisational field experience, established strategies and procedures to 
cope with unexpected situations.  
Empirical evidence supports the abovementioned theories. Cariño (1999) emphasised that 
smaller and less experienced NGOs may receive fewer grants because of their lack of 
information about funding possibilities, less experience in preparing and presenting project 
proposals, or weaker reputations when compared to larger and older NGOs. Ruben and 
Schulpen (2009), in their critical assessment of the allocation of public funding by Dutch 
NGOs, claimed that larger organisations have a higher probability of being selected to receive 
                                                             
35 Cariño (1999) studied the challenges faced by Philippine NGOs, one of which is the funding received from 
government that can limit the independence and autonomy of the recipient organisation. As an example, 
organisations that receive funding from government are unlikely to engage in policy advocacy initiatives to 
secure funding as state the state may regard the organisation as a political threat. 
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funding and are deemed to have better networks and opportunities for partnerships than 
smaller organisations.
36
 Fafchamps and Owens (2009) observed a positive association 
between NGOs that obtain grant funding and duration of the operation. In a recent study 
Burger and Owens (2013) confirmed that larger organisations are likely to have more and 
stronger network connections and stronger reputations. A similar situation was found in the 
case of microfinance institutions (MFIs), where larger organisations were more profitable and 
received better performance rating scores (Beisland, Mersland & Randøy, 2014).  
2.3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY  
2.3.1. Data  
This study uses a panel data set inclusive of 295 NGOs in Uganda gathered in 2002
37
 and 
again in 2008. In 2008 the research team surveyed the same NGOs that were interviewed in 
2002. The team tracked those organisations through field visits and they only categorised a 
demise of an NGO after this had been confirmed by either the community development 
officer or a former member of staff. Field workers were also required to provide a short 
description of the time of the demise and reasons for non-survival. The survival rate for 
NGOs (i.e. those still functioning in 2008) in Uganda was 83 percent. In the first phase of this 
survey of nonprofit organisations, differences in characteristics were observed between two 
groups of agencies according to their different funding sources (grant vs community). The 
former group was assumed to be older, larger and more sustainable. In the second wave of the 
panel survey, surviving NGOs were interviewed (Burger & Owens, 2013).  
The questionnaires were similar for the 2002 and 2008 surveys, including detailed questions 
about assets, revenue, expenditure, networks, leadership characteristics, governance, 
activities, funding sources, target groups, staff, grants and donor requirements.  
                                                             
36 It is important to mention that the main criterion used in the Dutch programme assessment procedures is that 
organisations have to be able to mobilise at least 25 percent of their own (internal) funding. This criterion 
naturally excludes smaller organisations. 
37 The sample was drawn from the NGO Registration Board in the Ministry of Internal Affairs (which includes 
information since 1989) after checking the organisations that were actually operating. For instance, they were 
still operating, but had not renewed their licences or, in other cases, they had already terminated their operations. 
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2.3.2. Methodology  
The literature on which this study is based measured financial vulnerability through 
programme expenses instead of using income data, based on the fact that the nonprofit sector 
aims to maximise social well-being (partially through programme services). The other 
common measure of financial vulnerability in the literature is the reduction in net assets over 
the years (the difference between assets and liabilities) (e.g. Trussel, 2002; Trussel & 
Greenlee, 2004; Keating et al., 2005; Andrés-Alonso et al., 2015). This manifests as a 
decrease in revenues or an increase in expenses. However, because the available Ugandan 
survey data do not have sufficient information about programme expenditure, and because 
records on expenditure are generally regarded as less reliable than revenue (Verbruggen & 
Christiaens, 2012),
38
 this study uses income as the dependent variable. This alternative and 
simple way of measuring financial volatility was also used by Keating et al. (2005, p. 11), 
who called it “funding disruption”. In line with the previous studies, NGOs would likely 
reduce their services offerings when they experience a significant decrease in revenue.  
Thus, first, a dummy variable is created that takes the value 1 if the organisation experiences 
a drop of funding of 25 percent or greater as a proportion of total revenue over the period 
2000 and 2001. Then, it calculates the same variation for the period 2006–2007, as a second 
dependent variable. The analysis runs the model using the explanatory variables of 2000 
(initial period) and checks if coefficients vary significantly when examining a drop in 
revenue over the two different periods.  
Motivated by the literature review, the empirical analysis considers the following potential 
correlates of financial vulnerability:
39
 
 Surplus Margin (MARGIN): This measures low income generation from operations 
cycles as the difference between the amount of recurrent revenues and recurrent 
expenditures as a percentage of total recurrent revenue. It reflects the short-term cash 
surplus available that may affect management decisions in adverse financial contexts. 
                                                             
38 According to Verbruggen and Christiaens (2012) the records on expenditures may not always be reliable 
because NGOs tend to drive their results towards zero profit in order to: i) show performance to donors by 
increasing programme expenses, ii) reduce their taxable income by overstating taxable expenses, and iii) attract 
more contributions. 
39 The data do not allow consideration of all indicators of financial vulnerability as discussed in the literature.  
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Prior researchers found that NGOs with relatively low surplus margins, i.e. less funds to 
draw on in the case of financial shock, have more probability of being financially 
vulnerable than those with relatively high surplus margins (see e.g. Tuckman & Chang, 
1991; Greenlee & Trussel, 2000). Thus, NGOs with low surplus margins are expected to 
be financially vulnerable.  
 Revenue Concentration Index (CONCEN): This is a measure of the amount and number 
of revenue sources that an organisation has. The index is constructed by summing the 
square of the percentage share that each of the revenue source represents to total revenue. 
If an NGO receives all of its revenue from one source, its revenue concentration index 
will be equal to one, while an NGO with similar shares of revenue from multiple sources 
of revenue will have an index close to zero. This study divided the revenue sources into 
grants, membership fees, fees paid by beneficiaries, income from services provided, 
donations and others, including endowment income. Authors have shown that NGOs are 
able to decrease their financial vulnerability through diversification of their revenue 
sources (e.g. Chang & Tuckman, 1994; Carroll & Stater, 2009). Thus, an NGO that 
presents a low concentration index is expected to be less financially vulnerable as it has 
more alternative sources of revenue from which to fund operations than those with fewer 
alternative sources of funds. A positive relationship is expected between this indicator 
and the dependent variable.  
 Reporting requirements (REPORT1 and REPORT2): This measures rigidity of donor 
requirements regarding funds/budgets. Previous studies showed that conditionalities 
attached to the disbursement and use of funds can increase the financial vulnerability of 
NGOs (Bulíř & Hamann, 2003; Burger & Owens, 2013). Organisations that receive 
grants from donors or funds from government, which are subject to stricter compliance 
with reporting conditions, might face delays in payments of committed funds and will 
have fewer options to reallocate expenditure. This factor is measured based on the 
reporting requirements.
40
 If an NGO is required to produce monthly, quarterly and/or 
half-year progress reports and/or interim accounts, the explanatory variable REPORT1 
takes the value 1, and 0 if it is not required to produce such reports at all. If an NGO is 
                                                             
40 The data also provide information on visits from granting agencies to head offices and field visits to activities 
sites. However, this study considered only reporting requirements (i.e. progress reports and interim accounts). 
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required to report annually, the explanatory variable REPORT2 takes the value 1 and 0 if 
it does not. A positive relationship between the independent and dependent variable is 
expected from the results. 
 Access to funding sources (SAVINGS): This is represented by a dummy variable for the 
existence of a savings accounts. It takes the value 1 if an NGO has a savings account and 
0 if it does not. NGOs in general have limited access to banking products such as credit 
lines, savings accounts and overdraft facilities, which in turn limits their capacity to 
manage their revenue streams (Bowman, 2002; Yan, Denison & Butler, 2009). Thus, 
NGOs with savings accounts are expected to increase their financial stability (i.e. 
decrease their financial vulnerability). 
 Size (SIZE): This measure reflects the reputation of the NGO which is positively related 
to the ability to attract contributions (Trussel & Parsons, 2007). Size is measured by the 
total number of employees (i.e. salaried staff). It is expected that larger organisations with 
stronger and more established reputations than smaller NGOs will be less prone to 
financial problems. 
 Capital and equipment assets (ASSETS): Previous research has shown that NGOs that 
possess assets have better access to alternative sources of revenue (e.g. debt finance) and, 
therefore, are able to decrease their financial vulnerability (Rose-Ackerman, 1986; 
Bowman, 2002). Another reason to consider this variable is related to the ability of NGOs 
to use capital assets to generate internal financial resources. This measure includes three 
dummies that take the value 1 if the organisation owns capital assets, i.e. land and 
building, vehicles, and equipment and machinery, and 0 otherwise. The rationale for 
using three variables is related to the degree to which each of them can be converted into 
liquid funds in order to compensate for the loss of income to cover programme costs. 
NGOs that lack this equity are expected to experience higher levels of financial 
vulnerability. 
 Types of NGO according to source of main funds (community funded or donor funded): 
This variable takes the value 1 if an NGO receives any amount of revenue from donors 
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and 0 otherwise.
41
 This appears to be an important distinction based on the work of 
Burger and Owens (2013) that used the same Ugandan data. Their empirical work showed 
that NGOs funded mainly by donors are typically larger, richer and with lower levels of 
fund fluctuations (even though they may be less diversified) than community-funded 
NGOs.
42
 However, dependence on donor funding is also related to higher uncertainty of 
fund disbursements (Bulíř & Hamann, 2003). Therefore, it is expected that the sign of the 
coefficient for this variable can be either positive or negative. 
Table 2.3.1 presents the indicators and the way they were calculated. The expected sign of 
each variable relates to whether they have an expected partial positive or negative impact on 
NGOs’ financial vulnerability.  
Table 2.3.1: Indicators, measure and expected sign  
Indicator Measure Expected sign 
Surplus Margin (MARGIN) 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑠 − 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑠
 
- 
Revenue Concentration Index 
(CONCEN) 
∑ (
𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 𝑗
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑠
)
2
 
+ 
Reporting Requirements (REPORT1 
and REPORT2) 
Dummy variable𝑎  + 
Savings Accounts (SAVINGS) Dummy variable𝑏 - 
Size (SIZE) Total salaried staff - 
Capital and Equipment Asset (ASSET) Dummy variable𝑐  - 
Donor Funded  Dummy variable𝑑  ? 
a. The variable REPORT1 takes the value 1 if the organisation is required to report once a year and 0 if it does 
not report. The variable REPORT2 takes the value 1 if the organisation is required to report more than once 
a year and 0 if it does not report at all. 
b. The variable is measured as 1 if the organisation has a savings account and as 0 otherwise. 
c. This measure includes three dummies that take the value 1 if the organisation owns capital assets (i.e. land 
and buildings, vehicles, and equipment and machinery) and 0 otherwise. 
d. The omitted variable of donor-funded is community funded.  
 
                                                             
41 The frequency distribution of the donor-funded variable is provided in Appendix A. 
42 The same study found that grant allocation by donor agencies is based on practice and tradition, which means 
that those funds are more likely to go to NGOs that have received funds in the past. 
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Due to the limitations of the available survey data for Ugandan NGOs, some variables from 
the literature could not be included in this analysis. 
2.4. DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS 
In this chapter, an NGO is deemed to be financially vulnerable when there is the probability 
of a decrease equal to or higher than 25 percent in its total revenue.
43
  
The sample shows that 10 percent of NGOs were considered financially vulnerable for the 
period 2000–2001 (with 190 total observations) and 14.74 percent for the period 2006–2007 
(total number of observations equal to 251).  
The data for all selected independent variables are 2000-2001 data. The study uses the 
selected indicators to predict current funding disruption (i.e. significant decrease in recent 
revenue, in this case 2000-2001) and future funding disruption (i.e. significant decrease in 
future revenue, in this case 2006-2007). 
Table 2.4.1 displays summary statistics for the independent variables considered in the study 
for each group of NGOs (i.e. financially vulnerable and non-financially vulnerable) in 2000–
2001. 
                                                             
43 Appendix A provides the results for a cut-off of 15 percent (i.e. decrease of revenue of 15 percent or greater) 
as a robustness check. 
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Table 2.4.1: Summary statistics: Financially vulnerable NGOs (FV) and Non-financially 
vulnerable NGOs (NFV) in 2000–2001 
  Financially Vulnerable (FV) Non-financially Vulnerable 
(NFV) 
Variable Obs. Meanª  
(Standard Deviation) 
Obs. Meanª  
(Standard Deviation) 
MARGIN  19 0.11 
(0.57) 
167 0.16 
(0.37) 
CONCEN  19 0.90 
(0.17) 
171 0.57 
(0.40) 
REPORT REPORT1 15 40.00% 93 20.43% 
 REPORT2 15 53.33% 93 63.44% 
SAVINGS  19 47.37% 171 47.95% 
SIZE  19 13.37 
(22.11) 
170 18.63 
(35.06) 
ASSETS Land & 
Building 
19 52.63% 171 45.61% 
 Vehicle 19 57.89% 171 50.88% 
 Equipment & 
Machinery 
19 57.89% 171 70.76% 
Donor 
Funded 
 19 94.74% 171 59.65% 
Note: ª the difference between the mean values of FV and NFV NGOs for CONCEN variable is significant at 
the 1% level using a two-tailed t-test for equal means. The REPORT1 and Donor Funded variables are 
significant at the 10% level and 1% level respectively, using a contingency table analysis with chi-square 
statistic to determine whether the variables are statistically independent or not. The tests are presented in 
Appendix A. 
Financially vulnerable NGOs show an average concentration index of 0.90, while non-
financially vulnerable NGOs show an average concentration index of 0.57. The difference 
between these two means is significant at the 1 percent level. The level of reporting 
(REPORT1) is also higher for financially vulnerable NGOs. While 40.00 percent of 
financially vulnerable NGOs report once a year, only 20.43 percent of non-financially 
vulnerable NGOs have to report annually. This difference between these two groups of NGOs 
is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. However, more non-financially vulnerable 
NGOs have to report more than once a year (REPORT2) (63.44 percent) compared to 53.33 
percent of financially vulnerable NGOs.  
There are also differences of financial vulnerability regarding the type of NGOs. Almost 95 
percent of financially vulnerable NGOs receive funding from donors, while 59.65 percent of 
non-financially NGOs are community-funded. The mean value for this variable is significant 
at the 1 percent level of significance.  
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The mean margin is lower for financially vulnerable NGOs (11 percent) compared to 16 
percent for non-financially vulnerable NGOs. The average figures for the existence of a 
savings account are similar for the two groups of NGOs. Non-financially vulnerable NGOs 
are larger (i.e. have more salaried staff) than financially vulnerable NGOs. In terms of assets, 
the main significant difference is related to ownership of equipment and machinery. Almost 
71 percent of non-financially vulnerable NGOs reported having equipment and machinery, 
while 58 percent of financially vulnerable NGOs reported having these assets. However, the 
means for each of these variables are not statistically significant.  
Table 2.4.2 displays summary statistics for each independent variables for the period 2006–
2007.  
Table 2.4.2: Summary statistics: Financially vulnerable NGOs (FV) and Non-financially 
vulnerable NGOs (NFV) in 2006–2007 
  Financially Vulnerable (FV) Non-financially Vulnerable 
(NFV) 
Variable Obs. Meanª  
(Standard Deviation) 
Obs. Meanª  
(Standard Deviation) 
MARGIN  16 -0.04 
(0.46) 
74 0.19 
(0.36) 
CONCEN  16 0.69 
(0.44) 
76 0.53 
(0.39) 
REPORT REPORT1 14 28.57% 69 18.84% 
 REPORT2 14 50.00% 69 72.46% 
SAVINGS  20 55.00% 116 50.00% 
SIZE  19 17.32 
(23.86) 
116 18.66 
(34.82) 
ASSETS Land & 
Building 
20 35.00% 116 45.69% 
 Vehicle 20 60.00% 116 54.31% 
 Equipment & 
Machinery 
20 70.00% 116 68.97% 
Donor 
Funded 
 16 62.50% 76 71.05% 
Note: ª the difference between the mean values of FV and NFV NGOs for MARGIN variable is significant at 
the 5% using a two-tailed t-test for equal means. The REPORT2 is significant at the 10% level a contingency 
table analysis with chi-square statistic to determine whether the variables are statistically independent or not. 
The tests are presented in Appendix A. 
Similarly to the previous analysis, financially vulnerable NGOs show a lower surplus margin 
(-4 percent) than non-financially vulnerable NGOs (19 percent). The difference between 
these two means is significant at the 5 percent level. This means that NGOs that experienced 
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a sharp decrease in 2006–2007 had a lower surplus margin (in 2000–2001) than NGOs that 
did not. The level of reporting (REPORT2) is higher for non-financially vulnerable NGOs: 
while 72.46 percent of non-financially vulnerable NGOs report frequently (i.e. more than 
once a year), 50.00 percent of financially vulnerable NGO have to report more than once a 
year. The difference between these two groups of NGOs is statistically significant at the 10 
percent level.  
The average figures for the savings account variable, number of salaried staff and assets are 
similar for the two groups of NGOs. The means for each of these variables are not 
statistically significant.  
The results of the differences in means for each of the independent variables, for NGOs that 
are financially vulnerable and those that are not, are shown in Appendix A. The differences 
between the mean values of continuous variables were tested by using a t-Test for equal 
means. Contingency tables analyses (cross-tabulations) with chi-square statistics were used to 
determine whether the categorical variables are statistically independent or not. 
Correlation Analysis 
A correlation analysis for the continuous independent variables is useful to understand the 
expected coefficient signs, as well as the magnitude of the relationship between variables. 
Generally, the independent variables analysed present a low level of correlation and should 
not present a serious threat to the estimation of the linear probability regression model (i.e. no 
problem of multicollinearity).  
VAR01 and CONCEN have the highest correlation. Changes in concentration index 
(CONCEN) is negatively correlated with recent funding disruption (-0.39) and negatively 
correlated with future funding disruption (-0.23). The correlations between these variables are 
significant at the 1 percent level and 5 percent level respectively.  
Changes in MARGIN is also negatively correlated (-0.29) with decrease in current revenue at 
the 1 percent level significance. Contrary to what is theoretically expected, this means that a 
positive variation in margin is related to a decrease in current revenue.  
Larger NGOs are negatively correlated (-0.13) with sharp decreases in current revenue at the 
10 percent level significance.  
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The correlation between the dependent variables is positive and low, however, not 
significant. A significant decrease in 2000–2001 revenue is correlated 0.08 with a significant 
decrease in revenue between 2006 and 2007.  
Table 2.4.3: Correlation matrix (Spearman pairwise correlation) 
Variables Variables  Spearman p-value No. cases 
VAR01 (2000–2001) VAR2 (2006–2006) 0.08 0.47 90 
VAR01 (2000–2001) MARGIN -0.29 <0.01 185 
VAR01 (2000–2001) CONCEN -0.39 <0.01 189 
VAR01 (2000–2001) SIZE -0.13 0.08 188 
VAR02 (2006–2006) MARGIN 0.02 0.86 89 
VAR02 (2006–2006) CONCEN -0.23 0.03 91 
VAR02 (2006–2006) SIZE -0.11 0.21 134 
MARGIN CONCEN 0.32 <0.01 191 
MARGIN SIZE 0.15 0.04 190 
CONCEN SIZE 0.24 <0.01 197 
Note: VAR01 is the variation of revenue from 2000 to 2001(as a percentage of 2000). VAR02 is the variation of 
revenue from 2006 to 2007 (as a percentage of 2007). 
2.5. REGRESSION ANALYSIS – LINEAR PROBABILITY MODEL 
This section presents an empirical analysis and uses the Linear Probability Model (LPM) to 
explore the impact of several possible determining factors on the probability of a negative 
variation in total revenue as proxy of financial vulnerability. The reason for choosing this 
model is because it is easy to draw a ceteribus paribus analysis of independent variables on 
the probability of financial vulnerability (i.e. it controls for other factors that simultaneously 
affect the income variation). However, there are some shortcomings related with LPM, 
specifically: it is possible to get predictions/results either less than 0 or greater than 1. Such 
results are difficult to interpret as the dependent variable is a probability ranging from 0 to 1. 
The other shortcoming is that a probability cannot be a linear function of independent 
variables (e.g. an increase of 10 percent in surplus margin is expected to reduce the 
probability of financial problems, but a more than 10 percent increase is expected to have a 
smaller marginal effect). 
As a first step, this study calculated the dependent variable, defined as the variation of 
recurrent revenue as a percentage of total recurrent revenue for two periods between 2000–
2001 and 2006–2007. Then it creates a variable defined as 1 if the organisation had a drop 
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equal to or greater than 25 percent as a percentage of total income in 2000 and 0 otherwise 
(i.e. it does not take into account positive variations). The same calculation was done for the 
years 2006 and 2007 and transformed into a binary variable. Finally, a variable was 
calculated that takes the value 1 if the organisation presents the value 1 in periods 2000–2001 
and 2006–2007, and 0 otherwise (i.e. consider any of the two variations). 
The regression model was estimated using the explanatory variables outlined in the previous 
section. Table 2.5.1 also includes results for the dummy variable for type of organisation 
(community-funded is the omitted variable). 
Table 2.5.1: Estimates of the Regression Model 
 VAR1 (2000–2001) VAR2 (2006–2007) 
𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑎 Coefficients 
(SE) 
Coefficients 
(SE) 
Coefficients 
(SE) 
Coefficients 
(SE) 
MARGIN -0.1220 
(0.1002) 
-0.1272 
(0.0986) 
-0.2269 
(0.1673) 
-0.2244 
(0.1703) 
CONCEN 0.3008*** 
(0.0787) 
0.2817*** 
(0.0802) 
0.2941* 
(0.1655) 
0.2851 
(0.1752) 
REPORT     
REPORT1 0.1342 
(0.0983) 
0.1336 
(0.0968) 
-0.0174 
(0.1524) 
-0.0165 
(0.1549) 
REPORT2 -0.0200 
(0.0684) 
-0.0246 
(0.0688) 
-0.1442 
(0.1393) 
-0.1423 
(0.1404) 
SAVINGS 0.0351 
(0.0729) 
0.0252 
(0.0734) 
-0.0649 
(0.1105) 
-0.076 
(0.1106) 
SIZE -0.0005 
(0.0005) 
-0.0006 
(0.0005) 
-0.0005 
(0.001) 
-0.0005 
(0.001) 
𝐷𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑟 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑𝑏  0.1165 
(0.0779) 
 0.0555 
(0.1568) 
ASSETS     
Land & Building 0.0250 
(0.0703) 
0.0327 
(0.069) 
-0.0765 
(0.1145) 
-0.0710 
(0.1101) 
Vehicles 0.0451 
(0.0727) 
0.0395 
(0.0739) 
0.1463 
(0.1463) 
0.1431 
(0.1502) 
Equipment 
&Machinery 
-0.2688** 
(0.1247) 
-0.2868** 
(0.1263) 
-0.2465 
(0.1606) 
-0.255 
(0.1636) 
Constant 0.1174 
(0.1215) 
0.0589 
(0.1167) 
0.3364 
(0.2266) 
0.305 
(0.2119) 
R-square 0.1987 0.2113 0.2196 0.2214 
Number of obs. 105 105 54 54 
Notes: The Linear Probability Model robust for error terms uses a sample of 105 NGOs for the period 2000–
2001 and 54 observations for the period 2006–2007. 
*Represents 10% level of significance; **5% level of significance; ***1% level of significance. 
a. The latent dependent variable equals 1 if the NGO is financially vulnerable and 0 otherwise. 
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b. The omitted variable of donor-funded is community-funded. 
Overall, the first attempt to identify organisations that have a higher probability of being 
financially vulnerable showed a low predictive and explanatory power based on R-squared. 
This can be due to small sample size, possible omitted explanatory variables, or the existent 
of proxy variables that do not effectively measure the factor related to financial vulnerability, 
and the way the cut-off point of the dependent variable was defined. However, a few points 
can be noted about indicators of future financial vulnerability.  
The magnitudes of the coefficients are often large, however the relationships are not precisely 
estimated (and are not significant), due to small sample size. To avoid repetition, it should be 
assumed that the relationship is not significant, unless stated otherwise.  
Conversely to the correlation signal between margin and dependent variable for 2000–2001 
variation, the margin is shown to be negatively associated with the probability of being 
financially vulnerable in both periods.
44
 An increase of 10 p.p. in an NGO’s surplus margin is 
expected to decrease by approximately 1.2 p.p. the probability that they faced a financial 
downturn from 2000 to 2001 and approximately 2.3 p.p. in 2006 to 2007, keeping all the 
other variables fixed.  
The concentration index was shown to be a positive and significant correlate of financial 
vulnerability across models, except for column four. The coefficients are consistent with the 
correlation signals between the concentration index and dependent variable for both periods. 
This finding is also in line with the expected direction of causality. An organisation with low 
diversity of income sources is likely to be more financially vulnerable. A variation of 10 
percent in the concentration index is predicted to increase the probability of financial 
vulnerability by approximately 3 p.p. in both periods, keeping all the other variables fixed.  
In terms of the existence of assets to cope with liquidity issues, the table shows that only 
equipment and machinery are negatively related to the independent variable for the period 
2000–2001. All other factors being equal, NGOs that own equipment and machinery have 
2.69 p.p. lower probability of having a sharp decrease in current revenue. This probability 
                                                             
44 The difference between Spearman pairwise correlation and the signal of the coefficient in the regression is 
because of the sample sizes. The pairwise correlation considers a larger sample than the regression sample, 
which controls for other variables.  
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increases slightly (by 2.87) if the variable for the type of NGOs is included. The existence of 
donor restrictions on the liquidity characteristics of capital items can explain the difference in 
significance between equipment and machinery (more liquid) and land and building and 
vehicles (less liquid). 
The other variables were not statistically significant, however, the models provide insights 
into the signs of the variables when used to predict current and future financial vulnerability.  
Annual reporting (REPORT1) is associated with an increase the probability of an NGO being 
considered financially vulnerable in the current period but the variable is negatively related to 
future financial distress. Conversely to what was expected but in line with the analysis of 
frequency distribution in the two groups (i.e. contingency tables), higher reporting 
requirements (REPORT2) are negatively associated with financial vulnerability of NGOs. 
The descriptive analysis showed that non-financially vulnerable NGOs have higher reporting 
requirements than financially vulnerable NGOs. This can be explained by the fact that NGOs 
subject to higher monitoring and evaluation (i.e. higher reporting requirements) also have 
higher organisational capacity (e.g. fundraising capabilities) and therefore are in a better 
position to apply for other sources of funding and manage financial distress.  
The variable SAVINGS is inconsistent with a positive association with current financial 
vulnerability and a negative association with future financial vulnerability.    
The larger the organisation, the less likely it is to be financially vulnerable. As expected, the 
estimated coefficient on size is negative, meaning that there is a negative relationship 
between the size of the organisation (measured by the number of salaried staff) and financial 
distress.  
Evidence shows that an NGO considered as donor funded is expected to have 11.65 p.p. 
higher probability of facing a decrease in current revenue, and 5.55 p.p. decrease in future 
revenue than NGOs which are community funded (columns 2 and 4). This result is in line 
with the analysis of the distribution of these two groups for the first period (i.e. 2000 to 
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2001).
45
 Donor-funded NGOs are usually more concentrated in terms of revenue sources and, 
therefore, more financially vulnerable than community-funded organisations. 
Considering the debate around the definition of financial vulnerability of NGOs (and the 
appropriate cut-off point) the study examines the results for a different cut-off point of 15 
percent decrease in revenue (i.e. dependent variable) as a robustness test. The results obtained 
for regression coefficients estimates are similar to the ones presented above. The results are 
presented in Appendix A.  
2.6. CONCLUSION AND LIMITATIONS 
The nature of this chapter was exploratory as the aim was to get new information on the topic 
in the context of developing countries. The focus was on the vulnerability of NGOs in 
developing countries as well as on possible differences between the financial vulnerability of 
donor-funded NGOs and community-funded NGOs. 
Based on the literature review and the available data of NGOs in Uganda during two periods 
(2000–2001 and 2006–2007), the variables that could potentially predict a variation in total 
revenues were identified. The explanatory variables included the surplus margin, the revenue 
concentration index, whether the organisation has a savings account as a proxy of funding 
resources, two dummy variables that reflect the different levels of reporting requirements, the 
size of the organisation measured by total number of salaried staff, and ownership of several 
capital assets.  
Using the above data, the intention was to answer the key question of what financial ratios 
and organizational features are associated with financial vulnerability of NGOs in developing 
countries. Financial vulnerability was defined as a minimum drop of 25 percent in recurrent 
revenue (net of divestment) as a percentage of total revenue, during two separate periods of 
time: 2000–2001 and 2006–2007. As stated earlier, a linear probability model was used to 
predict variations of revenue. The findings show similar results to the study by Greenlee and 
Trussel (2000) and related literature. The revenue concentration index was found to be a 
significant correlate of financial distress in both periods. The assets variable, particularly 
equipment and machinery, seems to help to cope with decreases in recurrent funding. The 
                                                             
45 The donor-funded variable is significant at 10 percent for a cut-off point of 15 percent in the dependent 
variable. The results are presented in Appendix A. 
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other variables used to be related to financial vulnerability of NGOs were often large in 
magnitude and with a consistent sign, but not accurately estimated (i.e. not statistically 
significant). 
The second part of the question relates to possible outcome differences according to type of 
organisation. It was found that NGOs that receive donor grants appeared to have a higher 
probability of being financially vulnerable than their community-funded counterparts. 
However, these results were not statistically significant. 
This study contributes to the literature in three ways. First, the most notable contribution is 
the use of data from a developing county where the financial vulnerabilities of NGOs are 
undoubtedly different from developed countries. Secondly, new potential correlates of 
financial vulnerability were identified and introduced to the model. Thirdly, the study 
distinguished between NGOs with donor funding and NGOs with community funding.  
Nevertheless, some limitations should be noted for additional work. Firstly, the definition of 
financial vulnerability was operationalised as the reduction in total revenues, which is not 
totally accurate because not all reductions in revenues result in a reduction of services offered 
by NGOs. In fact, the organisation may be able to manage programme expenses and try to 
safeguard programmes (Tuckman & Chang, 1991). In this way, a decrease in revenue reflects 
a financial problem if expenses cannot be decreased by the same proportion. Secondly, the 
data available on NGOs is not entirely complete and reliable. A more comprehensive data set 
would allow the improvement of the model by including better proxy and more factors and to 
reduce the problem of omitted variables and measurement error in the model. A larger sample 
size with more complete data should also increase the consistency of the estimators as well as 
the significance of the model.  Ideally, such a model would examine the volatility in revenue 
over a longer period. Finally, as the study is in essence a replication of previous studies on 
predicting financial vulnerability of NGOs with a focus on intra-organisational factors, it 
does not consider extra-organisational factors or environmental variables. Following 
Prentice’s (2016) study, further research could be done to take into account factors that might 
affect the financial stability and vulnerability of NGOs.  
This chapter laid the foundation for an investigation of the conditions that could help NGOs 
to successfully implement strategies to deal with financial distress, which is the subject 
addressed in the next chapter. 
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APPENDIX A 
Appendix A 1: Frequency distribution of Donor Funded NGOs 
Variable  Frequency Percent Cum. Percentage 
Donor Funded = 0 107 53.77% 53.77% 
0< Donor Funded <0.3 6 3.00% 56.77% 
0.3≤ Donor Funded<0.5 3 1.50% 58.27% 
0.5≤ Donor Funded≤1 83 41.71% 100.00% 
Total 199 100.00%  
 
Appendix A 2: Test of equal means for financially vulnerable NGOs and non-financially 
vulnerable NGOs 2000–2001 
Variables Mean diff. Standard Error [95% Conf. Interval] p-value 
MARGIN 0.0498 0.0957 -0.1390 0.2387 0.6033 
CONCEN -0.3277 0.0931 -0.5114 -0.1440 0.0005 
SIZE 5.2610 8.2320 -10.9785 21.5000 0.5235 
 
Appendix A 3: Cross tabulation and Chi Square for financially vulnerable NGOs and 
non-financially vulnerable NGOs 2000–2001 
Variables Financially 
Vulnerable (FV) 
Non-financially 
Vulnerable (NFV) 
Pearson 
Chi Square 
p-value 
REPORT REPORT1 40.00% 20.43% 2.7807 0.0950 
 REPORT2 53.33% 63.44% 0.5603 0.4540 
SAVINGS  47.37% 47.95% 0.0023 0.9610 
ASSETS Land & Building  52.63% 45.61% 0.3387 0.5610 
 Vehicle 57.89% 50.88% 0.3372 0.5610 
 Equipment & 
Machinery 
57.89% 70.76% 1.3346 0.2480 
Donor 
Funded 
 94.74% 59.65% 9.0476 0.0030 
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Appendix A 4: Test of equal means for financially vulnerable NGOs and non-financially 
vulnerable NGOs 2006–2007 
Variables Mean diff. Standard Error [95% Conf. Interval] p-value 
MARGIN 0.2308 0.1042 0.0236 0.4379 0.0294 
CONCEN -0.1648 0.1099 -0.3832 0.0535 0.1372 
SIZE 1.3394 8.3022 -15.082 17.7608 0.8721 
 
Appendix A 5: Cross tabulation and Chi Square for financially vulnerable NGOs and 
non-financially vulnerable NGOs 2000–2001 
Variables Financially 
Vulnerable (FV) 
Non-financially 
Vulnerable (NFV) 
Pearson 
Chi Square 
p-value 
REPORT REPORT1 28.57% 18.84% 0.6766 0.4110 
 REPORT2 50.00% 72.46% 2.7301 0.0980 
SAVINGS  55.00% 50.00% 0.1706 0.6800 
ASSETS Land & Building  35.00% 45.69% 0.7907 0.3740 
 Vehicle 60.00% 54.31% 0.2233 0.6370 
 Equipment & 
Machinery 
70.00% 68.97% 0.0086 0.9260 
Donor 
Funded 
 62.50% 71.05% 0.4566 0.4990 
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Appendix A 6: Estimates of the Regression Model (reduction in revenue ≥ 15%) 
Notes: The Linear Probability Model robust for error terms uses a sample of 105 NGOs for the period 2000–
2001 and 54 observations for the period 2006–2007. 
*Represents 10% level of significance; **5% level of significance; ***1% level of significance. 
c. The latent dependent variable equals 1 if the NGO is financially vulnerable and 0 otherwise. 
d. The omitted variable of donor-funded is community-funded. 
 
 VAR1 (2000–2001) VAR2 (2006–2007) 
𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑎 Coefficients 
(SE) 
Coefficients 
(SE) 
Coefficients 
(SE) 
Coefficients 
(SE) 
MARGIN -0.0525 
(0.2915) 
-0.0585 
(0.2694) 
-0.1800 
(0.1714) 
-0.1895 
(0.1704) 
CONCEN 0.2915*** 
(0.0832) 
0.2694*** 
(0.0857) 
0.2600 
(0.1721) 
0.2937 
(0.1833) 
REPORT     
REPORT1 0.1587 
(0.1040) 
0.1580 
(0.1020) 
-0.0210 
(0.1549) 
-0.0244 
(0.1517) 
REPORT2 -0.0710 
(0.0751) 
-0.0764 
(0.0755) 
-0.0789 
(0.1443) 
-0.0858 
(0.1446) 
SAVINGS 0.0017 
(0.0770) 
0.0096 
(0.0774) 
-0.1825 
(0.1255) 
-0.1409 
(0.1222) 
SIZE -0.0006 
(0.0005) 
-0.0008 
(0.0005) 
-0.0007 
(0.0010) 
-0.0004 
(0.0010) 
𝐷𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑟 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑𝑏  0.1345* 
(0.0806) 
 -0.2078 
(0.2121) 
ASSETS     
Land & Building -0.0193 
(0.0758) 
-0.1040 
(0.0739) 
-0.0411 
(0.1308) 
-0.0616 
(0.1228) 
Vehicles 0.0635 
(0.0766) 
0.0570 
(0.0783) 
0.1501 
(0.1520) 
0.1622 
(0.1562) 
Equipment 
&Machinery 
-0.2570** 
(0.1261) 
-0.2779** 
(0.1271) 
-0.3655* 
(0.1867) 
-0.3334* 
(0.1821) 
Constant 0.1741 
(0.1275) 
0.1065 
(0.1228) 
0.4738 
(0.2345) 
0.5912 
(0.2760) 
R-square 0.1827 0.1979 0.2034 0.2257 
Number of obs. 105 105 54 54 
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CHAPTER 3 
CONDITIONS TO IMPLEMENT STRATEGIES TO DEAL 
WITH FINANCIAL VULNERABILITY 
Abstract  
Over recent decades NGOs have become known as sources of development finance, as well 
as for their active engagement in different aspects of the socio-economic development of 
countries, such as education and health. In order to fulfil their mission they depend on a 
diversity of funding sources from charitable corporate enterprises, governments and private 
donors. In practice, funding providers may delay the transfer of committed funds, interrupt 
the funding or even end projects during periods of economic downturn, or in the case of non-
compliance with donor requirements. Consequently, the NGO sector in general is 
characterised by unpredictable and unstable income flows, as a result of which NGOs are 
often considered to be financially vulnerable. Some NGOs can experience a large drop in 
revenue without this affecting their programme delivery; however, in many instances the 
interruption or a dramatic decrease of funding can cause NGOs to decrease expenditure on 
service delivery programmes or, in the worst scenario, force them to shut down operations. 
This is of grave concern to all relevant stakeholders (i.e. board members and donors) as it 
harms those that are supposed to be the beneficiaries of the programmes.  
This observation raises the research question related to how institutional conditions and 
stakeholder relations combine to shape NGOs’ responses to a sharp decrease in revenue and 
the impact of this on programmes. This chapter explores this question and aims to identify 
those features or conditions that must apply for NGOs to successfully implement strategies to 
deal with financial vulnerability. This entails an analysis of the impact of a decrease of 
revenue on the operations of NGOs, with a specific focus on those conditions that mitigate 
the impact on an organisation’s operations. Specifically, it is argued that NGOs with a 
diversified structure of revenue sources and a significant surplus margin are more likely to 
maintain programme expenditure and essential services. Strong institutional capital in the 
form of networking and donor relations can contribute to effective negotiation between NGO 
managers and funding providers to ensure the survival of the organisation, either through the 
relaxation of donor restrictions or through access to grants. 
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To explore the research question, a case-orientated analysis is presented of 22 NGOs in 
Uganda that all experienced a drop in revenue between 2000 and 2001. The NGOs are 
matched by core activity of operation, but they differ in terms of structure, assets base, years 
of experience, size and networks. The analysis builds on earlier research on financial 
vulnerability and understands the term broadly as a minimum drop of 15 percent in recurrent 
revenue as a percentage of total revenue. The study uses a (crisp-set) qualitative comparative 
analysis (csQCA), a methodology deemed to be suitable to identify and test conditional 
relationships between different conditions and outcome for small N samples. This is 
particularly appropriate for the purpose of this research, as the ability of an NGO to safeguard 
programmes when faced with a drop in revenue can have different explanations depending on 
the presence or absence of specific conditions. To the best of this researcher’s knowledge, 
this methodology has never been applied as a comparative technique within the research area 
of the nonprofit sector.  
The study offers a conceptual framework that highlights the possible configurations of 
conditions that can mitigate the impact of financial vulnerability on programme expenditure. 
It is of particular relevance to managers and fund providers who manage financial resources 
and donor funding. It should help all those involved in development partnerships to think 
through the best approaches to development management strategies in order to achieve the 
stated goals of financial stability and efficient programme delivery.  
In agreement with earlier empirical evidence, a preliminary finding is that where combined 
conditions such as higher diversification of funding and flexible donor restrictions are 
present, NGOs are more likely to maintain programme expenditure in response to shrinking 
revenues. Furthermore, particular combinations of conditions thus explain differences in 
terms of outcomes among NGOs that experience a similar drop in revenue. There is strong 
evidence that institutional capital is a necessary causal condition that can improve the ability 
of NGOs to respond resourcefully and creatively to a drop in revenue.  
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3.1. INTRODUCTION 
NGOs experience fluctuations in their revenue. Decrease of revenue as a result of, for 
instance, delays in the transfer of committed funds or termination of projects, can 
compromise service delivery programmes. Under such circumstances, programme 
expenditure is often under strain, and this can result in the scaling down or closing of specific 
programme activities. This raises concerns about unreliable and highly volatile funding 
sources in the NGO sector, on the one hand, and on the other, the need to implement 
development programmes, such as adult education or the provision of palliative care, that 
require long-term investment and commitment. Of interest is the extent to which the latter is 
compromised by the former. The study examines NGOs that do not reduce programme 
expenditure as well as those that do so after a drop in revenue. Specifically of interest are 
features and conditions that combine to determine the outcome of a decrease of revenue and 
its impact on programme delivery.  
This chapter aims to identify the features and conditions that must be present for NGOs to be 
able to successfully implement strategies to deal with financial vulnerability. This entails an 
analysis of the impact of financial vulnerability on the operations of NGOs, with a specific 
focus on the existing conditions that could mitigate the impact. It is argued that NGOs that 
have a high diversification of income sources or that face a low level of restrictions imposed 
by donors on the utilisation of funds are more likely to maintain programme delivery. 
According to earlier research, the effect of a drop in revenue can be also reduced when there 
is strong and efficient networking and good relations with stakeholders that contribute 
towards effective negotiations between NGO managers and funding providers. 
The study uses a unique panel data set from the NGO sector in Uganda. The Ugandan 
nonprofit sector is relatively large, active and well-regulated in comparison to that of other 
developing countries, which make it suitable for a case study to understand financial 
decisions and the management responses to financial problems. An analysis of 22 Ugandan 
NGOs that experienced a drop in revenue between 2000 and 2001 is presented. The 
organisations differ in terms of size, mandate, asset base, funding levels and years of 
experience.  
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The study builds on the previous chapter on financial vulnerability. It considers a minimum 
drop of 15 percent in recurrent revenue as a percentage of total revenue.
46
 The study uses a 
crisp-set qualitative comparative analysis (csQCA), a pioneer methodology in this field which 
is suitable to test conditional relationships between different factors for small population (N) 
samples. By using this technique, it is possible to combine complexity with the principle of 
parsimony in order to understand what causal mechanisms are at work and what is driving the 
impact. Secondly, interviews were conducted with key individuals of the sample of the NGOs 
selected. This was done in an attempt to gain an understanding of the findings and to test the 
validity of the results.  
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 presents the background to contextualise the 
operations of the Ugandan NGOs. Section 3.3 reviews previous research on the conditions 
that are perceived to reduce the impact of financial vulnerability. Section 3.4 outlines the 
case-oriented research by describing the features and conditions that help NGOs to mitigate 
or offset the impact of a decrease in revenue, while their absence may increase the risk of a 
decrease on programme expenditures. The section also describes the empirical strategy 
adopted by introducing the methodology of csQCA. Conditional relationships between 
conditions and outcome are tested using 22 organisations operating between 2000 and 2001. 
The section then tests the model by presenting the initial impressions from recent field work 
and discusses the findings in the light of the literature. Section 3.5 interprets the results, and 
finally Section 3.6 presents the general conclusions and research contribution to the debate on 
financial vulnerability and sustainability of the operations of NGOs.  
3.2. BACKGROUND 
This section presents the background of the NGO sector in Uganda to help in understanding 
the features and conditions that can influence the impact of a decrease of revenue.  
After decades of political instability, social and economic challenges, Uganda experienced a 
period of relative economic growth and peace after 1986 (Nyangabyaki et al., 2004). During 
this time, and especially after 2000, NGOs grew fast in terms of numbers and as important 
role players in service delivery and advocates for policy change (Dicklich, 1998). In 2007 the 
                                                             
46 In order to get a larger sample, this chapter considers a lower percentage of a decrease in revenue as a proxy 
of financial vulnerability compared to 25 percent considered in the previous chapter. The main purpose of this 
strategy was to increase the number of cases through which to identify important causal factors. 
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Ugandan government estimated that there were approximately 7,000 registered NGOs, which 
reflected a dramatic expansion since 1992 when, according to the World Bank (1994, p. 21), 
there were fewer than 500. During this period the country was faced with a rising HIV/AIDS 
pandemic, which attracted large amounts of international funding (Hanson & Twaddle, 
1988). According to the USAID Sustainability Index (2015), approximately 13,000 NGOs 
were registered in Uganda at the end of 2015.
47
  
The NGO sector in Uganda is funded mainly by international NGOs and foreign donors and 
they are formed in response to the funds available (Barr, Fafchamps & Owens, 2005; USAID, 
2013). According to a USAID Report (2013), grant
48
 income represents over 90 percent of 
total revenue, with the majority of NGOs relying on one or two donors. Although many 
NGOs charge membership fees, the relative contribution to total revenue is low, usually less 
than 10 percent (Burger & Owens, 2008).  
Despite being providers of those state services that are not adequately provided by the state, 
such as health and education (Cannon, 1996), NGOs in Uganda receive little financial 
support from the government, especially at local level. However, organisations are required 
to follow the National Plan
49
 and work with some line ministries, such as the Minister of 
Gender, Labour and Social Development (USAID, 2009).  
Initially NGOs in Uganda focused on areas that targeted the poor and most vulnerable, where 
the government was not able to provide assistance, given that the private sector was almost 
non-existent and inaccessible to the poor (Nyangabyaki et al., 2004). NGOs were particularly 
active in the fields of education, health, HIV awareness and prevention, support for farmers 
and community development activities – areas that were badly affected during times of 
conflict and when funding was readily available (such as for HIV/AIDS interventions). In the 
mid-1990s the organisations became more involved in advocacy work, public awareness 
programmes and monitoring of government policy as a result of donor priorities, which had 
shifted to human rights issues and governance (Wallace et al., 2004). At the same time many 
donors changed their implementation strategies from direct project implementation (i.e. direct 
                                                             
47 See Section 1.9.2. 
48 Grants are funds disbursed by one institution (i.e. government, foundation or intergovernmental organisations) 
to a recipient nonprofit entity. 
49 http://npa.ug/wp-content/uploads/NDPII-Final.pdf. 
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transfer to specific NGOs) to more indirect support
50
 by transferring funds to a pool of funds 
managed by an intermediate agency such as the Democratic Governance Facility and Civil 
Society Fund. This agency then forwards the funds to local organisations.  
Another important factor is the lack of funding from donors to build institutional capacity. 
Usually donor resources are targeted directly to project activities and accompanied by 
conditions (USAID, 2009) which reduce the extent to which NGOs are able to guarantee the 
sustainability of their programmes and the survival of the organisations. The organisations 
therefore join networks to benefit from training and other support services. According to 
USAID (2009), more than 70 percent of organisations registered in 2009 belong to umbrella 
organisations, such as the well-known National NGO Forum and Uganda National 
Association of AIDS Service Organisations (UNASO).  
Ugandan NGOs are characterised by a high dependence on donor funding, a project-driven 
approach and lack of institutional capacity.  
The following section presents a perspective on previous research related to the conditions 
that help NGOs to mitigate the impact of financial vulnerability on programmes, followed by 
the case-oriented research, which was chosen to examine and analyse the diverse range of 
NGOs in the data set.  
3.3. RESEARCH ON CONDITIONS FOR EFFECTIVE RESPONSE TO 
FINANCIAL VULNERABILITY 
This section presents an overview of the findings of earlier research related to specific 
conditions that can mitigate or even prevent the negative impact of financial vulnerability on 
the operations of NGOs.  
3.3.1. Diversified revenue base 
A diversified revenue base, i.e. not being dependent on a single source of funding, is a 
condition that allows NGOs to overcome a drop in one source of revenue, as managers are 
able to reallocate expenses to another revenue source. Yan, Denison and Butler (2009) 
studied a sample of 1,387 arts, culture and humanities nonprofit organisations in the USA 
                                                             
50 Or as Wallace et al. (2006, p. 26) refer to it as Sector Wide Approach (SWA).  
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between 2000 and 2003. They claim that financial structure (i.e. sources of funds and their 
respective weights
51
) plays a crucial role in the financial sustainability of nonprofit 
organisations. This is in agreement with the resource dependence theory, according to which 
reliance on a few sources of funding increases the risk of financial vulnerability (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978; Chang & Tuckman, 1994). Organisations are accordingly encouraged to 
reduce their dependence on only a single source of revenue. 
3.3.1.1 Diversification index, type of funding source and crowding-out  
Chang and Tuckman (1994), who measured the financial vulnerability of nonprofit 
organisations in the USA based on four financial ratios (the concentration ratio, surplus 
margin, equity balance and administrative costs), studied the determinants of revenue 
diversification. They developed a diversification index
52
 that was applied to US nonprofit 
organisations. Their findings are interesting: firstly, the sector to which an organisation 
belongs and the proportion of fundraising costs affect an organisation’s ability to diversify its 
revenue base; secondly, organisations do attempt to diversify their revenue sources in order to 
reduce financial vulnerability. 
Apart from the number of revenue sources, the types of sources (i.e. the variety of funders) 
that constitute the financial structure also matter. In fact, NGO managers need to balance the 
level of volatility of each revenue source, the nature of restrictions and time frame of each 
funding source and the organisational efficiency in terms of programme life span and 
administrative costs.
53
 For instance, funds from international agencies or government grants 
have underlying grant agreements that determine the management framework, terms and 
conditions. These types of sources are based on agreements that prescribe specific terms of 
payment, technical responsibilities, rules of financial compliance and accountability, 
reporting requirements, and timelines to which all programme partners are subject throughout 
the grant period. NGOs thus have fixed amounts of expected funds and times of payment on 
which donors are unlikely to default should the recipient organisations fulfil all the 
                                                             
51 Weights refer the contribution of each funding source as proportion of total funding. 
52 The diversification index determines the number of sources from which an organisation receives funds and 
the extent to which the funds are dispersed across sources.  
53 Administrative costs relate to the requirements impose by donors around the approval and disbursement of 
funds, such as reports, monitoring and evaluation. See Section 2.2. 
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requirements. Conversely, other types of revenue sources, such as donations from private 
individuals and revenue from programme services, are less predictable (i.e. more volatile) in 
terms of amounts and times. 
However, some researchers detected a crowding-out effect between different sources of funds 
(Jegers, 2008; Ribar & Wilhelm, 2002; Okten & Weisbrod, 2000). For instance, donors may 
perceive their grants as less necessary when governments increase their contributions and, 
subsequently, are likely to reduce their future contributions. Kingma (1989) and Kingma and 
McClelland (1995) found evidence of a partial crowding-out between private donations and 
government support (less than dollar-per-dollar rate). Donors’ reactions towards an increase 
in revenue from the commercial activities of an organisation can be similar (Desmet, 1998; 
Yetman, 2003). A more recent study by Ribar and Wilhelm (2002) that analysed the 
relationship between private donations and government support of international relief 
organisations found that crowding-out disappears as the number of donors increases.  
In contrast, Okten and Weisbrod (2000) found a positive effect between revenue from 
government or from commercial activities and donor contributions by using a model 
developed by Weisbrod and Domingues (1986).
54
 Similarly, Callen (1994), using the same 
model, did not find support for the hypothesis that government financing crowds out private 
donations.  
3.3.1.2 Endowment and excess funding  
Endowments include long-term investments, such as assets that may have legal restrictions 
attached and which are usually used to protect organisations from bankruptcy. Excess 
funding refers to funds without legal restrictions on their use which are held to be invested in 
highly liquid investments or as a measure of contingency. Both are reserves that organisations 
use for precautionary savings or to fill the gap of unfunded expenditures (Fisman & Hubbard, 
2005; Gentry, 2002). Bowman, Tuckman and Young (2012) highlight reasons why excess 
funding is important as a source of revenue to finance the long-term needs of organisations, 
future programme expenditures, organisations’ expansion plans and/or new programme 
developments. Excess funding enhances the capacity of the organisation to borrow and 
                                                             
54 The model was extended by Posnett and Sandler (1989). It had been applied to nonprofits in the USA to 
determine the factors that can affect donations in the sector. 
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safeguard against financial vulnerability (Jegers, 2008; Strydom & Stephen, 2014). Excess 
funding can, however, cause the problem of crowding out of future contributions, because 
donors are concerned about mismanagement of excess funds for personal use. According to 
Calabrese (2011), donors encourage NGOs to use excess funding for financial stability (i.e. to 
hedge against uncertainty and risk to increase financial independence) and to smooth 
programme expenditure, but they impose restrictions on the use of funds and the amount to 
be retained. By using an ordinary least squares regression model of 182,801 NPOs in the 
USA, the author found that excessive reserves negatively affect future contributions by 
donors (i.e. excessive wealth crowds out donor contributions) and he recommended strategies 
that allow organisations to build moderate reserves.  
3.3.1.3 Capacity to borrow  
The capacity to borrow is an alternative option to access funding and to diversify the revenue 
base (Boris & Steuerle, 1999). There are two categories of financial debt: market debt 
provided by banks or other commercial institutions at market conditions, and non-market 
debt provided by individuals, such as board members or donor institutions supportive to the 
organisation’s mission (Jegers, 2008). Borrowing enables managers to stabilise revenue 
streams, which in turn decreases the likelihood of cutting back on service delivery when a 
significant decrease in revenue is experienced. It permits organisations to distribute cost 
across the lifespan of a capital asset, thus avoiding the running down of financial resources 
that are earmarked for daily operations (Denison, 2009).  
Organisations that have long-term investments are able to issue more debt relative to their 
physical assets, as they hold more capital that can serve as collateral. Bowman (2002) and 
Gentry (2002) show that endowment is an important factor for the capital structure and the 
decision of an NGO to borrow by using a dataset of a diverse field group of large US 
organisations. In a similar vein, Yan, Denison and Butler (2009) found that an increase of 
government contributions is positively associated with the leverage ratio, supporting the idea 
that financial stability and a strong debt capacity increase the likelihood of borrowing. The 
authors also verified that organisations with more diversified revenue streams are more likely 
to take on long-term debt. However, according to Jegers and Verschueren (2006) and 
Khodjamirian (2008), NGOs face constraints imposed by capital markets (i.e. lack of 
collateral and assessment of creditworthiness) and borrowing is not always an option. 
Furthermore, donors such as CIDA and USAID do not allow NGOs to use the donated assets 
as collateral to borrow. 
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3.3.2. Donor flexibility and allocation of resources 
Donor flexibility as a condition is related to restrictions imposed by donors on the use of 
resources and the eligibility of expenses. Fund providers expect resources to be utilised 
efficiently, and they therefore often impose specific conditions and restrictions on the use and 
allocatin of funds (e.g. specifying programme frameworks such as themes, target groups, 
detailed work plans, geographical areas). While endowments have no donor restrictions and 
allow organisations discretion in the use of funds, restricted funds limit organisations to using 
funds only for specific purposes (Wallace et al., 2006, p. 12; Edwards, 2008; AbouAssi, 
2013). The number and nature of restrictions imposed by donors determine the level of 
flexibility that NGOs have to reallocate expenses (i.e. to deviate from the original planning of 
projects) (Foster & Fine, 2007; Chikoto & Neely, 2013). In general, NGOs receive three 
types of funds depending on their degree of rigidity vs flexibility: endowments, ‘restricted’ 
and ‘non-restricted’ contributions (Rossouw, 2006).  
The use of restricted funds for a purpose other than the one agreed to between donor and the 
organisation is difficult and costly, because it is subject to donor approval prior to the 
expenses being incurred
55
 (including elaboration of financial and project reports and 
accounts) (Moore & Stewart, 1998; Ebrahim, 2005; Rossouw, 2006; Banerjee, 2006).
56
 This 
is particularly difficult in the case of development projects with often unpredictable outcomes 
and dynamic conditions, where NGOs frequently need to adapt to changes in the project 
environment and local priorities (Wallace et al., 2006; Doornbos, 2003; Sanyal, 2006; Elbers 
& Arts, 2011; Fisher & Mendonça, 2002). Khodjamirian (2008) claims that the adjustment 
costs allocated among sources of revenue are potentially large as they require conscious or 
discretionary decisions to be made only after an internal deliberative process. In fact, one of 
the challenges of organisations in poor countries, as noted by Moore and Stewart (1998), is 
                                                             
55 Donors usually allow a variance of approximately 10% to 20% over or under the approved line budget 
without prior approval of expenditure being incurred. For example, general conditions applicable to grants from 
the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, clause number 3.3 allows up to 10% variation between the approved 
budget and the expenses charged. Available from: https://www.nrc.no/globalassets/pdf/transparency/part-ii-
general-conditions.pdf). Another example can be found on the USAID Grant Manual, clause 11.5. Available 
from: http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pnadl393.pdf. 
56 Financial reports including accounting requirements, financial audits and the use of specific procedures such 
as timekeeping policy (i.e. time-sheets for staff that are being charged to a specific donor project). In this way, 
donors intend to control and assess performance of the recipient organisation (Wilson & Kattelus, 2004 cited by 
Rossouw, 2006). 
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the formalities and bureaucratic discipline that are imposed by a diversity of external funding 
sources (i.e. submission and printing of frequent and detailed reports, recruitment and 
training of skilled staff).  
Elbers and Arts (2011) identify problems associated with donor rigidity in terms of their 
impact on institutional systems and programme intervention. They have noted, for instance, 
that there is a reluctance to fund overhead costs (i.e. expenses not directly related to the 
project, such as institutional/capacity building, costs of premises and fundraising expenses). 
Even when donors provide an allowance for overhead costs, it often excludes costs such as 
capital expenditures (e.g. vehicles) and construction costs (CIDA agreement). 
Another donor restriction is related to the time period to use funds. Funds not used within the 
period of the grant are often required to be returned to the donor (Rossouw, 2006; Elbers & 
Arts, 2011; Banerjee, 2006). This is problematic, especially for new projects, which usually 
take time and can face unforeseen challenges, such as the recruitment and training of staff, 
familiarisation of the target communities with the implementation plans, and setting up the 
systems required by donors that are needed for financial and narrative processes (e.g. 
accounting software). Such circumstances are likely to delay projects that can only start when 
funds become available. In addition, the funds are often made available for the short term 
(Elbers & Arts, 2011; USAID, 2011, p. 5; USAID, 2012, p. 6), which challenges the 
autonomy and the strength of the organisation, as it lacks the resources to retain high-quality 
staff, invest in research and innovation, and plan for the long term. In fact, Chikoto and Neely 
(2013) found that organisations with a higher proportion of expenditure on administrative 
costs are associated with higher financial capacity and are therefore more financially stable. 
Organisations that do not comply with these requirements are often perceived as illegitimate 
(Suchman, 1995). Non-compliance often implies the cessation of funding and/or the donor 
may demand that the funds should be paid back (Rossouw, 2006). This diminishes the 
attractiveness of the organisation in the case of other funding agencies, forfeiting future 
donations and ultimately compromising its financial sustainability. This is of special 
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importance for most Southern NGOs,
57
 which depend on donor agencies for their financial 
sustainability (Tvedt, 2006; Riddell, 2008; AbouAssi, 2013; Dunn, 2010).  
However, NGO managers attempt to obtain more freedom and flexibility to reduce 
dependency on donors’ restricted funds in order to decrease their financial vulnerability 
(Banerjee, 2006; Dunn, 2010). As an example, they use compensatory measures of drawing 
money from other sources to cover the costs that donor agencies are unwilling to fund
58
 
(Rossouw, 2006). Other managers report inaccurate information and misrepresent 
performance by pushing expenses such as fundraising or administrative expenses under 
project lines in the budget and the discretionary use of accruals and deferred income (Healy 
& Wahlen, 1999; Ballantine, Forker & Greenwood 2007; Verbruggen & Christiaens, 2012; 
Boterenbrood, 2014). 
Other organisations shift their focus in order to attract donor funding. Rahman (2006) reports 
on a case in Bangladesh where the NGO reallocated its focus from promoting good 
governance to the delivery of basic services to secure financial survival. Such action 
diminishes an organisation’s ownership of its intervention goals and much of its identity. 
Edward and Hulme (1996, p. 961) point out that “if you have your hands in another man’s 
pocket, you must move when he moves”. Consequently organisations become accountable to 
donors who control funding and not to their constituents (Ebrahim, 2003). 
3.3.3. Institutional capital 
Institutional capital relates to, among other things, the leadership (management) of NGOs, 
informal networks of the leaders, direct involvement of the board of directors, experience of 
the financial manager. 
3.3.3.1 Leadership, informal networks and donor relations 
The nature of the leadership of an NGO is a strategic factor that can contribute towards the 
survival of the organisation when it faces periods of financial vulnerability. Donor conditions 
and requirements can be subject to negotiation and adaptation in practice (i.e. a certain degree 
of flexibility concerning the use of funding) in such a way that organisations are able to 
                                                             
57 ‘Southern NGOs’ is the term used to refer to NGOs located in the southern hemisphere as opposed to the 
Northern NGOs. Southern NGOs are usually supported by Northern NGOs. 
58 Refer to Section 3.3.1 related to diversification of funding sources. 
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manage and secure service delivery and sustainability of programmes (Banerjee, 2006; 
Rossouw, 2006). NGOs need donors for survival as well as government support,
59
 but donor 
agencies also need to be associated with well-performing NGOs (Elbers & Arts, 2011; 
Aliyev, 2015).
60
 Thus, managers are able to influence the decisions of donors and align 
interests, and in this way find some ‘room to maneuver’. This is done by approaching donors 
to relay concerns and to give feedback, or involve them more directly in the organisation’s 
work.  
Exchange of information (through reports and evaluations) and good communication between 
organisations and donors are used as mechanisms to build legitimacy and confidence between 
parties. This is especially important when existing donors revise funding priorities and 
organisations need to secure funds (Ebrahim, 2003; Frumkin & Kim, 2001; Dunn, 2010; 
AbouAssi, 2013). For instance, a donor may decide to fund a water and sanitation programme 
when it was previously funding a civil society project. However, parties may agree to allocate 
resources to both projects as civil society can enhance water and sanitation outcomes through 
training of communities on maintenance of water and sanitation facilities. This tactic, 
however, requires solid performance by NGOs and personal contact with a certain degree of 
trust that enables constructive negotiation (Stiles, 2002; Elbers & Arts, 2011; AbouAssi, 
2013). Wallace et al. (2006, p. 126), in their study on the role and importance of interpersonal 
relations, called for more face-to-face contact between donors and recipient NGOs. An 
interesting study by Aliyev (2015) that relies on qualitative in-depth interviews with the elite 
of the not-for-profit sector (including founders of NGOs, CEOs, board members, NGO 
employees and donor representatives) in Azerbaijan and Georgia reveals that the use of 
informal networks by NGO leaders (personal connections, contacts, or kinship ties) is widely 
practised by the majority of organisations in those countries.
61
 Moreover, informal networks 
are regarded as effective mechanisms for the survival of organisations through the 
                                                             
59 The government in Uganda govern the operations of the NGO sector. NGOs are required to be registered with 
the NGO Registration Board in the Ministry of International Affairs to operate in the country. In addition, all 
registered organisations need to get a recommendation from the line ministry in terms of technical advice to 
implement any activity. The stated reason for this policy is to reallocate organisations to areas where 
communities need the services (see also Section 1.9.3.).  
60 Aliyev (2015) refers to this relation between NGOs and their donors as patron-client relations, where NGOs 
seek patronage to receive funding and political support from donors and, in return, they provide services or 
public goods to communities.  
61 Over 80 percent of those interviewed. 
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circumvention of complex and corrupt state bureaucracies,
62
 forming partnerships with other 
organisations
63
 that help them to access funds from donors and individuals, and strengthening 
organisations’ positions within the community (Barman, 2002). In the same study a 
representative of an international donor drew attention to the importance of the 
representative’s personality where NGOs were referred to by the name of their founders or 
executives. Their reputation and the use of personnel networks are important criteria to attract 
donations and contributions including volunteers or hiring employees to work for the 
organisation.  
3.3.3.2 The role of the board of directors and finance manager  
Another aspect of institutional capital is the nature of the role played by the board of 
directors. Many authors consider the board of directors as the most direct measure of 
governance as they run the day-to-day affairs of the organisation (Eldenburg et al., 2004; 
Bradshaw, Murray & Wolpin, 1992; Van Puyvelde, Caers, Du Bois & Jegers, 2012). Some 
authors refer to the board as the ‘interface stakeholder’, a crucial link between the 
organisation and its environment that can influence the ability to get funds (Balser & 
McClusky, 2005; Van Puyvelde, Caers, Du Bois & Jegers, 2012). A strong board is linked 
with organisational effectiveness (Herman & Renz, 1997), and the frequency that it is 
informed about NGOs operations and the timeline of their members’ decisions are relevant to 
an organisation’s performance (Stone & Ostrower, 2007). Callen et al. (2003) found that the 
presence of donors on the board acts as a positive signal to other donors.  
Strydom and Stephen (2014) examined the use of financial management practices on the 
ability to cope with financial distress, and drew attention to the experience of the financial 
manager related to budgeting, forecasting and management of cash resources. The authors 
found that organisations with less experienced financial managers are more likely to be 
financially vulnerable. This is comprehensible as adequate execution and monitoring of the 
budget and resources enable financial managers to take proper measures to hedge financial 
risks and to mitigate the impact of financial problems. For instance, programme activities 
                                                             
62 This is of special importance for NGOs that work with government institutions on projects or which require 
permits from officials.  
63 Some donors such as USAID and EU require recipient NGOs to collaborate with other NGOs on joint 
projects in order to apply for funding.  
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should be planned and implemented according to available cash flow, and the contracts of 
direct project staff should be conditional on donor agency funding.  
3.3.3.3 Community contributions 
Community contributions in the form of money, in-kind and volunteer labour contribute 
towards the sustainability of programmes and the survival of the organisations. AbouAssi 
(2013) studied the possible response of NGOs to shifts in donor funding, and acknowledged 
that one of the strategies to a drop in revenue is to mobilise the grassroots and to rely more on 
volunteer labour. Callen (1994) investigated the relationship between money donated, 
volunteering and technical efficiency of NGOs, and found that money donations and 
volunteer labour are complementary at the organisational level. The more efficient the 
organisation is (i.e. in terms of good reputation), the more able it is to attract community 
contributions.  
3.3.3.4. Size and years of experience 
According to recent studies, the size and age of an organisation are institutional factors that 
signify the reputation of an NGO (Trussel & Parsons, 2007; Strydom & Stephen, 2014). 
Ruben and Schulpen (2009) in their critical assessment of the allocation of public funding on 
Dutch non-governmental development organisations, found that larger organisations have a 
higher probability of being selected to receive funding and are deemed to have better 
networks and opportunities for partnerships than smaller organisations. An analogous 
situation was found with microfinance institutions, where larger organisations were shown to 
be more profitable and receive better rating scores on performance (Beisland, Mersland & 
Randøy, 2014). Age is another feature that reflects the reputation and experience of an 
organisation, which impacts positively on the amount of donations and scale of donor interest 
(Trussel & Parsons, 2007). 
In summary, there are specific conditions, such as the diversification of revenue sources, 
flexibility of donor funds and institutional capital that can explain the different impacts of a 
decrease in revenue on the operations of NGOs. 
Based on the foregoing, this study considered the following propositions:  
Proposition 1. The diversification of revenue sources is likely to help the NGO to maintain 
programme expenditure, because of the access to alternative sources of revenue, when an 
NGO loses funding from one source. 
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Proposition 2. High flexibility of donor funding (i.e. low level of restrictions on the 
utilisation of funds) enables NGO managers to reallocate expenditures and, therefore, to 
maintain programme expenditure when revenue decreases. 
Proposition 3. NGOs’ institutional capital contributes as a positive effect on maintaining 
programme expenditure in case of financial difficulties because of the potential to access 
alternative resources within the network. Institutional capital was seen as an experienced 
manager (CEO), who would likely be more connected to strong networks that can contribute 
to effective negotiation with stakeholders and the ability to attract donations, which could 
enable organisations to maintain programme performance following a drop in revenue. 
3.4. CASE-ORIENTED RESEARCH ON UGANDAN NGOS  
The presence or absence of specific conditions or combinations of conditions is analysed for 
a sample of Ugandan NGOs that all experienced a large drop in their revenue over the period 
2000–2001. The reduction in revenue may be the result of a delay in the transfer of funds or 
delay in renewal of contracts, termination of contracts as a result of projects being closed or 
even as per donor policy,
64
 non-compliance with donor requirements or non-performance, or 
a consequence of an economic downturn.  
Based on the literature review and field work, it can be stated that, as a result of the decrease 
of funding, NGOs are forced to decrease their programme expenditure. Expenditures directly 
linked to the provision of services, such as salaries of programme staff and provision of 
services (e.g. training and workshops, school fees, drugs) are immediately cut back. Other 
expenditures, such as rent and salaries of administrative staff, are maintained to ensure 
organisational sustainability. However, these operational costs are also negatively affected as 
a result of the downscaling of the number and scope of programme activities.  
3.4.1. Data and sample selection  
The base sample consists of 22 organisations of a panel survey of approximately 300 
Ugandan NGOs for the years 2000 and 2001. These NGOS experienced a drop of 
                                                             
64 For instance, US agencies do not fund NGOs for longer than 10 consecutive years. Even though in these cases 
the drop in revenue is expected, the problem is related to the perceptions of NGOs. They expect the funding to 
be renewed and are not always well informed regarding the policy of donors.  Walllace et al. (2006, p.125) 
showed that NGOs, especially local and smaller NGOs, have a lack of understanding about the funding process 
of donors and their policies. 
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more than 15 percent of their revenue between 2000 and 2001.
65
 Of these 22 
organisations 20 are local NGOs, and the remaining two are branches of an 
international NGO. In some cases organisations have offices in more than one 
geographical location. Only 30 percent of the sampled NGOs have offices in the 
capital, Kampala, and the others maintain offices across the country from where they 
implement projects. Each of these NGOs is dedicated to the provision of services and 
community development, raising public awareness, and advocacy and lobbying (see  
Table 3.4.1). The selected NGOs ranged from having only volunteers up to having 98 salaried 
staff. The CEOs of 11 of the NGOs have more than 10 years of professional experience. 
                                                             
65 This study considered a decrease in revenue for the period 2000–2001. It was not possible to consider the 
years 2006 and 2007, because detailed information on expenditure which is needed to investigate the impact of a 
drop in revenue on programme performance was not available. 
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Table 3.4.1: Research sample characteristics 
NGO 
ID 
Core Activity No. of staff and 
volunteers 
VAR in 
revenue (%) 
VAR Programme 
Expenditure (%) 
23 Raising public awareness 36 
[20 staff,16 volunteers] 
32% 45% 
41 Raising public awareness 24 
[15 staff, 9 volunteers] 
31% 31% 
53 Provision of services – elderly 8 
[8 volunteers] 
45% - 
60 Provision of services - relief 53 
[53 staff] 
17% 20% 
61 Provision of services - religious 62 
[32 staff, 30 volunteers] 
55% 64% 
79 Provision of services - enterprises 18 
[9 staff, 9 volunteers] 
71% 40% 
115 Provision of services - religious 18 
[2 staff, 16 volunteers] 
33% - 
118 Advocacy & lobbying 10 
[10 volunteers] 
34% - 
125 Provision of services - religious 9 
[8 staff, 1 volunteer] 
30% - 
135 Provision of services – training to women 3 
[3 volunteers] 
31% - 
140 Provision of services - education 10 
[2 staff, 8 volunteers] 
19% - 
152 Raising public awareness  8 
[8 volunteers] 
80% 66% 
159 Provision of services  12 
[12 volunteers] 
17% - 
168 Provision of services – training  13 
[3 staff, 10 volunteers] 
80% - 
173 Provision of services - training 19 
[11 staff, 8 volunteers] 
32% 50% 
187 Provision of services – health and 
education 
11 
[11 staff] 
30% - 
195 Provision of services - training 26 
[9 staff, 17 volunteers] 
56% - 
199 Provision of services -elderly 8 
[8 volunteers] 
53% - 
208 Provision of services - agriculture 8 
[8 staff] 
26% 32% 
216 Provision of services - health 98 
[98 staff] 
31% - 
278 Provision of services - training 10 
[6 staff, 4 volunteers] 
22% - 
300 Provision of services - agriculture 15 
[12 staff, 3 volunteers] 
37% 33% 
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3.4.2. Method of analysis and operationalisation 
The study used QCA
66
 to analyse the sample. It is particularly well suited for the purpose of 
this study as it is grounded in case-oriented research. The method entails the assumption that 
the ability of an NGO to safeguard programme expenditures when faced with a decrease in 
revenue can have different explanations depending on the existence or absence of specific 
conditions. This is the equifinality principle
67
, which applies when the same outcome can 
result from different causes (i.e. conditions) and from a variety of different combinations. 
Another principle is causal asymmetry, which is the combination of conditions leading to a 
specific outcome of interest which may be different from those leading to the absence of the 
outcome (Ragin, 2008).
68
 The method requires in-depth knowledge of cases by analysing 
cross-case patterns (i.e. by comparing cases) and identifies key conditions that lead to the 
same outcome (Ragin, 2008; Berg-Schlosser et al., 2009). Furthermore, QCA respects the 
diversity of characteristics of NGOs and their heterogeneity with regard to their different 
causally relevant conditions and contexts by comparing cases as combinations. The possible 
combinations of causal conditions (INUS
69
) that generate the same outcome (i.e. negative 
variation on programme expenditures) attempt to assess complex causation in a very simple 
way through a set of relations of necessity
70
 or sufficiency
71
. Consequently, the relevant issue 
of the method is on testing each complex combination of conditions rather than examining 
the net effect of each independent variable in a given outcome (Hsiao, Jaw, Huan, & 
Woodside, 2015). The method is particularly appropriate for small to intermediate N samples, 
as was the case in this study.  
QCA includes three distinctive methods of configurations (i.e. combinations of conditions): 
crisp-set QCA (csQCA), fuzzy-set QCA (fsQCA) and multivalue QCA. This study uses 
                                                             
66 To the best of the researcher’s knowledge QCA has never been applied as a comparative technique within the 
field of the non-profit sector. 
67 As opposed to ‘unifinality’ that assumes the occurrence of only one optimal combination. 
68 For example, an experienced CEO can help the NGO to maintain programme expenditure. But the absence of 
CEO experience does not mean that the NGO is not able to maintain programme expenditure. 
69 ‘INUS’ conditions are conditions that are not sufficient but a necessary part of the combination of conditions. 
70
 A condition is necessary if it must be present in order for a certain outcome to occur (Ragin, 1987). However, 
a necessary condition might also be present even when the outcome does not occur.  
71
 A condition is sufficient if a condition can lead to a specific outcome by itself. Sufficient conditions are not 
present if the outcome does not occur (Ragin, 1987). 
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csQCA for two reasons. Firstly, is the simplest and most straightforward and is thus easy to 
present because it uses binary variables (0 or 1). A value of 1 indicates the presence of a 
particular condition and 0 its absence. Secondly, the results are more directly comparable 
with previous research because of the dichotomous nature of the outcome. The Boolean 
minimisation technique
72
 allows for a reduction of the complexity and results in more 
parsimonious combinations of conditions linked to the outcome. For instance, if two 
configurations differ in only one causal condition, yet produce the same outcome, then the 
causal condition that distinguishes the two configurations is not relevant and the two 
configurations can be combined into a single configuration (Ragin, 1987).  
The use of csQCA includes three technical components of analysis (Basedau & Richter, 
2014): the truth table, the solutions of combinations of conditions, and the measures of fit. 
The truth table displays the data showing the conditions as columns, the number of cases 
associated with the combination of conditions listed in the row (i.e. the distribution of cases 
across causal combinations), the value of the outcome and consistency of each combination 
of conditions. The solutions of combinations of conditions show the causally relevant 
conditions that lead to the occurrence of the outcome. In the solution of combinations of 
conditions uppercase letters signify the ‘existence’ of a condition or outcome (i.e. having the 
value 1) and lowercase letters signify the ‘absence’ (i.e. having the value 0) of a specific 
condition or outcome. The measures of fit are consistency and coverage. Consistency refers 
to the percentage of causal combinations of similar composition which result in the same 
outcome. In other words, if consistency of a given combination (or condition) is low, it means 
that is not supported by empirical evidence (i.e. cases). Coverage refers to the number of 
cases for which a combination of conditions (or condition) is valid (analogous to 𝑅2in 
statistical analysis). When there are several causal combinations, the coverage may be small. 
Nevertheless, they are still useful to explain those cases that result in the outcome. The 
guidelines used in this study are that a csQCA model is useful when its consistency is equal 
to or greater than 0.85 and its coverage is above 0.00. A high score indicates high 
membership scores in the outcome.  
                                                             
72 Further information on this technique can be found in the The comparative method (Ragin, 1987).  
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3.4.2.1. Outcome: maintenance of programme expenditure as a proxy of programme 
performance 
Programme performance (i.e. the outcome) of csQCA refers to the ability of the NGO to at 
least maintain programme expenditure. It takes the value 1 if the NGO increases or maintains 
the amount of programme expenditure from 2000 to 2001; and 0 otherwise (i.e. if programme 
expenditure decreases). This study considers programme expenditure as the sum of (i) direct 
programme expenditure that goes to the beneficiaries: drugs, school fees and materials, and 
training sessions and workshops; and (ii) subsistence allowance per diem to NGO staff, and 
number of volunteers and beneficiaries to go to the field.
73
 The cost structure and the relative 
percentage of each cost as a total of expenditure is provided in Appendix B.  
For the selected sample of NGOs, two organisations that reported a decrease in the amount of 
programme expenditures did not decrease the share of expenditure allocated to programmes 
to the same extent. Those organisations were considered able to safeguard programmes and to 
limit the impact of the drop in revenue on programmes by shifting resources from another 
cost category towards affected programmes.  
3.4.2.2. The conditional effects of programme performance 
Based on the relevant literature and previous research findings (from Chapter 2) the 
following variables are considered to reflect the conditions that may influence the outcome of 
a decrease in revenue:  
(1) Two variables for the diversification of the revenue base 
 Diversification index. In Chapter 2 it was found that the revenue concentration index was 
a significant predictor of financial distress. If the total revenue comes from one source, 
then the index is equal to 1, and it decreases as the number of sources increases. The 
value of the index also falls as the share of the several sources of revenue also increases 
and becomes more equal. The cut-off point selected was 0.7 based on analysis of revenue 
structure of the sampled NGOs and on Chang and Tuckman’s (1994) study. The authors 
considered NGOs as having concentrated revenue if the value of the index is higher than 
                                                             
73 To be accurate it should include other costs, such as project staff (i.e. professionals and skilled labour) and 
fuel expenses that are incurred in the pursuit of programme activities. However, these costs were not specified in 
the data. 
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0.65. An NGO that exhibits a high diversification of its revenue is assumed to have more 
options through which to fund operations, i.e. to shift another source of revenue toward 
the specific programme activities.  
 Grant penetration. Burger and Owens (2013) found that Ugandan NGOs are funded 
mainly by donors and are less financially vulnerable than community-funded NGOs. 
Therefore, in this chapter, access to donor funding was used as a proxy of financial 
stability. According to the same authors, access to grant funding is also associated with a 
higher probability to access other sources of revenue (Burger & Owens, 2008). Once an 
NGO has received a grant, it is likely to have other proposals accepted and approved by 
other donors
74
 and it is therefore in a stronger position to secure and continue with 
projects. This variable is operationalised by taking the value 1 if the NGO receives 
funding from donors and 0 otherwise.
75
 
(2) Two variables for the flexibility of funds 
 Availability of unrestricted funds, which include membership fees, other fees paid by 
beneficiaries, income from services rendered, income from commercial activities and 
private donations (i.e. financial contributions). This type of revenue can generally be used 
in a discretionary manner by NGOs to cover unfunded expenses and financial shortfalls. 
It is expected that the presence of unrestricted funds or the likelihood of increasing the 
amount of these funds can mitigate the impact of a drop in other sources of revenue on 
programme expenditure. The cut-off point was set to 15 percent based on the percentage 
used to select the financially vulnerable NGOs (i.e. the sampled NGOs). The variable 
takes the value 1 if the NGOs have more than 15 percent of their revenue from 
unrestricted funding sources, and 0 otherwise. 
 Overhead costs as a percentage of total expenditures. The proportion of overhead costs on 
the total expenditure is a proxy for flexibility of donors. Donors that fund overhead costs 
                                                             
74 Burger and Owens (2008) showed that there is a ‘funding allocation mechanism’ according to which NGOs 
that have received grants previously have a higher proportion of total revenue derived from grants.  
75 The same criterion was used in the previous chapter based on the analysis of the distribution of the variable to 
identify donor-funded NGOs (page 47). The grants include revenue from international NGOs, Ugandan NGOs, 
UN organisations and bilateral donors. 
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only allow a small percentage,
76
 which ranges from 5 percent to 15 percent. This study 
considered a threshold of 5 percent. As stated earlier, NGOs with a larger share of 
overhead costs are expected to be able to shift expenditure towards affected programmes 
and therefore to reallocate expenditure in order to continue with operations.  
(3) Three variables for the institutional capital  
 Professional experience of CEO equal to or more than 10 years of experience. The CEO’s 
previous and current work experience is a proxy for CEO competence as well for his/her 
networks. Leaders, such as a CEO who is better connected, are in a better position to 
secure funding. This variable takes the value 1 if the CEO has more than 10 years of 
experience, and 0 otherwise. This operationalisation was based on a commonly applied 
minimum requirement for the CEO position.
77
 
 Community contributions in the forms of in-kind, financial or labour contributions. NGOs 
that are able to mobilise communities to contribute resources towards programmes are 
more likely to maintain programme expenditures. It takes the value 1 if the NGO receives 
any contribution from beneficiaries and 0 otherwise.  
 Size in terms of the number of salaried staff. Larger NGOs with more visibility and more 
internal capacity are more likely to attract resources through their organisational networks 
and personal relationships in order to maintain programme performance. It takes the value 
1 if the NGO has more than 10 workers, a value based on examining the typical size of 
NGOs in the sample. 
Table 3.4.2 details the variables and measures and the threshold used to make the data 
feasible for the csQCA. The information about each condition and its calibration (i.e. 
operationalisation of each variable) across the set of cases being assessed is presented in the 
data matrix in Appendix B.  
 
                                                             
76 For example, Global Affairs Canada allows 12% indirect costs. Available from: 
http://www.international.gc.ca/development-developpement/partners-partenaires/bt-oa/overhead-
compensation.aspx?lang=eng#app1. USAID do not allow indirect costs. Available from: 
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pnadl393.pdf.    
77 To define the cut-off point for CEO experience variable several recruitment websites were consulted. 
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Table 3.4.2: Conditions to mitigate the impact on programmes and threshold points 
Conditions  Variables Measure Threshold points 
Diversification of 
revenue base 
Diversification 
index 
∑ (
𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 𝑗
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑠
)
2
 
> 0.7 concentration index 
 Grants penetration NGO grants, UN organisation or 
bilateral donor 
Receive funding from 
grants 
Flexibility of funds and 
resource allocation 
Unrestricted funds Proportion of unrestricted funds  > 15% in 2001  
 Overhead costs Services rendered, grants, 
donations and other contributions, 
and other non-operational costs  
> 5% amount of overheads 
as a percentage of total 
costs 
Institutional capital CEO experience No. of years with the NGO and 
previous work with another NGO 
> 10 years 
 Community 
contribution 
In cash, in kind, in labour 
contribution 
If beneficiaries pay or 
contribute for NGO’ 
services 
 Size Number of salaried staff > 10 no. of salaried staff  
 
Figure 3.4.1 presents a summary of the conditions, variables and the outcome considered in 
the study. 
Figure 3.4.1: Summary of the research  
 
Features and 
Conditions 
Diversification of 
revenue 
• Diversification index 
• Grant penetration 
Donor Flexibility 
• Unrestricted funds 
• Overhead costs 
Institutional Capital 
• CEO experience  
• Community contribution  
• Size 
Programme 
performance 
Maintain the amount of 
programme 
expenditure from 2000 
to 2001 
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3.4.3. Empirical analysis  
This section presents the results using four variables of the three possible causal conditions 
that were explained in the previous section. Each condition was assigned to each case and 
compared outcomes (i.e. if the NGO maintained programme expenditure or not) across cases. 
The data matrix is presented in Appendix B. The conditions presented in this section are the 
set of variables that explain the outcome better (i.e. higher consistency and coverage). For 
transparency, the results from other models and conditions are presented in Appendix B. 
3.4.3.1 Model and truth table  
The model uses csQCA to test for the necessary and sufficient conditions to avoid a decrease 
of programme expenditure. 
Maintenance of programme expenditure = f (diversification of revenue, flexibility of donors, 
institutional capital) (1) 
Table 2.3.1 presents the truth table for Model (1) (to simplify the presentation, only rows with 
cases are shown). There are eight possible configurations combining three binomial 
conditions (8 = 23): not all are covered by empirical cases (i.e. no logical remainders).  
There are two non-contradictory rows: one that is uniform in displaying the outcome, i.e. 
maintain programme expenditure (consistency = 1.0; rows 1; NGO 195), and one that is 
uniform in not displaying the outcome (consistency = 0.0; row 8; NGO 41).
78
 There are six 
contradictory rows (rows 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7), i.e. consistency scores not equal to one or zero
79
. 
Two of the contradictory rows (rows 3 and 7) can be explained by using a deeper analysis 
through interviews of the specific cases, namely NGOs 23 and 300. The programmes of both 
organisations were not affected by the decrease in revenue because they reallocated costs in 
order to protect programmes (i.e. increasing the share of resources allocated to programmes) 
(see cost structure in Appendix B).
80
 Since the inconsistency of these two cases could be 
                                                             
78 The consistency is measured by the percentage of the cases in each row that display the outcome. If the 
consistency is equal to 1, it means that all cases were able to maintain programme expenditure. See Section 
3.4.2. 
79 According to Ragin (1987), it is acceptable to relax the standard of consistency cores if the consistency case 
can be explained by its specific circumstances. 
80 Interviews with key informants of NGO 23 and 300 confirmed these specific situations.  
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explained, the cases were not relevant to the combination of conditions and therefore were set 
aside.  
Table 3.4.3: Truth table 
Note: D=diversification of revenue; O=overhead costs; E=experience of the CEO; P=maintain programme 
expenditure 
A comparison of the positive and negative cases in rows 2, 4 and 6 reveals that the cases 
(NGOs 60, 61, 79, 208) do not have unrestricted funds, whilst all other organisations that 
maintained programme expenditure have unrestricted funds. This suggests that having 
unrestricted funds is a necessary condition to maintain programme expenditure. The variable 
is thus added to the model. 
In the revised   
 Conditions   Outcome 
Row D O E  n. Cases n. Adjust 
(NGO ID) 
n. Not Adjust 
(NGO ID) 
Consistency 
 
1 0 1 1  1 
 
0 1 
(195) 
1 
2 0 1 0  4 
 
1 
(61) 
3 
(199/216/159) 
0.75 
3 1 1 1  3 
 
1 
(300) 
2 
(118/140) 
0.66667 
4 1 0 1  3 
 
1 
(79) 
2 
(53/278) 
0.6667 
5 1 0 0  2 
 
1 
(152) 
1 
(168) 
0.5 
6 0 0 0  4 
 
2 
(208/60) 
2 
(135/125) 
0.5 
7 0 0 1  4 
 
2 
(173/23) 
2 
(115/187) 
0.5 
8 1 1 0  1 
 
1 
(41) 
0  0 
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Table 3.4.4 the cases that safeguard programme expenditure are removed (i.e. NGO 23 and 
300) and two contradictory cases of the previous table are resolved. 
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Table 3.4.4: Revised truth table 
 Conditions  Outcome 
Row D O E U  n. Cases n. Adjust 
(NGO ID) 
n. Not Adjust 
(NGO ID) 
Consistency 
1 0 1 1 1  1 0 1 
(195) 
1 
2 0 0 0 1  2 
 
0 2 
(125/135) 
1 
3 0 0 1 0  2 
 
0 2 
(115/187) 
1 
4 1 0 1 1  2 
 
0 2 
(53/278) 
1 
5 0 1 0 1  3 
 
0 3 
(159/199/216
) 
1 
6 1 1 1 1  2 
 
0 
 
2 
(118/140) 
1 
7 1 0 0 1  2 
 
1 
(152) 
1 
(168) 
0.5 
8 0 0 0 0  2 2 
(60/208) 
0 0 
9 1 1 0 0  1 1 
(41) 
0 0 
10 1 0 1 0  1 1 
(79) 
0 0 
11 0 1 0 0  1 1 
(61) 
0 0 
12 0 0 1 1  1 1 
(173) 
0 0 
13 1 1 1 0  0 - - - 
14 1 1 0 1  0 - - - 
15 1 0 0 0  0 - - - 
16 0 1 1 0  0 - - - 
Note: D=diversification of revenue; O=overhead costs; E=experience of the CEO; U=unrestricted revenue; 
P=maintain programme expenditure.  “-” indicates that there are no empirical cases with the combination of 
conditions listed in the row. 
According to Ragin (2008) consistency scores should be as close to 1.0 as possible. 
Consistency scores below 0.85 make it difficult to assert that a set relation exists, therefore it 
is coded as 0. In fact, NGO 168 (row 7) has experienced the highest drop in its revenue (80 
percent), which is expected to affect programme expenses negatively. But, surprisingly the 
organisation reported an increase in programme expenditure. According to Barr, Fafchamps 
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and Owens (2005), the data are not fully accurate and transparent. In addition, NGO 168 is 
funded by donor grants and therefore may be tempted to misreport information in order to 
satisfy donor interests by hiding operational costs under programme costs.
81
  
3.4.3.2 Identifying the necessary conditions to maintain programme performance 
There is no single necessary condition for maintaining programme performance (i.e. none of 
the consistency values reaches a value of 1.00 in Table 3.4.5. and Table 3.4.6 for the eight 
different values of the four binomial conditions that are tested).
8283
 In other words, none of 
the conditions is always present when organisations are able to maintain programme 
performance. 
Table 3.4.5: Results for the necessary conditions tests of maintenance of programme 
expenditure 
Configurations Consistency Coverage 
DIVERSIFICATION 0.3846 0.6250 
diversification 0.6154 0.6667 
OVERHEAD 0.4615 0.7500 
overhead 0.5385 0.5833 
EXPERIENCE 0.5385 0.7778 
experience 0.4615 0.5455 
UNRESTRICTED 0.8462 0.8462 
unrestricted 0.1538 0.2857 
Note: uppercase letters represent the ‘existence’ of a condition (i.e. having the value 1)  
and lowercase letters represent the ‘absence’ of a specific condition (i.e. having the value 0). 
 
                                                             
81 According to Verbruggen and Christiaens (2012) donors evaluate programme expenses of NGOs as a proxy 
of “good use” of organisation’s money when they make decisions about donating money. This fact results in 
NGOs shifting expenses from one category to another in order to attract more donor funding.  
82 The consistency value of a necessary condition refers to the degree to which this specific condition overlaps 
with a particular outcome relative to all cases with the same outcome. If a given condition is presented in all 
cases and all have the same outcome, the consistency value will be 1.00 – indicating that is a necessary 
condition. For example, the first row of the Table 3.4.5, shows that 38.46 percent of the samples of NGOs that 
maintained programmes expenditure (i.e. outcome equal to 1) has a diversified revenue, which means that five 
NGOs (NGOs 53, 118, 140, 168, 278) that have a diversified revenue (i.e. diversify variable equal to 1) out of 
thirteen NGOs, were able to maintain programme expenditure (i.e. outcome equal to 1).  
83 The coverage value of a necessary condition refers to the number of cases with the same outcome that 
overlaps with the necessary condition. For example, the first row of the Table 3.4.5, shows that 62.5 percent of 
the sampled NGOs that has a diversified revenue (i.e. diversified variable equal to 1) were able to maintain 
programme expenditure, which means that five NGOs (NGOs 53, 118, 140, 168, 278) out eight NGOs (NGOs 
41, 53, 79, 118, 140, 152, 168, 278) that have a diversified revenue (i.e. diversify variable equal to 1) were able 
to maintain programme expenditure (i.e. outcome equal to 1). The interpretation of the coverage coefficients of 
the necessary conditions is only meaningful at consistency values of 1.00.  
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Similar to the necessary tests for the maintenance of programme expenditure, there is no 
necessary condition for reducing programme expenditure (i.e. the contrary of the outcome).  
Table 3.4.6: Results for the necessary conditions tests of reduction on programme 
expenditure 
Configurations Consistency Coverage 
DIVERSIFICATION 0.4286 0.3750 
diversification 0.5714 0.3333 
OVERHEAD 0.2857 0.2500 
overhead 0.7143 0.4167 
EXPERIENCE 0.2857 0.2222 
experience 0.7143 0.4545 
UNRESTRICTED 0.2857 0.1538 
unrestricted 0.7143 0.7143 
Note: uppercase letters represent the ‘existence’ of a condition (i.e. having the value 1)  
and lowercase letters represent the ‘absence’ of a specific condition (i.e. having the value 0). 
3.4.3.3 Identifying sufficient and INUS conditions of programme performance  
Boolean minimisation is used to test for sufficient conditions in relation to the outcome. The 
Boolean operationalisation has three possible solutions: the parsimonious solution, the 
complex solution and the intermediate solution. For the purpose of this study the 
parsimonious solution that includes assumptions about logical remainders (that are not 
represented through empirical cases) is presented.  
The parsimonious solution points to five different combinations (i.e. equifinal) that help 
organisations to maintain programme expenditure.  
Table 3.4.7: Parsimonious solution for maintaining programme expenditure  
Combinations   Boolean expression  Raw 
coverage 
Unique 
coverage 
Consistency 
1. diversification*EXPERIENCE*unrestricted  0.153846 0.153846 1 
2. diversification *experience* UNRESTRICTED 0.384615 0.153846 1 
3. DIVERSIFICATION *EXPERIENCE* 
UNRESTRICTED 
0.307692 0.153846 1 
4. OVERHEAD* EXPERIENCE 0.230769 0 1 
5. OVERHEAD *UNRESTRICTED 0.461538 0 1 
     
Solution consistency: 1, solution coverage: 0.923077    
Note: uppercase letters represent the ‘existence’ of a condition (i.e. having the value 1) and lowercase letters 
represent the ‘absence’ of a specific condition (i.e. having the value 0). 
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Raw coverage measures the proportion of cases in the outcome explained by each term in the solution (Ragin, 
2008). Unique coverage measures the proportion of cases in the outcome explained solely by each individual 
solution term, which are not covered by other solution terms (Ragin, 2008).  
* indicates the conjunctive ‘and’. 
In the first combination the existence of manager experience, low diversification of income 
and the absence of unrestricted funds together are sufficient conditions to maintain 
programme expenditure. This combination is compatible with Proposition 3 (see Section 3.3), 
where the manager and his network are important tools to manage the restricted funds 
available. Manager experience and his/her strong networks with donors play an important 
role in the reallocation of restricted donor funds. The two cases (NGOs 115 and 187) that 
fulfil the combination present a consistency of 1 and a raw coverage of 15.38 percent.
84
 
The second combination is comprised of five organisations, NGOs 125, 135, 159, 199 and 
216, that have unrestricted income, low diversification of income and low manager 
experience. This combination highlights the importance of the existence of unrestricted 
funds, whether they come from a single source or not. The consistency for this combination is 
1 and a raw coverage of 38.46 percent.  
The third combination is comprised of four NGOs (NGOs 53, 118, 140 and 278) that have 
diversified income sources, unrestricted income and management experience and were able to 
maintain programme expenditure. This combination is in line with the two previous 
combinations. The organisations that have experienced managers who can use the diverse 
sources of funding in a discretionary manner are able to maintain programme expenditure. 
The consistency for this combination is 1 and a raw coverage of 30.77 percent. 
The fourth combination (NGOs 140, 118 and 195) shows that a minimum share of overhead 
costs, together with manager experience, are sufficient conditions to allow NGOs to maintain 
programme expenditure. These organisations also have unrestricted income which is 
consistent with the previous combinations. Three out of 13 NGOs were able to maintain 
programme expenditure (23.08 percent). 
                                                             
84 Raw coverage measures the proportion of cases in the outcome explained by the cases that fulfil solely that 
particular combination (Ragin, 2008). In other words, the degree to which a specific combination “accounts for” 
the number of cases of the outcome. For example, two NGOs (NGOs 115 and 187)  that fulfil the combination 
of conditions in the first row were able to maintain programme expenditure (out of the thirteen NGOs from the 
sample that maintained programme expenditure). 
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Finally the last combination reflects the importance of flexibility of donors and the low level 
of restriction on the utilisation of funds and supports Proposition 2 (see Section 3.3). This 
combination leads to the outcome in 46.15 percent of the NGOs (NGOs 118, 140, 159, 195, 
199 and 216) that were able to maintain programme expenditure (i.e. six NGOs that have 
unrestricted funds and overhead costs) with a consistency level of 1 (i.e. all cases that fit in 
this combination of conditions were able to maintain programme expenditure). 
All four conditions in the model are relevant in explaining the ability of organisations to 
maintain programme expenditure. They form the INUS conditions as part of the five 
sufficient explanations. The consistency for this solution is 0.9231, which means that the 
cases covered by the five combinations are a subset of membership in the outcome (i.e. 
number of NGOs that maintain programme expenditure). The results suggest firstly, that 
there are different combinations of conditions that lead to the outcome, and secondly, and in 
accordance with earlier research and empirical evidence, the presence of unrestricted donor 
funding and manager experience are important conditions to cope with financial problems 
and to protect programmes.  
3.4.4. Test of the model  
3.4.4.1 Robustness  
According to Skaaning (2011), there are three possible methods to check for robustness: 
change of case selection, model specifications, and/or the operationalisation
85
 of the outcome 
and conditions. This study firstly uses the change of model specification through the addition 
of an explanatory condition (i.e. unrestricted revenue). Secondly, the study uses the 
replication of the model QCA by replacing the explanatory condition of diversification of 
revenue sources with access to grants and the explanatory conditions of institutional capital 
(i.e. manager experience) with size and community contribution. Thirdly, it tests the effect of 
different ways to operationalise the explanatory conditions (i.e. the thresholds of the 
conditions or thresholds), specifically overhead costs (from 5 percent to 10 percent) and years 
of experience (from 10 years to 5 years) and explores the similarity of findings. Overall, the 
results are consistent with the outcomes presented in the study. The model presented in this 
chapter was the one with the highest level of consistency and coverage, which means that the 
                                                             
85 As used in the QCA model. 
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set of conditions explains the outcome better than the alternative models tested. The results of 
the robustness tests (i.e. the alternative models) are presented in Appendix B. 
3.4.4.2 Testing the quantitative analysis through interviews 
To test the empirical results and to add more granularity and texture to the research (e.g. 
reasons for the drop in revenue and consequently the real impact on programme delivery), in-
depth interviews were conducted with a few NGOs that experienced a drop in revenue 
between 2000 and 2001. The interviews were carried out in Uganda during 2016. The 
purpose of the fieldwork was to gain further insight into the financial and operational 
vulnerability of NGOs. It also provides insight into how managers cope with financial 
problems and anticipated risks (a theme that will be further explored in Chapter 4). The 
questionnaire consisted of six open-ended questions that helped to facilitate structured as well 
as open-ended discussion to explore participants’ experiences. Specifically, it investigated 
how individuals perceive their financial situation, the type of financial problems they faced, 
how they responded to such problems, how they were affected by a decrease in revenue, and 
the type of coping mechanisms they employ to mitigate such impacts. The questionnaire is 
set out in Appendix B.  
The informants were individuals who manage NGOs and they all had more than five years of 
experience. The participating NGOs were selected from the panel survey of approximately of 
300 NGOs in Uganda for the years 2000 and 2001 based on the criterion that they had 
experienced a reduction in revenue of more than 15 percent. The final sample of NGOs 
interviewed was 8 out of 22 NGOs (NGOs 23, 53, 79, 115, 118, 152, 208 and 300), which 
represents approximately 36 percent of the entire sample used in this chapter.
86
 
The insights that follow from the interviews are perceived to be reasonably well aligned with 
and generally supportive of the findings of the QCA method. During the interviews the 
respondents frequently mentioned the importance of access to unrestricted funds, especially 
related to the funding of overhead costs to secure organisational sustainability. In our sample 
only two NGOs (NGO 115 and NGO 187) (  
                                                             
86 Although the pre-selected list of NGOs included many more NGOs than the ones interviewed based on NGOs 
that had experienced a large drop in revenue it was not practical to interview all of them due to changing 
circumstances (e.g. some NGOs stop operating). Another reason was because it was difficult to access NGOs on 
the ground as an independent academic and foreign researcher. 
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Table 3.4.4) out of 13 that were able to maintain programme expenditure (i.e. 15 percent) had 
restrictions on their income. On the other hand, three NGOs (23
87
, 152 and 173) of the seven 
NGOs that experienced a drop in programme expenditure had unrestricted funds (i.e. 43 
percent). However, they reported no overhead costs. Where the two conditions were 
considered together as a proxy of donor flexibility (all cases had more than 30 percent of 
funding from donors), there was no reported case with room to reallocate expenses that had 
decreased programme expenditure when faced with a shortfall in revenue. The field work 
strongly supports Proposition 2 (see Section 3.3) with the majority of respondents mentioning 
the issue of unfunded overhead costs when asked if they were worried about the 
organisation’s financial sustainability. The lack of funding for overhead costs did not allow 
organisations to build capacity and to expand (i.e. build assets such as 
premises/infrastructure).
88
 One participant, from NGO 118, which had been able to maintain 
programme expenditure, said: “Donors don’t want to give you money for administrative 
costs. They always tell you only 10 percent for administration as if you are going to hang on 
air to implement the activities”. A few respondents even stated that they do not apply for 
grants when the support for core costs is very small relative to the project’s implementation 
needs.  
Regarding the diversification of revenue sources over the period, broadening the financial 
base was not a priority for NGOs in Uganda. The country experienced an influx of 
international funding, particularly from the USA, to fund long-term projects (as mentioned in 
Section 3.1). The sample is comprised of organisations that rely mainly on a few stable 
sources of funding from donors. Eighteen out of 22 organisations (82 percent) received more 
funding from grants (i.e. donor funded) than from any other sources of revenue. The 
remaining four NGOs (18 percent) received revenue from memberships. Moreover, all cases 
in the sample that had to decrease programme expenditure had access to grants (i.e. nine 
NGOs), which implies that access to grants is not a sufficient condition to ensure financial 
sustainability. Four of these nine NGOs were interviewed: three (NGOs 152, 208 and 300) of 
                                                             
87 The participant NGO 23 reported having a well-diversified funding structure including financial investments 
on the stock market as a strategy to deal with financial vulnerability.  
88 Three interviewees referred to the Global Fund as an example of a grant that empowers organisations by 
providing unrestricted funds which enable them to set up infrastructure. This donor based its monitoring method 
on result-oriented reports, i.e. whether organisations achieve the objectives and goals agreed.  
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which reported that the drop in revenue was a result of termination of projects or the end of 
donor contracts. They also reported difficulties in getting more donors on board to continue 
funding their activities, despite their performance. The participant from NGO 300, which had 
not been able to maintain programme expenditure, remarked: “for a long time we were 
working with one donor so it was difficult for us to have a second donor. It took us time”. 
The reasons they provided were mainly related to changes in donor priorities, such as 
mandate and location. This situation is illustrated by the participant of NGO 23, which works 
in advocacy for human rights: “Uganda is not a priority as such anymore. Before there was a 
lot of interest as its democratic declined donors’ interest also declined”. NGO 79 reflected a 
decrease in programme expenditure, but this was a result of a change in the organisation’s 
strategy in delivering services from being a project-based organisation to becoming a project-
driven organisation (i.e. advocacy) using experienced volunteer labour, particularly retired 
people who wanted to continue working.
89
  
In terms of institutional capital as condition and regarding the last proposition, it was found 
that the experience of the manager plays an important role in sustaining the finances of the 
organisation. Two of the organisations (NGOs 23 and 53), which performed well in terms of 
protecting programmes from financial vulnerability, had managers with 15 and 29 years of 
experience respectively. They emphasised that the reputation of the manager is a crucial 
factor in times of financial vulnerability. For instance, NGO 23
90
 was able to go through 
many structural changes in terms of strategic plan because the manager, who was about to 
leave the organisation, was asked to stay since he had strong networks. The words of the 
manager of NGO 23 serves as illustration: “Me I am an asset because my presence adds value 
to the organisation … the benefits are more in terms of visibility, knowledge and networks. 
My role is to open grounds.” NGO 53 was able to maintain programme expenditure because 
of the support of its executive director, who had provided an office for the continuation of 
activities and who had also mobilised resources from his friends. The general secretary of 
NGO 53 added: “One of the Board members had provided us an office … he had given it for 
free.” This serves as one of the reasons why NGO 53 was able to maintain programme 
expenditure.  
                                                             
89
 This organisation did not consider itself financially vulnerable. 
90 This organisation had a drop in revenue but increases the share on programme expenditure.  
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3.5. INTERPRETATION OF THE RESULTS AND LIMITATIONS 
Despite the importance of having diversified revenue sources as highlighted in the literature 
review (see Section 3.3.1) and in the previous chapter, the findings show that NGOs in 
Uganda were able to maintain programme expenditure despite having only a few sources of 
funding. This can be explained by the fact that, during the period under investigation, the 
funding for most organisations that were receiving long-term funding and grants were 
renewed, as shared by the participating NGOs. However, reliance on just a few donor sources 
still increases the risk of financial vulnerability as donors can change their strategies and 
priorities, as was reported by practitioners in the interviews. Another possible explanation 
derives from a limitation of the data to construct a reliable diversification variable, as the data 
do not accurately reveal how many sources are in each category, for example, the numbers of 
donors that are inside the grant category. There is strong evidence that unrestricted funds and 
flexibility of donors are important conditions to maintain programme expenditure. Four of the 
five possible combinations of conditions include the presence of unrestricted revenue or 
overhead costs to maintain programme expenditure when NGOs experience a decrease of 
revenue. The same conclusion was found in the interviews. Practitioners frequently reported 
the challenge of the absence of support for overhead costs and the number of restrictions 
imposed on the use of funds. Interviewees specifically mentioned the difficulties they face in 
building financial capacity that can sustain the organisations in times of financial difficulty. 
This finding is in agreement with the research of Chikoto and Neely (2013) (and others as 
discussed in Section 3.3.2), who show that organisations with higher capacity are likely to be 
more financially stable. 
The leadership was verified to be an important condition of the model to sustain programme 
expenditure. This is consistent with the literature (see Section 3.3.3). The findings from 
interviews substantiate this as participants mentioned that the good networking of leaders 
contributes to the building of trust and the good reputation of the organisation in the 
international community. This fact raises a question about the sustainability of young and less 
experienced organisations with usually weaker networks, as explained earlier (see Section 
3.3.3).  
There are certain limitations to the study that warrant further research. The approach used 
focuses on particular cases to identify different combinations of conditions that are important 
for a given outcome in a given context. In developed countries financial needs are much 
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smaller and NGOs have other funding structures (such as a higher share of private and 
corporate contributions). It would be interesting to replicate the model in different contexts, 
including in developed countries, in order to test the wider applicability of this model.  
The second limitation is the small overlap between the secondary data used for the analysis 
and the interviews conducted. The time gap between the secondary data collection and the 
interviews limited the number of cases that could be accessed for confirmation of the initial 
findings. It would be interesting to extend the investigation to more recent years to broaden 
the sample by also considering organisations that did not experience a decrease in revenue.  
The third limitation is related to the sample selection criteria, which was focused on 
financially vulnerable NGOs only. It would be relevant to extend the study to financially non-
vulnerable NGOs (as per the criteria used in the study) and investigate how they perform in 
face of financial difficulties.  
The last limitation is related to the extent to which the decrease of programme expenditure 
actually reflects a negative impact on programmes and beneficiaries. Certain programmes 
may be implemented efficiently without requiring high budgets, for instance, using 
volunteers instead of paid staff. In addition, projects in the final phase of implementation 
typically rely less on financial support.  
The more in-depth exploration of the NGOs revealed that some organisations that were 
classified as financially vulnerable based on the chosen criteria and the nature of the available 
data were, in fact, not truly financially vulnerable. This reality, which was only accessible 
through more in-depth study methods, may have played a role in the lack of statistical 
significance of certain variables tested in Chapter 2.The research will therefore expand into a 
more ground-level exploration of, for example, the reasons behind decreases in revenue, the 
ways in which programmes are affected by decreases in revenue, and the financial decisions 
made by practitioners, which forms the purpose of Chapter 4. 
3.6. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS  
This chapter follows from the previous chapter on the financial vulnerability of NGOs. It 
explored the presence of specific conditions in organisations that should be present so as to 
enable NGOs to successfully implement strategies to deal with financial vulnerability. 
Specifically, based on the previous chapter, it was proposed that a diversified revenue base, 
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flexibility in the use of donor funding and a high level of institutional capital would assist 
organisations to maintain programme expenditure. 
By using the QCA method, which is new in the NGO field, it was found that unrestricted 
revenue and donor flexibility as well as manager experience are important conditions to 
mitigate the impact on NGO programmes when a drop in revenue is experienced. In addition, 
there is no single condition that can secure sustainability of programme delivery following a 
decrease in revenue, but rather certain combinations of conditions.  
In order to strengthen the results and considering the limitation of the QCA method (i.e. the 
degree of arbitrariness for operationalisation), some robustness tests were firstly performed 
and then field work was conducted to collect primary data from key informants of a number 
of NGOs from our sample. The results from the robustness tests and the interviews largely 
confirm the propositions and the empirical analysis. The interviews with key individuals also 
shed light on current coping mechanisms in the case of financial vulnerability, and this will 
be analysed in more detail in the next chapter. 
This research makes an important contribution to the literature on the financial vulnerability 
of NGOs and the impact of this on programme delivery. The impacts of a decrease in revenue 
on either programme expenditures or operation of the organisations are obviously not equal 
among NGOs and there are different combinations of conditions that can contribute towards 
the programme sustainability of NGOs. This study assists managers to design strategic plans 
for sustainability and development. For instance, organisations with unrestricted income are 
likely to build endowments that ensure financial stability during hard times, such as renting 
out of premises or vehicles. The findings also leave room for further research, for example, 
examining the mandate and core activity of each organisation and equifinal pathways that 
lead to maintain programme expenditure.  
This chapter set the ground for the next chapter because it was realised that the data available 
and the methods used to study financial vulnerability of NGOs in developing countries do not 
offer a clear understanding of the whole system within which NGOs operate. For example, 
impoverished environments, typically in developing countries, limit the ability of 
organisations to raise significant community contributions which makes the variable of 
community contribution insignificant. In addition, many of the systematic factors are not well 
capture through quantitative methods. The awareness that other variables can affect the 
financial stability and vulnerability of NGOs and their capacity to manage the impact of such 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
101 
 
 
vulnerabilities on programmes will be addressed by shifting the focus away from secondary 
empirical data exclusively towards primary qualitative data.  
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APPENDIX B 
Appendix B 1: Cost structure of the sampled NGOs 
 Personnel Travel Operational Indirect Capital Programme 
NGO 2000 2001 2000 2001 2000 2001 2000 2001 2000 2001 2000 2001 
23 12% 43% 0% 0% 2% 4% 0% 1% 65% 13% 21% 40% 
41 15% 19% 2% 3% 2% 2% 14% 21% 17% 6% 50% 48% 
53 15% 17% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 85% 83% 
60 21% 22% 1% 1% 3% 3% 0% 0% 0% 2% 75% 72% 
61 10% 21% 11% 14% 2% 8% 9% 10% 7% 4% 62% 43% 
79 7% 17% 0% 0% 12% 16% 0% 0% 0% 0% 82% 67% 
115 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 1% 99% 99% 0% 0% 
118 0% 0% 1% 1% 7% 8% 14% 27% 10% 0% 68% 64% 
125 20% 47% 0% 0% 49% 33% 0% 0% 0% 0% 31% 21% 
135 0% 0% 0% 0% 70% 71% 0% 0% 0% 0% 30% 29% 
140 78% 87% 1% 1% 0% 0% 9% 6% 12% 7% 0% 0% 
152 42% 48% 0% 0% 36% 37% 0% 0% 0% 0% 22% 15% 
159 0% 0% 58% 20% 0% 0% 8% 0% 0% 0% 33% 80% 
168 14% 30% 1% 4% 61% 15% 0% 3% 0% 7% 23% 41% 
173 10% 24% 0% 0% 0% 0% 4% 13% 2% 1% 84% 62% 
187 94% 85% 0% 0% 1% 1% 0% 1% 0% 0% 6% 14% 
195 9% 9% 5% 3% 2% 1% 29% 27% 0% 0% 56% 60% 
199 28% 14% 0% 0% 0% 0% 59% 31% 13% 51% 0% 3% 
208 13% 22% 2% 4% 1% 13% 0% 0% 14% 6% 69% 55% 
216 12% 16% 0% 0% 1% 2% 27% 19% 60% 63% 0% 0% 
278 31% 35% 10% 11% 10% 9% 8% 12% 40% 34% 0% 0% 
300 41% 65% 3% 4% 7% 12% 37% 6% 0% 0% 12% 13% 
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Appendix B 2: Data matrix 
Cases D G U O1 O2 E1 E2 C S OUT 
23 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 
41 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 
53 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 
60 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 
61 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 
79 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 
115 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 
118 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
125 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
135 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 
140 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
152 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
159 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 
168 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
173 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 
187 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 
195 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
199 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 
208 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
216 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 
278 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 
300 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
Note: D=diversification of revenue; G=grant penetration; U= unrestricted funds; O1=overhead costs (5%); 
O2=overhead costs (10%); E1=experience of the CEO (10 years); E2=experience of the CEO (5 years); 
C=community contribution; S=size.  
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Appendix B 3: Robustness test of the QCA model  
Parsimonious solution for maintaining programme expenditure (replacing 
diversification with grant penetration) 
Combinations  Boolean expression  Raw 
coverage 
Unique 
coverage 
Consistency 
1. grant 0.307692 0.076923 1 
2. OVERHEAD*UNRESTRICTED 0.461538 0.230769 1 
     
Solution consistency: 1, solution coverage: 0.538462    
Note: uppercase letters represent the ‘existence’ of a condition (i.e. having the value 1) and lowercase letters 
represent the ‘absence’ of a specific condition (i.e. having the value 0). 
Raw coverage measures the proportion of cases in the outcome explained by each term in the solution (Ragin, 
2008). Unique coverage measures the proportion of cases in the outcome explained solely by each individual 
solution term, which are not covered by other solution terms (Ragin, 2008). 
* indicates the conjunctive ‘and’. 
Parsimonious solution for maintaining programme expenditure (replacing CEO 
experience with community contribution) 
Combinations  Boolean expression  Raw 
coverage 
Unique 
coverage 
Consistency 
1. OVERHEAD*UNRESTRICTED  0.461538 0.153846 1 
2. COMMUNITY CONTRIBUTION* 
UNRESTRICTED 
0.461538 0.153846 1 
     
Solution consistency: 1, solution coverage:0.615385    
Note: uppercase letters represent the ‘existence’ of a condition (i.e. having the value 1) and lowercase letters 
represent the ‘absence’ of a specific condition (i.e. having the value 0). 
Raw coverage measures the proportion of cases in the outcome explained by each term in the solution (Ragin, 
2008). Unique coverage measures the proportion of cases in the outcome explained solely by each individual 
solution term, which are not covered by other solution terms (Ragin, 2008). 
* indicates the conjunctive ‘and’. 
Parsimonious solution for maintaining programme expenditure (replacing CEO 
experience with size) 
Combinations  Boolean expression  Raw 
coverage 
Unique 
coverage 
Consistency 
1. UNRESTRICTED*OVERHEAD  0.461538 0.230769 1 
2. UNRESTRICTED*size*diversification 0.384615 0.153846 1 
     
Solution consistency: 1, solution coverage:0.615385    
Note: uppercase letters represent the ‘existence’ of a condition (i.e. having the value 1) and lowercase letters 
represent the ‘absence’ of a specific condition (i.e. having the value 0). 
Raw coverage measures the proportion of cases in the outcome explained by each term in the solution (Ragin, 
2008). Unique coverage measures the proportion of cases in the outcome explained solely by each individual 
solution term, which are not covered by other solution terms (Ragin, 2008).  
* indicates the conjunctive ‘and’. 
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Parsimonious solution for maintaining programme expenditure (overhead cost 
threshold 10%) 
Combinations  Boolean expression  Raw 
coverage 
Unique 
coverage 
Consistency 
1. UNRESTRICTED*OVERHEAD  0.307692 0.076923 1 
2. UNRESTRICTED *experience* diversification 0.384615 0.230769 1 
3. unrestricted *EXPERIENCE* diversification 0.153846 0.153846 1 
4. UNRESTRICTED*EXPERIENCE* 
diversification 
0.307692 0.230769 1 
     
Solution consistency: 1, solution coverage: 0.923077    
Note: uppercase letters represent the ‘existence’ of a condition (i.e. having the value 1) and lowercase letters 
represent the ‘absence’ of a specific condition (i.e. having the value 0). 
Raw coverage measures the proportion of cases in the outcome explained by each term in the solution (Ragin, 
2008). Unique coverage measures the proportion of cases in the outcome explained solely by each individual 
solution term, which are not covered by other solution terms (Ragin, 2008). 
* indicates the conjunctive ‘and’. 
 
Parsimonious solution for maintaining programme expenditure (CEO experience of 5 
years) 
Combinations  Boolean expression  Raw 
coverage 
Unique 
coverage 
Consistency 
1. diversification*experience2*UNRESTRICTED  0.307692 0.076923 1 
2. OVERHEAD* UNRESTRICTED 0.461538 0.076923 1 
3. DIVERSIFICATION *EXPERIENCE 2* 
UNRESTRICTED 
0.384615 0.230769 1 
     
Solution consistency: 1, solution coverage: 0.769231    
Note: uppercase letters represent the ‘existence’ of a condition (i.e. having the value 1) and lowercase letters 
represent the ‘absence’ of a specific condition (i.e. having the value 0). 
Raw coverage measures the proportion of cases in the outcome explained by each term in the solution (Ragin, 
2008). Unique coverage measures the proportion of cases in the outcome explained solely by each individual 
solution term, which are not covered by other solution terms (Ragin, 2008).  
* indicates the conjunctive ‘and’. 
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Appendix B 4: Questionnaire 
1. Where you ever worried about your organisation’s finances or their financial 
sustainability? Or do you consider the NGO’s financial position to be sustainable and 
secure? 
a. If you were worried about finances, did you make any changes? 
2. If you experienced financial difficulties in the past, how did you respond? 
a. Did you anticipate the financial difficulties and act early? What did you do? 
b. Did you only react to the financial problems after it happened? [Surprised by it 
and caught unaware] What did you do? 
3. Have you ever experienced a large drop in your income? Could you please explain 
why and how it happened? 
a. Did this drop in income affect your programme activities and the community 
beneficiaries?  
b. How were they affected? 
c. If the programme was not affected why not? 
d. Did you reduce expenditure, and if so, which categories [e.g. staff and 
personnel cost; administrative cost; programme costs]? 
4. What did you learn from that experience? 
5. How did you intend to prevent that happening again and to reduce the negative effect 
on organisation’s work? 
6. Do you think that the reputation of the organisation can help to protect against 
financial problems? 
a. If so, in what way? 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE FINANCIAL DECISION-MAKING OF VULNERABLE 
UGANDAN NGOS FROM A PRACTITIONER PRESPECTIVE 
Abstract 
Donor funding for non-governmental organisations (NGOs) is not guaranteed, especially for 
NGOs in the developing countries of Africa that are funded mainly by external donors. 
However, the funding situation for NGOs has deteriorated since 2008 as a result of the global 
economic crisis. In addition to the difficult application requirements, donor funding is usually 
restrictive and intended only for specific purposes; it is often also granted for a specific time 
period. Because of the impoverished environments in which NGOs operate, raising funds 
locally is not as easy as it is for NGOs in developed countries. Donor dependence has 
therefore become an increasingly challenging issue. 
The bulk of the existing literature on NGOs relates to developed countries, especially the 
United States and United Kingdom, with little coverage of issues of financial vulnerability in 
developing countries. The main reason for this is the lack of reliable data on NGOs in 
developing countries. To address this gap, this study aimed to gain an understanding of how 
NGO practitioners in developing countries respond to the financial challenges.  
The study involved interviews with a sample of 35 Ugandan NGO practitioners during 2016. 
The participants were individuals who played key roles in the management of their NGOs. 
By using qualitative analysis, the study provides insight into the financial decisions and the 
strategies of NGOs to survive and to continue delivering services. 
The study finds that there is a mismatch between donor expectations in terms of the actual 
capacity to deliver services and the reality on the ground, the result of which is that NGOs 
often battle to survive while still continuing to deliver services as per donor requirements. 
Accordingly, NGO practitioners implement a variety of strategies, such as to strengthen 
capacity to handle donor applications, to create financial reserves, to improve efficiency, to 
creatively seek alternative sources of revenue, and to build reputation through partnering and 
networking. The study also finds additional factors that influence the system and the extent to 
which NGOs can effectively respond to their specific local conditions and challenges. For 
instance, experienced and forward-looking, innovative leadership is likely to take advantage 
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of opportunities and to manage adverse events more efficiently than less experienced and less 
involved leaders.  
Through a better understanding of the dynamics under which NGOs operate, the study makes 
two main contributions. Firstly, it adds value to the current body of literature by providing 
additional evidence on the strategies and coping mechanisms of NGOs to deal with financial 
vulnerability and by covering aspects that had been previously neglected, such as the impact 
of high staff turnover, which seems to be typical of the NGO sector in developing countries, 
and its impact on the efficiency of service delivery. The second contribution relates to the 
practical knowledge and insights gained from the experience of Ugandan NGOs that can be 
shared with practitioners in developing countries who may experience similar circumstances.  
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4.1. INTRODUCTION 
This study builds on the earlier studies (presented here as Chapters 2 and 3) by adding field 
work to gain a deeper understanding of the previous research findings and their limitations. In 
Chapter 2 it was found that diversification of revenue sources and owning assets help to 
manage financial vulnerability. Donor-funded NGOs seemed to have a higher probability of 
being considered financially vulnerable than community-funded NGOs. The second study 
(Chapter 3) also found that fewer restrictions on the use of revenue, flexibility of donors, and 
manager experience assist NGOs after a negative financial shock. However, these studies 
have two shortcomings: first the studies relied on secondary data collected prior to the 2008 
financial crisis (which greatly affected the sector worldwide); and second, the data did not 
provide sufficient and totally reliable information to have a comprehensive overview of the 
entire system. In a country where the majority of NGOs are heavily dependent on donor 
funding to survive, a few relevant questions persist: what are the current factors behind 
financial vulnerability of NGOs in developing countries such as Uganda? Are those financial 
vulnerabilities caused by reliance on donor funding? Are NGOs that rely on community 
funding better off than donor-funded NGOs? And, what are the possible financial decisions 
and strategies that can be implemented by managers to cope with financial vulnerability and 
future risks? The relevance of these questions call for a deeper study to understand Ugandan 
practitioners’ experience based on personal empirical evidence. 
Stable funding for non-governmental organisations (NGOs) is not guaranteed, especially for 
NGOs in the developing countries of Africa, which are funded mainly by foreign donors. The 
funding situation for NGOs has deteriorated since the 2008 global economic crisis and donor 
dependence has therefore become an increasingly challenging issue
91
. In addition to the 
difficult application requirements, donor funding is usually restrictive and intended only for 
specific purposes, and often also granted for a specific time period. Because of the 
impoverished environments in which NGOs operate, raising funds locally is not as easy as in 
developed countries.  
                                                             
91 See also Section 1.9 about funding structures and funding trends. 
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The bulk of the existing literature on the financial vulnerability of NGOs is based on the 
experiences of developed countries, especially the United States and the United Kingdom 
(see e.g. Tuckman & Chang, 1991; Greenlee & Trussel, 2000). The main reason for this is the 
lack of reliable data on NGOs in developing countries. This is a considerable gap in the 
literature given that the nature and source of financial vulnerability differ dramatically for 
NGOs in developing and developed countries. This study aims to address this gap by 
examining the financial vulnerability and financial decisions of Ugandan NGOs as an 
example of a developing country in Africa. According to the USAID report for 2015, 
Ugandan NGOs have been largely funded by foreign donors, whose funding has been 
reduced over the last decade, as has the support provided for institutional capacity building. 
As a result, Ugandan NGOs have been under pressure to find ways to become sustainable, 
which makes them particularly suitable for the purpose of this study as a representative 
example of an NGO sector in an African developing country.  
Drawing from in-depth interviews with a sample of 35 Ugandan NGO practitioners during 
2016, the study’s intention was to gain a deeper understanding of the findings in the literature 
as well as the findings from the two studies reported in the previous chapters. This focus was 
twofold. Firstly it was about gaining deeper insight into the nature of financial vulnerability 
of Ugandan NGOs, and secondly, it was about their financial strategies and coping 
mechanisms to address their situations of vulnerability. 
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 presents a review of the existing 
literature on NGO strategies to deal with financial vulnerability, with a focus on the context 
of developing countries. Section 4.3 explains the method of data collection and data 
interpretation. Sections 4.4 and 4.5 outline the findings and present a discussion of the 
findings in the context of the literature, respectively. Section 4.6 offers a number of 
recommendations. Section 4.7 describes the contribution of the study to the existing body of 
knowledge related to NGOs in developing countries.  
4.2. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
The financial conditions of NGOs in general are characterised by scarcity and uncertainty of 
funding, making these organisations financially vulnerable and dependent on resource 
providers (Froelich, 1999; Nunnenkamp, Öhler & Schwörer, 2013). Typically, NGOs in 
developing countries are more dependent on a few important sources of external funding 
from foreign donors than NGOs in developed countries (USAID, 2015). While NGOs in 
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developed countries have a more diverse range of funding sources, which include grants from 
foundations and governments, earnings from commercial activities and contributions from 
individuals and companies (Anheier & Ben-Ner, 2003), NGOs in developing countries 
receive only small contributions from local individuals and the business sector, and little 
financial support from governments (USAID, 2015). The environmental dimension of NGOs 
financial health was previously highlighted by Prentice (2016), who includes several 
environmental factors, such as median household income and gross domestic product, to 
explore the determinants of the financial health (or financial vulnerability) of NGOs. 
Several authors point out the uneven concentration of financial resources in a few INGOs 
based in the North Europe and America (Elbers, 2012; Fowler, 2016; Houghton, 2016). 
These INGOs, in turn, transfer funds to their southern partners. Further, foreign established 
NGOs and local NGOs differ in terms of their levels of financial vulnerability, resource 
mobilisation capacity, visibility, coping abilities, and responsiveness to financial challenges 
(Fowler, 2016). Foreign NGOs
92
 are perceived to be larger, to have better access to more 
diversified sources of funds, and to experience lower financial risk than local NGOs. The 
funding sources of the latter are more limited because of their geographical location and lack 
of networks. Foreign NGOs also benefit from more support in terms of fundraising activities, 
lobbying, and administrative support from their intra-organisational networks than local 
NGOs. Indeed, international donors favour funding to their national partners as they have 
better accounting, higher capacity to comply with their requirements and offer a lower level 
of risk (Sriskandrajah, 2015). A study by Wallace et al. (2006, p. 81) shows that funding from 
the Department for International Development in the UK (DFID) goes to UK-based NGOs. 
On the other side, foreign NGOs face local country challenges as they are susceptible to 
geopolitics that might translate into obstructive legislation such as formal registration, 
funding limits, and financial reporting requirements (Houghton, 2016). As a result, foreign 
NGOs often shift to other regions or delegate their operations to established national 
organisations.  
Tinkelman and Mankaney (2007) and Nunnenkamp and Öhler (2012), who examined donor 
motivation, found that donors are motivated more by specific targeted services or 
                                                             
92 The author refers to these organisations as Northern NGOs as opposed to Southern NGOs based on their 
geographical location.  
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communities than by disclosed information on the use of funds (e.g. narrative and financial 
reports). This is in agreement with Aldashev and Verdier (2010), who found that NGOs 
diversified their services to match donor interests as a strategy to attract funding. Ebrahim 
(2005), Elbers and Arts (2011) and AbouAssi (2013) stated that the need to satisfy donor 
interests and requirements may have an adverse effect on NGOs at the expense of 
commitment to beneficiaries. The authors call for more flexibility in the use of donor funds 
and a change in programme evaluation, from process-based evaluation to result-based 
evaluation. 
The risk of drifting away from the original core mission of the organisations in order to 
attract available funding is another concern raised about satisfying donors to ensure financial 
sustainability (Ebrahim, 2003; Edwards & Hulme, 1996). In other words, NGOs start 
focusing more on survival objectives than on fulfilling their original missions (Wallace et al., 
2006, p. 82). This problem also arises when NGOs engage in commercial, profit-making 
activities to generate revenue for their operations. However, some authors regard commercial 
activities as a positive strategy for NGOs to generate internal resources towards fulfilling 
their social missions (Fowler, 2000; Svidroňová & Vaceková, 2012).  
The study by Elbers and Arts (2011) shows that NGOs in developing countries struggle to 
comply with such donor requirements. Easterly (2002) had warned about donors placing 
considerable demands on the weak and scarce administrative skills in developing countries, 
hence the human resource capacities of NGOs can barely keep up with the number of 
conditions imposed by donors.
93
 Further, Wallace et al. (2006, p. 129) make a point about the 
relative power of many donors and the tension NGOs have to face between the need to 
comply with donor requirements in order to secure funding and their own realities.  
Of special concern is the reluctance of donors to fund overhead costs (Trussel & Parsons, 
2007; Ashley & Faulk, 2010). In this respect, Chikoto and Neely (2013) showed that 
overhead costs are important for helping NGOs to comply with donor conditions, such as 
monitoring and reporting requirements. Overhead costs also include fundraising costs, which 
Tinkelman and Mankaney (2007) and Nunnenkamp and Öhler (2012) found to influence 
positively donor contributions. 
                                                             
93 The author refers to the high demands on staff in developing countries in terms of skills and time.  
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Several authors recommend a diversification of funding sources as a strategy to minimise the 
risk of financial vulnerability (e.g. Tuckman & Chang, 1991; Greenlee & Trussel, 2000; Yan, 
Denison & Butler, 2009; Carroll & Stater, 2009). In contrast, a few other studies suggest that 
concentrating funding on a few stable sources enhances the growth of organisations by 
providing greater financial stability (e.g. Foster & Fine, 2007; Chikoto & Neely, 2013). 
Frumkin and Keating (2002) also point out that funding concentration saves costs associated 
with fundraising. Similarly, Prentice (2016) finds that revenue diversification is not a reliable 
strategy to increase financial stability in human services NGOs.  
The volatility of donor funding and the imposed restrictions have led several authors to 
highlight the importance of building capacity and the accumulation of reserves or 
precautionary savings (e.g. Bowman, Keating & Hager, 2007; Calabrese, 2012). The 
literature shows that reserves are positively associated with lower financial vulnerability and 
allow organisations to manage their expenditures (Chang & Tuckman, 1990; Greenlee & 
Trussel, 2000; Calabrese, 2012). The value of building reserves is also highlighted by Fisman 
and Hubbard (2005), who claim that NGOs use reserves to guard against unpredictable 
shocks in revenue. The authors also identified the benefits of building reserves in the form of 
long-term investments. Investments enable NGOs to have a source of revenue for 
discretionary expenses (Bowman, Tuckman & Young, 2012).  
Partnerships are common strategies among NGOs as a way to improve services, for 
legitimacy purposes, and for access to resources such as information and financial resources 
(O’Brien & Evans, 2017). The authors investigated partnerships within northern NGOs in 
developed countries in light of the resource dependency theory. They found that access to 
financial resources was not the primary motivation but rather non-financial resources (e.g. 
knowledge). The authors also shed light on the value of partnerships in achieving the 
missions of organisations and in reaping collective gains, even when there are power 
imbalances
94
 and costs associated with those partnerships, which might include losing 
autonomy and independence in favour of larger NGOs. Similarly, Wallace et al. (2006, p.  
140) showed the extent to which partnership relations between INGOs and Ugandan NGOs 
                                                             
94 Power imbalances refer to when one NGO has more control over resources than the other partner NGO and 
because of that the first NGO has power to dictate the terms of partnership over the second.  
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affect and influence the identity and autonomy of partner organisations. The authors also 
highlighted the difficulty of building strong and long-term relationships between INGOs and 
local NGOs because of the distance and lack of good communication as well as interest and 
cultural differences.  
Another concern raised in the literature on developing countries is that external funding is 
usually channelled directly to NGOs without the involvement of governments and the use of 
local resources (Cannon, 1996; Collier, 1996). Moreover, CIVICUS reports (2011) that many 
NGOs are not only ‘disconnected’ from governments but also from the private sector, other 
organisations and the public in general. These authors claimed that working closely with the 
government and other institutions would increase the potential of NGOs being sustainable 
and would also enhance the legitimacy and credibility of these organisations.  
The literature seems to give little attention to governance in the NGO sector in developing 
countries of Africa (Tandon, 1995; Barr, Fafchamps & Owens, 2005; Kreutzer & Jacobs, 
2011).The debates they deal with are mostly related to monitoring and overseeing NGOs. 
NGO governance is generally associated with the role of NGO boards, the structuring of 
organisations and the culture of the organisations, which is viewed as the work ethic and 
value systems shared across the members (Tandon, 1995; Brown, Ebrahim & Batliwala, 
2012; Costa et al., 2012). NGO boards are generally viewed as covering a range of functions. 
One is about playing a more active role in providing strategic direction and taking operational 
decisions, in comparison to the way boards function in the for-profit sector (Coombes, 
Morris, Allen & Webb, 2011). It is argued that the function of NGO boards is to oversee the 
NGO’s operation and to ensure that it keeps to its social mission (O’Regan & Oster, 2005; 
Coombes, Morris, Allen & Webb, 2011; Brown, Ebrahim & Batliwala, 2012; Kreutzer & 
Jacobs, 2011). Moreover, boards are seen as responsible not only for monitoring 
management, but also for strategic planning and fundraising (Kreutzer & Jacobs, 2011; 
Jaskyte, 2015). 
Coombes et al. (2011) and Jaskyte (2015) found that active boards positively influence the 
ability of NGOs to innovate, exploit external opportunities and take advantage of their 
resources as they are likely to encourage the NGO to be active in adapting to changes. 
Inactive boards, according to Tandon (1995), are those that neglect their supportive and 
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advisory roles to NGO management.
95
 A strong board reputation is often found to relate to 
the effectiveness and trustworthiness of NGOs (Herman & Renz 1997; Eldenburg et al., 
2004; Szper & Prakash, 2011). Moreover, Barr, Fafchamps and Owens (2005) emphasise the 
role of governance in the Ugandan NGO sector to retain credibility and reputation of integrity 
of the sector as a whole, which positively influences the capacity of the sector to attract 
funding from donors. 
The roles that board members could play also receive frequent attention by researchers. For 
example, board members can, together with executive directors, influence donations 
positively through their valuable links and networks (Callen, Klein & Tinkelman, 2003; 
O’Regan & Oster, 2005; Ostrower & Stone, 2006; Coombes, Morris, Allen & Webb, 2011; 
Kreutzer & Jacobs, 2011). Board members could also be valuable resources with a variety of 
skills, knowledge and experience that are important to meet the needs of the NGO (O’Regan 
& Oster, 2005; Coombes, Morris, Allen & Webb, 2011; Jaskyte, 2015). Several authors have 
thus recommended taking these aspects into consideration by electing board members with 
specific characteristics and competences (Kreutzer & Jacobs, 2011; Jaskyte, 2015).  
Another function within the definition of governance is related to accountability (Brown et 
al., 2012; Steen-Johnsen, Eynaud & Wijkström, 2011). Brown et al. (2012) show that 
international advocacy NGOs face several demands for accountability from multiple 
constituents (e.g. donors, boards, staff, government, regulators and beneficiaries) and their 
governance and structures are shaped by accountability priorities. For example, NGOs that 
prioritise constituents that benefit directly from their activities would typically have boards 
with several representatives from their beneficiaries.  
Steen-Johnsen, Eynaud and Wijkström (2011) highlighted the need to consider the link 
between internal governance, which is embedded in the NGO structure, and the external 
governance that involves a range of different actors such as donors and government. The 
increasing control and accountability mechanisms required by donors and government, for 
example, require NGOs to have an internal system of rules and procedures to insure 
compliance and sustainability (Steen-Johnsen, Eynaud & Wijkström, 2011).  
                                                             
95 The author refers to an inactive board as a ‘sleeping’ or ‘invisible board. Kreutzer and Jacobs (2011) refer to 
an inactive board as an apathetic and ineffective board.  
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It is also suggested that the size and age of NGOs contribute to their reputation, which is in 
turn are associated with higher financial stability (e.g. Fafchamps & Owens, 2009; Trussel, 
2002; Trussel & Parsons, 2007). While size reflects the ability of growing and attracting 
contributions, age represents the capacity to be financially sustainable. According to Ruben 
and Schulpen (2009), larger Dutch NGOs have a higher probability of being selected for 
funding and are deemed to have better networks and opportunities for partnership than 
smaller NGOs. Other researchers found a positive relationship between size and more 
experienced organisations and their survival, both in developed countries (Nunnenkamp, 
Öhler & Schwörer, 2013) and in developing countries (Burger & Owens, 2013). 
Previous studies on Ugandan NGOs find that foreign donors are the main resource providers 
for NGOs in developing countries (Barr, Fafchamps & Owens, 2005; Burger & Owens, 2013; 
Wallace et al., 2006). Researchers have shown that INGOs in Uganda have better access to 
resources, donors and networking than local NGOs (Wallace et al., 2006). The majority of 
local and small NGOs have difficulty in accessing funding, especially from the international 
donor community, because of their limited organisational capacities to compete with larger 
and better resourced NGOs to meet the donor requirements (e.g. bidding and grant 
management).
96
 According to Barr, Fafchamps and Owens (2005), the most common reason 
for low access to donor grants is because the grant application process is too complicated and 
time-consuming. A study on the impact of funding requirements of UK NGOs and donors on 
NGOs in Uganda and South Africa (Wallace et al., 2006, p. 82) revealed that NGOs found 
reporting requirements to be intense, complex and time-consuming, which limits time for 
downward accountability (Wallace et al., 2006, p. 111).
97
 Moreover, there is an unequal 
relationship between donors and recipient NGOs because of the financial dependence of 
NGOs, a situation which results in donors imposing certain conditions and restrictions on 
how recipient NGOs may use their funds; NGOs often struggle to comply (Rossouw, 2006; 
Elbers & Arts, 2011; Elbers & Schulpen, 2013; Wallace et al., 2006).
98
  
                                                             
96 Donor mechanism for funding became stricter on accountability and reporting requirements. See Section 
1.9.2. 
97 For more details about the broad concerns about reporting, see Chapter 7 of Wallace et al. (2006). 
98 These restrictions are meant to ensure the efficiency and transparency of the use of funds and may include 
time boundaries, specified application of funds, usually only for direct programme activities, and prescribed 
reporting and accounting procedures (Elbers & Arts, 2011). 
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The asymmetrical power relationship is more severely felt and the ability to generate funds 
for overhead costs is more limited in developing country contexts than in developed country 
contexts. This study, then, sought in particular to add value to the body of knowledge on 
NGOs by providing richer and more coherent insights into the functioning of the NGO sector 
in a developing country.  
4.3. RESEARCH METHOD AND DATA COLLECTION 
In-depth interviews were conducted with a sample of 35 Ugandan NGOs practitioners during 
2016.
99
 Participants were individuals who played key roles in managing NGOs and they all 
had more than five years of experience. The interviews explored their experiences relating to 
the following themes through open-ended discussions:  
 how individuals perceive their financial position;  
 the way individuals respond to financial difficulties;  
 their concerns when the funding decreases and how they are affected;  
 what they learn from their experiences in managing NGOs; and 
 the kind of strategies and coping mechanisms they implement to protect them against 
financial risks and to reduce the impact of financial problems. 
The questions were deliberately few in order to stimulate a largely open discussion on their 
experiences in order to allow deeper issues related to the operation of NGOs to emerge, 
themes that might add richer understanding to the existing research findings from previous 
chapters as well to literature.
100
 
The questionnaire is set out in Appendix C. The sample for this study was obtained in two 
ways. A core sample of 15 NGOs was purposively selected from a panel survey of 
approximately of 300 NGOs in Uganda for the years 2001 and 2008 based on the criterion 
that they had experienced a reduction in revenue of more than 15 percent. The sample was 
then expanded through referrals (i.e. snowball sampling) by the initial participating NGOs to 
other NGOs that could make a valuable contribution for the purpose of this study. Twenty-
                                                             
99 According to the NGO Board which oversees the NGO sector in Uganda, there were more than 13,000 
organisations registered in 2015. However, the number is an underestimate, because there are many 
organisations operating in the country without registration (USAID, 2015).  
100 The questionnaire was designed based on previous chapter findings in a more practitioner-oriented language. 
For example, the concept of financial vulnerability was approached as a financial issue. 
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five (25) percent of the total sample was endorsed by the Uganda Networks of AIDS Service 
Organisation (UNASO),
101
 of which NGOs are members. The list of NGOs per method used 
is presented in Appendix C. 
The sample consisted of 35 NGOs. Out of those, 37 percent work with youth and children by 
providing education services, 23 percent are involved in the health sector, 14 percent work in 
agriculture, livelihoods and community development, 9 percent are dedicated to empowering 
women and advocacy of women’s rights, 6 percent work with the elderly, and the remaining 
11 percent focus on cultural issues, transport and environmental matters, emergency relief 
and human rights advocacy. Seventy-seven (77) percent of NGOs have offices in Kampala – 
Central region (i.e. 27 NGOs), six operate in the Eastern region (i.e. 17 percent), and two 
operate in the Western region. 
Thematic content analysis was used to analyse the data. The purpose was to derive the sense 
that the practitioners make of their organisation’s financial position, to understand their 
approaches to sustaining their organisations and programmes, and how their financial 
contexts shape the way organisations respond and draw up their risk mitigation strategies. 
The analysis incorporated the data-driven approach of Boyatzis (1998), where themes emerge 
from the data using inductive coding. The process to identify the themes involved a “careful 
reading and re-reading of the data” (Rice & Ezzy, 1999). The study was also influenced by 
the principles of Blom and Nygren (2010), according to which the degree of heterogeneity of 
the data determines the method of analysis and the identification of themes.  
The first step was, through repeatedly working through the interviews and notes from the 
field, to gain a ‘naïve’ (Blom & Nygren, 2010) understanding of the underlying narratives as 
a whole. The emerging picture was further developed by regular discussion between co-
researchers before a coding structure underlying the data emerged and a comprehensive 
framework could be constructed. Then, the data were categorised individually using codes 
and terms derived directly from the transcriptions and matched with the underlying bigger 
picture. The relevant quotes were grouped together in memos per code in MS Word. In the 
following step, the first-order concepts were grouped under higher level concepts through 
                                                             
101 UNASO is an umbrella organisation formed in 1996 to provide coordination and representation among Civil 
Society AIDS Services Organisations (ASOs) in Uganda. 
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interpretation of the transcriptions by looking for negative instances that contradict prior 
observations. This phase included regular discussion and critically testing the grouping of 
concepts leading to further refining and reallocation of quotes. The themes were presented to 
other academic researchers at conferences and colloquiums, and where necessary they were 
refined. Finally, in the last step, the data were aggregated to a more abstract dimension and 
relevant literature was drawn upon to refine labels.  
The plausibility and credibility of the study were addressed by conveying the richness of 
verbatim examples shared by practitioners to illustrate the findings in a transparent way. 
Subsequently, interactions with peers allowed the notions of the researcher to be scrutinised 
and subjected to alternative interpretations before the final coding structure took shape. 
The data from the interviews also achieved a satisfactory degree of saturation, as the same 
themes started to recur and hardly any new insights emerged from further interviews.  
4.4. FINDINGS 
From the transcribed interviews it can be derived that most contributions fell into two broad 
categories, which formed the higher-level themes produced by the data. These were: the 
environment within which these NGOs operate (Context) and the responses of NGOs to this 
environment in order to sustain themselves (Response). Each of these categories has, in turn, 
been broken down into a number of sub-categories. In addition, from the experiences that 
participants shared, two other categories that do not fit clearly into the two main categories 
emerged: specifically moderating factors that influence the system within which NGOs 
operate, and the size of the organisation that determines its capacity to secure funds and 
implement strategies. These categories help to provide a more holistic picture of NGO 
survival and service delivery in developing countries.  
The following sections present, first, the two main categories in terms of their identified sub-
categories, and second, the other two categories. Verbatim responses by the participants are 
used throughout to provide transparency as to the choice of conceptual codes.  
4.4.1. Context: The environment in which NGOs operate 
The context within which NGOs in Uganda operate presents real challenges to their 
sustainability. This is most likely also the situation in many other developing countries, 
especially in East Africa. The study finds a set of factors that may well apply to NGO 
environments in other developing countries, but which are not usually considered in the 
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standard literature. The data associated with the context were further grouped into the 
following six sub-categories:  
 High donor dependence; 
 Funding application restraints;  
 Restrictions on the use of donor funds; 
 Uncertainty of donor flows; 
 Close and tightly-knit donor community; and 
 High turnover of staff and low salaries. 
The first five sub-categories have to do with the problematic context created through the way 
in which donors operate and the unaccommodating environment of a poor developing 
country. The last sub-category is the almost inevitable consequence of losing staff in difficult 
times. The sub-categories are discussed in the following sub-sections.  
4.4.1.1. High donor dependence 
NGOs in Uganda rely largely on funding from donors, e.g. foundations and external 
governments. Other potential forms of funding, such as membership fees, payments for 
services rendered, and even income from entrepreneurial activity, seem relatively small 
because of the low income level of the communities where they are located.  
[T11]: “we don’t even raise a small fraction of our income from members. [They 
want] … to gain from the organisation, not to provide for the organisation as it is.”  
 [T19]: “Yes, we thought about getting a place and put some entrepreneurship 
activities like having sowing machines and put that somewhere … But when we put 
the sowing machines there, many people don’t have the money. We cannot run a 
business there.” 
4.4.1.2. Funding application restraints  
In a context that is already highly donor-dependent, funding application has become quite 
difficult, especially for small and young organisations. Recent mechanisms for funding 
applications expect organisations to apply in partnership, as well as to contribute pro rata for 
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the duration of project (i.e. the matching funding principle).
102
 The pro rata contribution may 
be drawn from their own resources or from other external sources.  
[T14]: “Now donors do not fully fund, they prefer cost sharing. So that means your 
reserves are being reduced.” 
[T18]: “I saw two / three calls for proposal saying that should be at least a minimum 
of three organisations and it should be at least two countries. So if you operate in 
Uganda you need to know another organisation in Kenya or in Tanzania to partner 
with ... Trying to fit in to the donor, the donor conditions.” 
[T05]: “One of my problems is basically regarding of the new concept of matched 
funding – it’s just likely to crash the organisation.” 
[T20]: “Especially UK and US. They don’t like giving you money unless they are 
partner a UK base organisation who is going to manage it for you. If you are partners 
they can give you part of that money. That one cannot empower organisations.” 
The requirements required by donors pose a lot of heavy demands in terms of staff time and 
financial resources, which is difficult for organisations to meet. Furthermore, some donors 
are changing their strategies of funding through a basket of funds managed by a local agency 
to fund local NGOs instead of channelling their funding directly to NGOs.  
 [T13]: “I stopped writing proposals even under those organisations [larger 
organisations] … I’ve wasted a lot of time … writing a proposal here in Uganda is 
expensive. And when you write, put it there and then it does not pass through. Yet you 
lose the money. Why don’t I use that money and put it on the ground? ... I don’t know 
how to make it. I need to get somebody … Then you put all that money and when it 
comes doesn’t pass through.” 
 [T20]: “Raising funds to sustain the organisation is very hard including now 
attracting staff who can stay and do the work.” 
[T30]: “but now in Uganda we have a centralised pool which is Democratic 
Governance Facility ... All donors are in one basket. Because of basket funding now 
you can’t go individual, because we now have a pool the number have gone down … 
                                                             
102 See Chapter 1 Section 1.9.2. 
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The basket is a donor management basket. They have a management unit which 
oversees that. It is put in place by the donors themselves.” 
4.4.1.3. Restrictions on the use of donor funds 
In addition to the cumbersome application requirements, donor funds are usually restrictive 
and granted only for specific purposes, often also for a limited period. Given the 
impoverished contexts in which NGOs operate, donor dependence has even become more 
challenging.  
[T09]: “everything has to be strictly in pursuit of the project objectives.” 
[T11]: “you can’t have a focal person just for fundraising because no donor will give 
you money to maintain the fundraising ... It’s mainly direct implementation.”  
[T35]: “most of the funders don’t plan long-term funding. They plan short-term 
funding … comes in for 1 year, 2 years, 3 years.” 
[T27]: “That is the biggest problem. For an NGO if it does not get capacity building 
support.” 
[T32]: “The project has ended. What next? You keep on pressure; how am I going to 
get money … We wanted to build our own offices … we don’t know where to get 
money because all the donors we have they can’t allow to build an office.” 
From the evidence it seems that in rare cases NGOs receive support from donors to build 
capacity. Thus, after implementation of projects, organisations are left with few resources. It 
is difficult for them to build assets, such as premises, to sustain the organisation after the 
period of the grant, or while waiting for new funds to be approved. 
4.4.1.4. Uncertainty of donor flows 
Funding from donors is uncertain, because there is no guarantee that it will continue. Donors 
may withdraw at times and they may simply reappear again. This uncertainty may stem from 
donor policies or priority changes.  
[T05]: “So as the fact that the cycles come to an end it means that you have to re-
apply and because of uncertainty of re-applying even if you have been with the donor 
for some time is not a 100% guarantee you going to get a grant.” 
 [T03]: “The last 10 years have been very tough and we always worried because 
projects are for short time. You get your funding for 6 months, 1 year, 2 years, then 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
130 
 
 
they are getting over, you have to get worried and terrified. I have been always 
worried.”  
4.4.1.5. Close and tightly-knit donor community  
Participants generally felt that the international donor community was communicating among 
themselves, and influencing each other’s decisions, more than in the past. Donors usually ask 
for references of current and past funders as a way to assess an NGO’s work before granting 
funds. 
[T12]: “each donor that is given you money wants to know who has been given you 
money or who is currently giving you money … and you know donors communicate.” 
[T11]: “any donor will look for references. Who have you worked with before and the 
donor in community is also small community. Donors also speak.” 
[T34]: “they [donors] usually have several meetings, so people usually actually are 
very close. The minute you have a bad reputation and one of the donors blacklist you 
is really likely that the rest of them will blacklist too. The reputation matters a lot.” 
[T10]: “the paradigm is changing, there is more talk within the international 
community.” 
4.4.1.6. High turnover of staff and low salaries  
Because of the difficulty of securing funding and the low contribution from donors to cover 
staff costs, most organisations are not able to retain staff. Therefore, when projects are phased 
out, the contracts of staff directly allocated to the project terminate and many of them leave. 
Usually NGOs negotiate with these staff to become part-time staff or even to work as 
volunteers until new projects are funded. However, from the experiences shared, NGOs 
(especially the small and local NGOs) are often unable to retain them. 
[T15]: “We had requested them to volunteer but nobody can work with an empty 
stomach.” 
[T20]: “once staff salaries are not constant, staff are looking elsewhere for a job. So 
you have a high staff turnover.” 
[T15]: “This is obvious you are paying somebody little money … that is why people 
are running away.” 
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[T20]: “You find international NGOs getting a lot of money. They are paying their 
staff very well, but when it comes to local NGOs when you make a proposal they say 
‘no we are not paying staff’, then you wonder how are they going to work without a 
salary.” 
[T31]: “projects don’t normally contribute a hundred percent of the administration 
salaries. We have about three projects and each project is contributing maybe 10 
percent of the salaries.” 
 [T22]: “some donors are not paying salaries.” 
Losing skilled staff affects the organisation in many ways and is particularly harmful for 
smaller organisations that see their capacity draining quickly.  
[T31]: “We had to let staff go which we had trained for many years.” 
[T18]: “is like you can’t rest, even the staff you work with in the second year will be 
looking for jobs because they know the project is ending next year and when it ends 
they have no job. It puts a lot of stress around on the final year of the project.” 
[T20]: “Without funds people lose morale, so the work is not so good … is no longer 
motivated.” 
[T25]: “If they [staff] get affected, even the organisation gets affected and also 
beneficiaries get affected.”  
[T03]: “And if you reduce on their hours of work and the remaining staff gets 
overloaded.”  
In conclusion, the strict funding application procedure as well as restrictions on the use of 
funds together with the high degree of uncertainty of funding flows from international donors 
present enormous challenges for NGOs in a country such as Uganda, which relies heavily on 
foreign funding.  
The next section focuses on the ways NGOs try to sustain themselves in this difficult funding 
context. 
4.4.2. How NGOs respond to the environment  
Contributions about responses and plans, or strategies for survival formed the second main 
category of themes extracted from the data. The ways in which organisations respond to 
different challenges were grouped into seven sub-categories: 
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 Strengthening donor applications;  
 Repositioning strategically;  
 Institutional reformation; 
 Building reputation, partnering and networking; 
 Building reserves and income-generating assets; 
 Seeking additional income opportunities; 
 Focus on efficiency; and 
 Focus on retaining key staff. 
 
4.4.2.1. Strengthening donor applications 
The low income of communities and restrictions set by donors on the use of funds force 
NGOs to continue sourcing other funds to broaden their revenue base. A common practice 
among NGOs is to scan for additional donors on a continuous basis and to write proposals, as 
well as upgrading their techniques of applying for funds. Some NGOs have even created 
dedicated teams for proposal development and ensuring compliance. 
[T06]: “continue looking out for more donors to have a wider base of income.” 
[T15]: “We prepare concepts, proposals written to different donors in a bid to solicit 
funding ... The organisation is really trying to tap from different donors left and 
right.”  
[T09]: “It was one of the first organisations, if not the first in Uganda with a grant 
office. An office which just look for money, regularly, without the pressure.”  
[T34]: “The main change was having a fundraising committee … people who are 
actually in charge of fundraising on top of their other jobs.” 
4.4.2.2. Repositioning strategically 
NGOs reposition themselves strategically in the international community environment and 
seek new mechanisms of funding. Some organisations have tried to widen their scope of 
operations by going beyond their core focus areas to cross-subsidise their main work with 
projects that are more easily fundable.  
 [T12]: “come up with a shopping list with annual budgets ... We have through our 
interaction with different donors they are interested in this shopping list. They pick 
out one or two items to fund. You pick out what the donor is most interested in.” 
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[NGOs prepare a plan of resources needed to donors from which they can select 
items to contribute, based on the whole discussion with participant] 
[T33]: “Because of the nature of the programme which we are doing is agriculture 
and the current situation of climate is changing … we now have a second donor who 
is bringing money for climate-change interventions”  
[T09]: “a lot of money in HIV but you have to look at other infectious diseases that 
may not have so much money now but can sustain if once they find the cure for HIV.”  
[T29]: [NGO whose target beneficiaries are the elderly] “because we found that it 
was very difficult to get funds for the elderly, many people look at them as just 
finished … so we decided to form another organisation … working for the children 
because these elderly had children who are orphans, so at least we get individuals 
[donors] easily, sometimes at least more easily than getting for elderly ... [NGO] 
started in 2004 as a strategy to raise some support for the families.” 
[T17]: “we had to look at our culture [NGO focus on culture] and see how it aligns 
with other issues that donors finance. How culture influences the spread and 
prevention of HIV/AIDs at the time.”103 
4.4.2.3. Institutional reformation 
 Other NGOs have undertaken institutional reforms, for example, by scaling down, by 
rebranding themselves, or by operating as subcontractors for larger NGOs to gain visibility 
and experience.  
[T08]: “We start to think about how could we make ourselves relevant and attractive 
to the donors. The fact what we did was downscale from about 6 districts to 1 district 
that was our strategy. We downscaled to attract the donors, to be focused so that the 
donors can say where you work you must have focus.” 
                                                             
103 The two main causes of the spread of HIV/AIDS are sexual relations between young people and the culture 
practice of widow heritance. Thus, in order to control the spread of HIV/AIDS the NGO promoted abstinence 
until youths get married and, instead of having young people inherit the widow, the widow is taken by an older 
person who will be responsible for providing her with protection within the family and not having sexual 
relations.  
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[T08]: “we had to even look at the kind of business we were doing was not related to 
the name of the organisation. So we had to rebrand. We changed our name to focus 
on what we were supposed to do … we were so wide so we changed our name.” 
[T08]: “what we did was to look for an organisation who can’t implement their own 
activities so we became activity-based organisation … we started to become too 
small, the fact that we were implementing for other organisations and here the 
purpose was to ensure that we do it very well … become credible and reliable… So 
we started working for others who had the funds.” 
[T30]: “You try as much as possible to live within your means to engage 
strategically. We are also exploring how best to broaden our investments. To be 
realistic you have to cut your clothing according to what you have.” 
4.4.2.4. Building reputation, partnering and networking 
The evidence collected shows that NGOs are well aware of the need to build their 
reputations, not only in working with current donors, but also by satisfying beneficiaries and 
by networking and working with other important bodies such as the government.  
[T33]: “This one donor that we have referred to since 2001 we are together. We can 
now discuss programmes, discussing budgets and says ‘no here I can manage, here I 
can’t manage’. It is through the mutual understanding and the capacity that we are 
building together.” 
[T08]: “because the project expired and it is not renewed … but the people would 
always be very positive about you. This was one of our key strengths that when we 
lost funding we had a satisfied client ... they will talk good of us.” 
[T11]: “So, uhm, your reputation is actually helped by you doing these things and 
other people talking for you.” 
[T31]: “We’ve got a lot of support because of the good reputation we have had … We 
have worked with Global Fund, with USAID fund all these websites and I’m sure they 
put us there, so the reputation is good. Our work is continuing protecting it, 
continuing to ensure that because it contributes directly to this fundraising.” 
The other aspect brought out by the evidence is that several NGOs go the route of partnering 
with other NGOs. This not only helped with strengthening the submission of applications, 
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which was listed as a donor requirement earlier, but also helped to strengthen the capacity to 
deliver services. 
[T12] “We have found out that we are much stronger in applying for funds as a 
consortium and not as an individual NGO ... It also helps us build network and 
expertise and on how to handle money but also big coverage in terms of service 
provision. We can always support each other here and there.” 
[T22]: “we plan for our networking because in case I am not there to do … Then you 
are able to do what I would do; in case you have the money I don’t have the money at 
this time, then you are able. They call it sustainable networking.” 
[T27]: “By joining networks and working with others. It’s very easier to get funding 
when you work with others and when you look around … The project has more 
visibility and they can even replicate it. Working with others allows them to replicate 
when the organisation is not able to continue.” 
4.4.2.5. Building reserves and income-generating assets 
Another strategy adopted by NGOs for dealing with the uncertainty of funding is to build 
reserves, particularly acquiring physical assets such as premises. NGOs need such assets for 
implementing their projects, but these also help in different ways to sustain them in difficult 
times.  
[T09]: “We really want to invest significantly so that we can increase our budget in 
the long run if you don’t get donor money. Where are you going to get the money to 
run? In terms of future funding that should be a real priority. If we have the income, 
we would invest it in treasury bills and so on.” 
[T14]: “[by building reserves and savings] you’re able to be sustainable in financial 
challenges, growing ourselves by taking other income avenues, sometimes liquidity, 
selling assets you don’t need.”  
[T22]: “We have learnt to save. Everything that we do we try to save for the harder 
times. For example, even if we are implementing activities we try as much as possible 
to save money from those activities to be able to invest.” 
This strategy also helps to fulfil donor requirements of matching funding.  
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[T08]: “Another contribution we say ‘we contribute with offices’ … or we have 
several motorcycles, we are contributing transport. So it is easier for us to contribute, 
so once you have several resources then you can contribute. That one also brings on 
board more donors.”  
Participants expressed a particular desire to acquire land and build infrastructure, such as 
offices, training centres and schools, because these not only help NGOs to save on the cost of 
renting, but premises can also supplement income through, for instance, renting out space.  
[T21]: “We were not here if we don’t have an office … That one is a must.” 
[T03]: “That is a very important thing for an organisation. This land here is ours 
even that building, even though is not completed. Right now paying rent in Uganda 
either for individuals or organisations is very difficult. If you don’t have a stable 
funding, you keep on shifting and moving from bad places. So ya very unstable. One 
way of keeping organisation to grow is to own premises.” 
[T15]: “[NGOs] with their own premises] they are raising a lot of money from those 
buildings when things get tough, they get their rent.” 
[T18]: “I’ve seen our friends who have their own premises they are better off. They 
survive better than us. They have that kind of income coming in.” 
4.4.2.6. Seeking additional income opportunities  
The problem of uncertainty of donor funding together with the restrictions imposed by donors 
makes organisations financially vulnerable, particularly during times when organisations are 
waiting for further funding. The lack of available reserves makes it hard for organisations to 
sustain themselves. Against this background, practitioners reported that they attempt to save 
out of donor funding and put more effort into other income-generating activities and 
community contributions.  
 [T09]: “What continue help us to diversify is not necessarily from the funders that we 
are seeking money from, but from the activities side.” 
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[T28]: “We have ECD centres. The ECD centre they enrol these young, babies and 
children and they contribute some little money. Just very little to help run the 
schools.”104 
[T03]: “if you have a car … you can charge miles to the new donor or to the new 
project … [donors] have to contribute with fuel and then some little money for 
maintenance … and it helps you to maintain the car. ... We negotiate with the donor 
we tell them please provides with miles for our car.” 
[T15]: “They hired us to develop a training module for how best their counsellors can 
counsel people on telephone.”  
[T12] “The catering classes hire out to go and give services on weddings and also do 
some baking on internal workshops.”  
 [T21]: “most schools don’t have computers so they want to set exams for the end of 
term so they come and write, and we give someone to type for them and produce for 
them and make copies. They are charged for that.” 
[T23]: “we also raise money through these projects like this medical facility. As 
people are getting treatment, receiving access in the health services, they are also 
bringing in some little money. The health service charges a fee. They are not free. 
That is how we are able to raise income.” 
4.4.2.7. Focus on efficiency  
In most cases the uncertainty of donor funding and difficulty in generating sufficient local 
funding led practitioners to look at the efficiency of their operations. Efficiency was 
enhanced by organisations using available funding wisely and, in terms of programmes, by 
ensuring their sustainability. It was very interesting to note how practitioners were pressed to 
make positive changes. They started planning and thinking strategically in order to ensure the 
sustainability and continuation of their activities and the survival of the organisation. 
[T31]: “we’ve now done, we reorganised, we are restructuring to fit within the 
changing environment. I’ve used my experience and interactions that I’ve had and 
lessons that I’ve learnt to now reinvent the organisation and say ‘this is what we 
                                                             
104 ECD refers to Early Childhood Development projects. 
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want’. We have to work with a strategy and list a proper strategy so we are not 
everywhere, we have these objectives and we’ve these strategies. We also have 
fundraising strategies which was also not in place; we are trying to put in place. Two, 
we are looking at programmes … We don’t want to do a project that is not 
sustainable.” 
From the institutional perspective, practitioners have started making adjustments to 
administrative costs and by using their resources, including human resources, more 
effectively. For example, some NGOs use government facilities to implement projects such 
as training, and staff are used in more roles. 
[T16]: “We had more staff than this but we had to lay-off some in order to fit the 
money we have … Actually the slogan is ‘more for less’. More people you have to add 
people but at a less of whatever amount of money … We try to use the resources 
diligently.” 
[T16]: “For example we have people who are entering data … the doctors knew how 
to enter their own data in the system, you may do it without a data keeper and then 
you just remain with a data manager who can make reports. Having multi-task staff 
… The nurses can also act as counsellors. We don’t have counsellors fully. If you can 
train the nurses to both to do counselling. The drivers can also do counselling, they 
don’t have to sit always in the cars. For example, if you go out to in outreaches, you 
can have the driver also counselling.” 
Some practitioners have redesigned their projects to provide them with a greater degree of 
self-financing to build sustainability. For instance, NGOs provide short-term vocational 
training when donors fund for shorter periods. This training provides skills that can help 
children or youths generate income to sustain themselves and their families after a year.  
[T23]: “We thought to reduce on some of the programme. Some we decided to merge 
them such that they are under one supervisor … So we go for one activity at a go so 
that we are able to track the results and the impact. Few activities, efficient and 
creating impact.” 
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[T02]: “We form VSL105 groups and train CBT [community-based trainers] … they 
link their groups to us ... In the end they become qualified at no cost, which guarantee 
the sustainability of the project.” 
[T15]: “The volunteers create a lot of sustainability ... This mechanism of using the 
communities’ persons to disseminate information or any other resources are very 
significant. It creates a lot of financial sustainability.” 
[T17]: “needs to identify more activities that they can do in the community with less 
funding … if the community appreciates that they need to preserve the heritage, they 
can identify a space within the community, they can offer land within the community 
and so put up a structure and call it our community museum. They’ll collect items for 
the museum within the community. Like community contributions.”  
[T33]: “this project is … self-sustained because it involves selling the solar systems 
to the communities … demand that has been generated from the sells will create an 
evolvement fund [after the project ends].” 
[T33]: “we [NGO] give you a goat, you take care of the goat, after kidding, you pass 
the first kid to your friend, to a neighbour in the group. So those goats also kept 
moving in the groups up to all people have and we having over like 700 goats in the 
community.” 
[T14]: “when we place livestock [with a beneficiary], then they … pass on the first-
born to your group member, then the last person to receive it in the group, passes on 
to [NGO] [give it back]. So meaning, we have livestock, so we can sell that as a 
source of income. When we are cost sharing, we can use that as our contribution … 
advertise that, that is in fact our biggest source of income.” 
4.4.2.8. Focus on retaining key staff 
By widening their funding providers and by interlinking projects, it is also possible for NGOs 
to secure their staff, especially for NGOs that do not have many financial resources. With this 
                                                             
105 VSL is the term used for village savings and loans group. These are community-based groups whose main 
purpose is to provide access to financial services such as small amounts of local capital to poor people. 
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strategy, they attempt to avoid losing knowledgeable and experienced staff when projects 
end, and so save the cost and time of recruiting and training new staff. 
[T17]: “the organisation has tried to do is to manage the staff in such a way they are 
not tied to a specific programme … So what the organisation does is collect support 
or contributions to personnel costs from the different projects into a pool and then 
from that pool is where staff are paid for ... at least we keep the staff so we have not 
had a situation where we had to lay off staff.” 
[T15]: “We are lucky because some of the staff is attached to some other projects … 
So we managed to maintain them.” 
[T08]: “ensure that one staff had to do more than one programme, one activity so 
that you are maximising skills.” 
4.4.3. Moderating influences 
Ultimately, the NGO community in a country is about delivery of services to people in need. 
In the previous sections the focus was on how the context within which NGOs operate 
demands different responses in order to survive and be sustainable. However, the sector is 
ultimately about how much of the capacity of NGOs is channelled towards effective delivery 
to beneficiaries as opposed to their own survival activities. In other words, the issue is the 
efficiency of the system within which NGOs operate. Other influences were picked up that 
seem to play a further role in moderating the different factors in the system and the extent to 
which NGOs can channel their capacity and efforts to render effective service to 
beneficiaries. 
4.4.3.1. Government’s role 
Firstly, the government can influence indirectly, or even directly, the flow of donor money to 
NGOs and consequently the success of NGOs as it governs the regulatory environment in the 
country,
106
 provides established structures and certainly influences the willingness of the 
donor community to channel development funding to the country.  
                                                             
106 To operate in the country organisations need permission from government and give an account of their 
activities to it (see Chapter 1 Section 1.10.3). 
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[T34] “That time was a bit worrying because many donors were pulling out … It 
came up when our government said anti-homosexuality. Then of course that human 
rights organisation weren’t happy about it, and some governments.”  
[T03]: “And also sometimes the conditions at home. If I told that the government has 
political and democratic issues, it can lead donors to turn away … and sometimes 
donor priorities change, they may leave Uganda to go to Congo and therefore the 
NGOs suffer.” 
Participants seemed to attempt to work with government for sustainability purposes. 
[T14]: “as an NGO you cannot work outside the government, before you enter into an 
area of operation then you need to seek government’s approval. So in a way you 
cannot operate without government’s support. If you’re going to operate within a 
district, you need to get the district officials’ support and give us a go-ahead in terms 
of implementing.” 
[T08]: “without work through government establishment systems and structures that 
one help us to ensure sustainability and cost effectiveness. For instance, if I am going 
to work with schools, I don’t need to go and establish a new system when I know that 
the whole infrastructure is in position.” 
[T18]: “we work with government staff, because then they will continue to interact 
with the same farmers and offering the same advice. It’s very rare we do things on 
our own.” 
4.4.3.2. Board’s role 
Secondly, an active and experienced board can positively contribute to fundraising efforts 
through their networks and reputation and, for the effectiveness of NGO activities, through 
their financial status and knowledge.  
 [T11]: “board members have networks ... they will move with us to some donors, 
they will know some donors that say oh, you will need to contact these donors, they 
will know something about what is happening.” 
[T21]: “The Chairperson is also a leader in the church ... For mobilising community 
contribution because they know her … So they think that the children will be well 
protected ... That is what should be the role of the Board to raise funds; to create a 
good image among the public; to speak for the organisation.” 
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 [T08]: “They can be able to advocate, including resources, does not only mean 
finance but also networking” 
[T17]: “their [board members] reputation earns the organisation quality profit value, 
so value addition to the organisation, their presence in the organisation as added 
value in terms of reputation because they are known people.” 
 [T09]: “a certain skills set we want on the board which that person because of the 
international status will bring to the board … one of our most really influential board 
members right now is Dutch. He was working for McKinsey ... So he brings a certain 
level ... the standards he had set for us in terms of reporting, in terms of certain 
analytics it’s nowhere amongst our peers.” 
However, in many cases they seemed not to be so active and committed in Uganda.  
[T23]: “The Board has not been so much effective as far as fundraising is concerned 
and they are not readily available. They are busy people.” 
[T13]: “ you make an organisation here in Uganda especially an NGO they [board 
members] think that … you are going to get sponsors from America … They are going 
to bring in money … so some members come with those kind of thinking. When … 
they’ve not seen those kind of things, some start pulling out slowly.” 
4.4.3.3. NGO leadership 
Thirdly, the leadership character and mindset represented by the executive of the NGO 
determine the kinds of strategies that are implemented and how programmes are designed to 
be sustainable. Throughout the sample one could see how qualities of innovativeness, 
tenacity, commitment to the values underlying the NGO services kept certain NGOs going, 
while others seemed more desperate and were hardly surviving. For instance, one executive 
director of an NGO had the vision to request a donor to provide the budgeted amount for rent 
in the beginning of the project to acquire land to save future costs of renting.  
[T09]: “Having business sense. Saying ‘this is not good for us even if is a lot of 
money’. Having some analytical skills to see. Move away from the programme. 
Programme will do wonderful things in one way or another… So it will go and give 
people food, will give people drugs. But you, who is doing it, what are you getting out 
of it and how is it helping you to develop as an institution ... Foreseeing how do you 
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sustain yourself on a regular basis ... but ultimately we don’t want to do good and 
sink.” 
[T33]: “We [NGO] have realised the need of sustaining the activities if donor funding 
ceases. As an organisation we started a business arm … The products that they 
[beneficiaries] are getting from their farms, especially maize, are being marketed 
through the company and the organisation is getting some commission, profit from 
the sell. It’s a shareholding company where the farmers have shares and the 
organisation has shares … if the donor funds cease for the organisation, the farmers 
will have gained the knowledge on how best they can produce quality maize and they 
will continue supplying the company to go to the markets. And the company still gets 
dividends that will sustain the organisation.” 
[T16]: “We have been trying. We have been thinking and we have failed. The only 
thing I think of is writing more proposals.” 
4.4.3.4. Flexibility and involvement of donors  
And, fourthly, the donor approach in grant-making decisions and the level of their 
involvement in building institutional capacity of organisations can not only ensure that 
money is efficiently spent, but can also enhance the quality of services delivered. Thus, the 
flexibility of donors in showing interest in improving the capacity of NGOs may play quite a 
substantial role in the effectiveness of the sector. The sample showed that very few 
organisations received institutional support from donors, although there is reason to believe 
that the ones that did receive support performed better and were able to strengthen their 
capacity.  
[T08]: “[donors] now wanted to come and evaluate – due diligence where they found 
that we were a very weak organisation because we didn’t have systems in place.” 
[T32]: “Some donors have changed strategy, they don’t put call for proposals but 
they come to the districts and say ‘can you give us a good partner here to work with?’ 
… around 3 grants through that process ... The donors come to our office and assess 
us. They find you some needs, some weaknesses that you have. They will tell you: 
before we can give you money, can you fill those needs. For example, they may find 
your policies are outdated or your accounting system is somehow weak … So they will 
tell you first do that, after doing that, we can talk. Because they fear, we don’t want 
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any risk use their money. So they want their money to be in safe hands. They will 
make sure that you can perform.” 
[T09]: “The money [from donors] helped us to do the first construction, set up the 
clinic.” 
[T20]: “they gave us funds not restricted and it empowered this organisation to the 
level that it is still alive when most of the organisations have died.” 
[T17]: “they offered to give us administrative support … And it was really good 
money.” 
[T28]: “[The umbrella organisation] that comprises of four communities … They are 
independent but they just federate … [Donor] said: let’s have an umbrella …. Then, 
[donors] posted their managers to [NGO], one programme manager and the finance 
and sponsorship. Their staff are sitting here. So it’s an extension.” 
4.4.4. The influence of NGO international affiliations and size  
Besides the moderating influences encountered in the data, international connections of 
NGOs and size were observed as further relevant factors that change the dynamics of the 
system. NGOs with international contacts seem to be in a better position to apply for funding, 
they experience lower financial vulnerability, and they manage their financial problems 
relatively better than local NGOs. For example, one advantage is the possibility of getting 
international volunteers to assist. These people, in turn, market the organisation abroad and 
are also sometimes able to go back and mobilise financial as well as non-financial resources 
for the organisation. 
[T17]: “it didn’t take so long [to get funding] because one taking the advantage of 
the fact that [co-founder and programme advisor who is a well-known international 
consultant] had worked in other organisations. They were able to sell the subject to 
local organisations” 
[T22]: “We are working with an organisation … in German and they are sending us 
volunteers for one year. Professionals they come and work with us for one year. We 
don’t pay them but then they pay them…They mobilise resources and we are able to 
come out with projects.” 
[T12]: “we receive quite a number of international interns. They witness what is 
happening. They mobilise money. They talk to their friends even when they are here 
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… and when she goes back she contacts family … Others just come and visit their 
daughters or sons while they are internship … and all of a sudden they say ‘well I 
think we are going to support them’.” 
Another form of international connection is through intra-organisational networks – with 
international NGOs (INGOs). These INGOs, who are based overseas, support Ugandan 
NGOs to gather funds in two ways: applying for funds internationally on their behalf, and 
providing support to their local partner NGOs in terms of professionalisation, experience, 
lobbying with donors in their home country, and serving as a reference when applying for 
funding. 
[T14]: “Depending where the call is coming from. If there’s a call in UK, [UK NGO] 
can apply, implementation will then done in Uganda but funding will be going 
through UK to Uganda. If is a local call (like the government) it will be done through 
[NGO] in Uganda.” 
[T14]: “I think we are better [position than local NGOs] in the sense that we are very 
fast. If the call is coming from the UK we have better chances to apply from there 
than through us, if the call is local, we have more chances of applying than through 
the UK. So in a way if you limit yourself to being local then you lose a lot on those 
international calls. And yet, you can be both, apply locally or you apply from UK.” 
[T14]: “Here we apply as [NGO] Uganda, but we can get assistance from UK. It puts 
the organization in a better position, because you can get support from UK. They 
have experience. If you don’t have skills here you can go to UK to support my 
proposal.” 
[T18]: “When we started the fundraising was internationally done at [mother 
international organisation]. All the fundraising was been done in Washington … we 
didn’t have very many such big problems. Then when the whole thing was localised to 
national level you have a situation where you cannot access funds unless there is a 
call.”107 
                                                             
107 A few NGOs in the sample started as INGOs but later transformed into local NGOs because of finance 
advantage in access to local and government funding, and tax exemptions. Another reason for INGOs to become 
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The international partners also contribute to the financial stability of NGOs. For example, in 
the case of a delay in payments from donors, the INGO is able to bridge the gap of their local 
partner and therefore ensures the continuation of programmes. 
[T26]: “This is a German subcontractor NGO ... No I am not worried [about 
finances] because I’m sure it’s there.”  
[T14]: “They [mother and international NGO] do, when we run low on our budget, 
when we short in balance they always come … they would advance our money [when 
there is a delay in payment]. They always come when there is a financial challenge” 
Eventually, the NGOs without these international connections seek for such connections as a 
possible strategy to improve their financial stability. 
 [T12]: “We are also considering to have international embossers for the 
organisation that would be also part of board members.” 
Similarly, based on practitioners’ statements, larger NGOs are in a better position to have 
their funding approved because of their greater visibility and reputation. Moreover, larger 
NGOs are also more capable of dealing with different challenges as they have more capacity 
and also better developed processes and policies than smaller NGOs. The smaller NGOs 
appeared to be struggling more to survive.  
[T19]: “They [donors] want to see organisations that are famous, which have big 
branches, which have directors who go out in conferences ... and those people at the 
grassroots … They are under looked.” 
[T30]: “they [donors] want to listen people who have records, have experience, 
knowledgeable, who have something to offer.” 
[T13]: “Especially people who work in big organisations don’t understand. They 
don’t take us serious who have these small organisations. Yet we are the people on 
the ground.” 
[T11]: “Of course the big organisation … donors go to them. They don’t go to 
donors. Donors go to them for them to implement.” 
                                                                                                                                                                              
national organisations is to circumvent disclosure of information regarding income and budgets for programmes 
required to access local funding from government (see Section 1.9.3) 
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[T09]: “And we [big NGO] always went for the best. The best system, the best setting 
up even before we grew the volume to an extent to build all that systems, they were 
there because we had the money.”  
 [T09]: “You get a certain level of clout when you reach a certain size and value. 
Because you can afford to be audited by the best in the world and standards, global 
standards. You can afford to do, have a lot of controls, which small organisations 
might not be able to afford.” 
[T32]: “Because when you see most donors now, they are not investing in small 
organisations. You find donors giving money to national organisations … They don’t 
come here. But we who are here we keep on struggling.”  
[T09]: “For us as [NGO] cash flow is not such a big problem but for some small 
organisation even cash flow is a problem.” 
[T19]: “these donors need to be educated. They should look out to those small 
organisations at the bottom there. Because those people at the bottom they have 
passion ... We have not so big expenditures, so I think donors should come down and 
look at this people at the grassroots. In fact the project we brought is because of that. 
That donor said instead of funding big and established organisations with branches 
and so on, wanted to look at the small CBOs on the ground. That how we got that 
opportunity, otherwise, we wouldn’t.” 
4.5. DISCUSSION  
4.5.1. Discussion in light of the literature 
This section interprets the research findings in the light of the literature and explains any new 
insight into the way NGOs operate and respond to financial challenges. 
Continuous tension between survival and service delivery 
In line with Wallace et al. (2006), this study found that there is a mismatch between the 
donors’ expectations of the capacity of NGOs to deliver services and the country context in 
which these NGOs operate. This study provides evidence and a better understanding of how 
the funding conditions affect the way Ugandan NGOs work on the ground. In order to satisfy 
donors, NGOs appear to be under constant pressure. While they are striving to remain 
committed to the delivery of their services, NGOs are putting in much effort just to survive. 
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For example, an uncertainty of funding in the poor resource environment of a developing 
country constrains the ability of an NGO to retain staff and continue implementing projects 
while it is unable to generate sufficient local revenues. 
Richer evidence about the effect of stricter donor requirements in a donor-dependent 
context  
As Barr, Fafchamps and Owens (2005) found, NGOs in Uganda are highly dependent on 
donor funding. Another finding consistent with the literature (Easterly, 2002; Trussel & 
Parsons, 2007; Ashley & Fauk, 2010; Elbers & Arts, 2011) is the negative impact of donor 
requirements on NGO operations. For example, NGOs often use their resources to comply 
with the growing number of policies and procedures instead of using those resources in 
programmes. This is particularly severe for small and young organisations with low capacity 
and fewer resources. A paradoxical situation exists whereby extensive procedural 
requirements are imposed by donors, such as comprehensive proposals and progress reports, 
while they are unwilling to pay for staff and administrative capacity to fulfil those 
requirements. Even in countries like Uganda with a young and qualified population, small 
organisations have difficulties in attracting and retaining skilled staff because of the low 
salaries that NGOs can afford. This is of special concern as it overburdens existing staff with 
paperwork instead of letting them focus on programmes.  
High staff turnover as a major capacity constraint  
Although literature on the impact of donor restrictions is vast, research on the human 
resources situation has not yet gained prominence. Elbers and Arts (2011) in a qualitative 
research in India and Ghana showed the adverse consequences of funding conditions and 
unwillingness to fund overhead costs, especially to retain staff, while NGOs are struggling to 
fulfil donor requirements and deliver services efficiently. The responses from participant 
NGOs in this study illustrate the same reality and existence of high staff turnover in Uganda. 
This study expands Elber and Arts’s (2011) study by providing NGOs’ strategic responses to 
those conditions. In an effort to overcome the staff problem, some Ugandan NGOs try to 
retain staff by interlinking projects and allocating staff time among different funding sources.  
Better justification for commercial activities to supplement donor funds  
The way NGOs in Uganda generate internal resources to ensure an organisation’s 
sustainability by allocating resources to sustain their mission is consistent with the view of 
Svidroňová and Vaceková (2012), Bowman, Keating and Hager (2007) and Calabrese (2012). 
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However, certain authors argue that, based on research in developed countries, commercial 
activities remove the real focus of the NGO’s work (e.g. Ebrahim, Battilana & Mair, 2014; 
Mersland & Strøm, 2010). This study has shown that most Ugandan NGOs, regardless of 
size, have alternative sources of revenue. Because of the uncertainty and restricted nature of 
donor funding, other sources of finance and even commercial activities should be seen as 
crucial for survival and effective implementation of programmes, and not as a way just to 
accumulate profits that deflect from their core missions.  
The study provides detailed examples of alternative ways of mobilising financial resources. 
These could take many forms, from simple ones such as renting out premises and vehicles, to 
establishing more complex business arms. Moreover, the need to generate additional revenue 
has also led organisations to change their programme approach by stopping the traditional 
‘handouts’ (i.e. providing goods or services for free) that could create dependence on the 
NGO, and requiring community contributions where beneficiaries pay a small price for the 
services provided. From the development point of view, this turns out to be more efficient as 
it shows commitment from beneficiaries, while ensuring project sustainability by 
empowering the communities.  
Practical examples of adaptation strategies to survive in funding environment  
The contextual realities and funding mechanisms pointed out earlier – such as the matching 
funding principle, applications in partnership, and a close donor community that relies on 
referrals and endorsements – pose significant challenges for small and young NGOs. Several 
examples of rescue strategies, and even restructuring, were found as ways to survive in this 
challenging environment. A particularly interesting finding, which is counter-intuitive when 
compared with the for-profit sector, was that downscaling seemed to be a viable, even 
positive, option for revitalisation by NGOs. Other examples include opting to work as 
subcontractors for larger NGOs, which is seen as an opportunity to gain experience, visibility 
and partners. This is a practical evidence of Malunga’s (2009, p. 73) lessons to improve 
leadership of NGOs. Self-assessment by NGO managers and willingness to learn from others 
are important elements to gain recognition, achieve organisational stability and improve the 
work of organisations.  
In line with O’Brien and Evans (2017) some participating NGOs emphasised working with 
others to fulfill the mission of the organisation unlike those that were aiming only at survival. 
However, several authors are concerned that such strategies (i.e. organisational 
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transformation) and adaptation to donor conditions may lead to losing some of the NGOs’ 
identity and autonomy (AbouAssi, 2013; Wallace et al., 2006, p. 143). Even though that is a 
possible consequence of such strategies, participant NGOs showed more concern regarding 
‘staff migration’ to larger and better resourced organisations. This is a reality, especially for 
the small and local NGOs, and is a common phenomenon in developing countries as 
observed by Fowler (2016). 
Contra the study of Wallace et al. (2006) NGOs try to align their work to match the available 
funding or to accommodate a shift in donor interests without necessarily compromising their 
mission and identity. From the examples studied, NGOs integrate their development and 
social objectives with newer opportunities emerging from changing donor interests. One can 
say that organisations were able not only to create synergies among projects, but also to 
cross-subsidise projects in their efforts to attract funding. An example verified in the research 
was an environmental project that pays for itself. Solar panels are sold for a small price to 
beneficiaries that are also involved in an agriculture project. The NGO gets money from the 
sales, which subsidies both projects, especially for administrative expenditures (e.g. office 
costs). This model of selling solar panels has been shown to be significantly more effective 
than simply giving them away. Beneficiaries from agricultural projects attend to agriculture 
training to receive or to access a subsidised solar panel. In addition, everyone who buys solar 
panels uses them, whereas it is not guaranteed that beneficiaries who receive them for free 
will use them.  
Partnerships towards sustainability 
The success of NGOs in surviving and making progress is not solely a function of the 
organisation and its strategies. This is reflected by practitioners’ work toward partnerships 
with government and other organisations. Consistent with Wallace et al. (2006, p. 140) 
Ugandan NGOs are willing to work for others to ensure financial and operational 
sustainability even though sometimes it comes at the cost of losing some autonomy and 
identity (as noted in the previous heading).  
The weight of the government influence in NGOs’ operations  
Generally, NGOs cultivate good relationships with government agencies in order to obtain 
permission to operate and implement projects as well as to get support in the form of 
infrastructure they can use, rather than financial contributions. This study makes a 
contribution to the discussion of regulation in the NGO sector and the creation of an enabling 
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environment for NGOs to operate in. A more detailed understanding of the impact of such 
conditions (e.g. the legal framework) on the functioning of NGOs and their capacity to 
implement projects, emerged from the research.  
A different approach from donors  
Unlike typical studies about donor restrictions (e.g. Trussel & Parsons, 2007; Ashley & 
Faulk, 2010; Elbers & Arts 2011), this study showed that some donors are interested in 
helping organisations to build capacity. Donors of Ugandan NGOs come on the ground in 
order to i) assess the capacity of their recipient NGOs to effectively deliver services before 
even granting funds; and ii) to work closely with its grassroots to enhance impact and 
outcomes.
108
 Wallace et al. (2006, p. 124-125) presented a similar Ugandan case study on 
how donors recognise and address organisational weaknesses by providing training to 
recipient NGOs. This study provided additional evidence of undergoing donor approaches 
and demonstrated the potential of such trends in improving the work of organisations.  
Unexploited potential of boards  
The potential benefits of active boards, as highlighted by Coombes et al. (2011) and Jaskyte 
(2015), are pointed out as not fully used by Costa et al. (2012) and Steen-Johnsen et al. 
(2011). This study provides further evidence of this finding. In cases of strong and active 
boards, boards are reported as having a positive influence in overcoming negative financial 
setbacks, whereas some struggling NGOs felt that their board members were not only absent 
but also sometimes in there for their own benefit.  
This study also contributes to the current literature by adding practical evidence of the way 
external context shapes the form of NGOs’ governance as reflected by institutional reforms 
conducted by some participant NGOs. One is the creation of fundraising committees to 
specifically focus on fund raising activities and reporting to donors. Another finding, in line 
with the definition of governance of Duncan and Schoor (2015), was the way some NGOs 
seek to recruit potential board members, especially foreign individuals. Based on participants 
                                                             
108 The importance of being close to grassroots is also depicted in the recent decision of Oxfam International 
(INGO) to move its headquarters to Kenya. Available from: https://blogs.oxfam.org/en/blogs/16-07-22-oxfam-
international-signs-historic-deal-move-nairobi-kenya. 
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interviewed these foreigners improve organisation’s communication and are effective 
facilitators of international contributions.  
A more elaborate concept of development of capacity  
Notwithstanding the importance of building capacity to improve financial stability and 
orgaisational sustainability highlighted in the literature (Bowman, Keating & Hager, 2007; 
Chikoto & Neely, 2013) this study supports a wider concept of capacity development. The 
concept of capacity development includes the links between NGOs and multiple actors such 
as governments and other organisations. In some respects, the development of capacity ties 
with the efforts towards partnerships (O’Brien & Evans, 2017). This study shows that 
Ugandan NGOs embark on these initiatives by forming effective partnerships and connect 
themselves with government institutions and other partner NGOs in order to secure the 
continuation of their projects and to survive. Nevertheless, the study shows a significant gap 
between NGOs and the private sector, from which there is a low level of involvement in 
development processes. 
The way NGO size and international affiliations change the dynamics of the system 
The study is in line with the literature on the comparative advantage of foreign NGOs to 
access to international funding and experience lower financial vulnerability compared to local 
NGOs (Fowler, 2016). The study analysed the extent to which international connections 
increase resource mobilisation, and enhance financial stability and organisational 
sustainability. The contribution of this study to the topic lies in the fact that international 
NGOs are locally registered, and not identifiable as international in the commonly reported 
data. It was only through interviews that these international links could be ascertained.  
Finally, according to the literature (Ruben & Schulpen, 2009; Burger & Owens, 2013), larger 
NGOs usually have higher capacity and more visibility and, hence, are more likely to receive 
donor funding. This is partly because donors’ assessments of potential recipient NGOs are 
often based on office evidence rather than on services delivered. Donors rarely show an 
interest in conducting field visits, especially when programme interventions are not easily 
accessed. Therefore, it is especially difficult for small NGOs to get access or proximity to 
donors to attract funding.  
Smaller NGOs have to deal with a type of vicious circle in that they have difficulty hiring 
quality staff and have fewer resources to document their experiences to promote the 
organisation; they typically would put forward relatively lower-quality proposals. In a 
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competitive market for funding, they would likely be unsuccessful with funding applications, 
and remain in a situation of having a financial capacity that is too weak to implement projects 
and build systems. 
4.5.2. Discussion in light of the previous findings 
This study contributes to a better understanding of previous findings of NGOs financial 
vulnerability. In Chapter 2, which explored the internal factors affecting financial 
vulnerability, revenue diversification was found to be negatively associated with financial 
vulnerability. Ugandan NGOs with different revenue sources experience less variation in 
revenue as they are less likely to be affected by a financial shock or termination of donor 
funding from several sources at the same time. In addition, organisations that rely mostly on 
donor funding have their revenue sources less diversified, therefore, they are more likely to 
be financially vulnerable. This chapter provided further evidence that donor-funded NGOs 
with more concentrated funding experience higher variation in their revenues than 
community-funded NGOs. Donor funding is usually bigger than community funding, 
however, it is less reliable and predictable. When the contracts terminate, funding cuts have a 
higher impact on NGO revenues and their financial conditions. The second variable that was 
found to be negatively related to financial vulnerability was the possession of assets. NGOs 
with assets such as equipment, vehicles and premises are in better position to manage 
financial current and future financial shocks and maintain their operations. This chapter not 
only confirmed these results but also showed that these assets improve financial sustainability 
of NGOs. The availability of assets allows NGOs to not only save costs (e.g. rent costs) but 
also to generate additional revenue in order to supplement other sources of revenue.  
In Chapter 3 the conditions that were likely to assist NGOs to manage financial vulnerability 
and the impact of such problems on the operations of NGOs were investigated. It was found 
that the experience of the CEO helps to manage financial distress. In this chapter details 
about the way in which leadership experience and skill of the CEO made a difference in times 
of financial problems were shown. Several practical examples emerged from the data to 
explain how skillful leaders went about to change or realign strategies, or to downscale when 
necessary to ensure the continuation of programmes and the organisation; and how business-
minded leaders had been pro-active in investing in assets and in developing other income-
generating activities. The other conditions tested in Chapter 3 and which was seen as 
potentially important for mitigating the impact of a significant decrease in revenue in 
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programmes, were the donor flexibility and the availability of unrestricted revenue. This 
chapter offered important examples of donor contributions to build capacity (e.g. build 
premises) and new approaches of assessing organisations towards improvement of their 
capacity to effectively deliver services. The importance of unrestricted revenue sources to 
supplement the contribution from donors was well demonstrated by the findings of this study. 
Examples included the use of assets as income generating mechanisms and the selling of 
products and services.  
Moreover, as acknowledged by Prentice (2016) these factors do not capture all dimensions 
that affect the financial position of NGOs as they are influenced by other external factors. 
This chapter extended the analysis of the determinants of financial vulnerability by 
identifying other environmental factors such as the nature of funding flows, the type of 
funding sources and other moderating influences that also affect the financial position of 
NGOs.  
Based on the above research findings and discussions, certain recommendations can be made. 
These are presented in the next section.  
4.6. RECOMMENDATIONS  
In view of the above realities, the following recommendations can be made to the three main 
stakeholders groups, namely NGOs, donors and the Ugandan government.  
The first recommendations are directed to NGOs. NGOs should consider alternative ways to 
sustain themselves, either by generating alternative sources of income and/or by becoming 
more efficient in the use of the available resources. In fact, NGOs should remember that they 
are not the final consumers of donor funding and the donor is not responsible for fully 
funding their core costs. This idea is shared by Fowler (2016, p. 570) who stated that NGOs 
have “a large share of co-responsibility for funding themselves”. A strategy to deal with 
uncertainty and dependency on donor funding that is not being adequately tackled by 
Ugandan NGOs, is to provide services to the private sector and link their projects to the 
market. The study found that NGOs seldom mentioned the participation or involvement of 
the private sector in the NGO sector, while it has the potential to be an important source of 
resources and also to enhance the impact of NGOs’ programmes. This situation may be a 
result of little attention that NGOs pay to private sector compared to other actors such as 
government and international donors. This research challenged NGOs to think in new ways 
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about how they can attract and engage the private sector in their operations, whether as a 
source of revenue or as development partners. 
An example of improving efficiency is to ask for a community contribution, e.g. in-kind 
contributions (such as labour) to the project. In this way, the organisation is able to ensure 
continuity of the work and decrease the reliance on donor funding.  
Equally important for the design of sustainable strategies is the leadership of the NGOs that 
should be able to do a proper risk assessment of their environment, to take advantage of 
opportunities and cope effectively with challenges. When we looked at the role of leaders on 
decision-making process and their ability to anticipate and handle changes, it was clear that 
having a strategic thinking and ‘business mindset’ helped NGOs to manage financial distress.  
Thus, it is recommended that NGOs consider appointing managers with specific attributes 
and competences to run the organisation. Yet it is critical that board executives remain 
aligned with the social mission of the NGO. Additionally, board members can also potential 
fulfil a strong role as linkages to funding as well as enhancing the credibility of NGO. As so, 
the research suggests that NGOs pay more attention to the constitution and the composition 
of the board. 
The second set of recommendations is directed to donors. The study showed new trends of 
donors for assessing the capacity of NGOs and investing in their capacity to deliver services 
by coming down to the ground and asking for references locally. Evidence showed that such 
trends improved the ability of the organisations to deliver services, as well as building up 
trust and ensuring alignment in terms of project objectives between donors and recipient 
NGOs. If the donor is involved and allows an open dialogue with implementing NGOs, it is 
more likely that projects will be suitable for their context and meet the real needs of target 
communities. The other advantage of working together, especially in the initial phase, is to 
create the grounds for the projects to be sustainable and have impact. As a result of gaining 
trust in the partner NGO, donors will likely reduce the number of restrictions (and costs of 
monitoring and supervision), in turn allowing NGOs to focus on programme delivery rather 
than on complying with donors’ requirements. Thus it is recommended that donors continue 
to support building NGOs capacity and strengthening their relationships. Given the 
importance of NGO leadership, one recommended way of building NGO capacity is 
providing training to NGO executives and project managers to enhance their capacities such 
as management skills, strategic planning and management of human resources.  
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Another finding highlighted in this study was the value of having unrestricted funds to reduce 
financial vulnerability and build capacity, especially, when organisations wait to renew their 
funding or have new funds approved. A possible action that donors might consider is to 
include a special fund drawn from the total amount approved that should be retained until 
completion of the project and after final evaluation. This fund is meant to be a reserve for 
capital investment, which includes an underlying investment plan. This will not only 
empower NGOs by giving them the resources (financial or physical assets) to use at their 
discretion, after good completion of projects but it will also create an incentive to implement 
projects well. 
The last recommended actions are directed to the government, which should consider 
creating a more conducive environment to NGOs and donors to work together. This study 
noted how government is a critical factor in the system within which Ugandan NGOs operate. 
First, as the oversight and monitoring body of the work of NGOs, it should integrate efficient 
NGOs into programmes to be undertaken where they are most needed and provide structures 
to improve and maximise the provision of services. This can be reached directly through the 
relationship with NGO networks that can support in the development of national strategic 
plans. In an indirect way the government should consider the reduction of bureaucracies in 
order to attract international development funds and create space for effective negotiations 
between donors and NGOs. 
4.7. CONTRIBUTION OF THIS STUDY  
This study has offered detailed analysis rooted in empirical evidence about the specific 
challenges faced by NGOs in a developing country context and how organisations are 
responding to them. This specific chapter brings together themes emerging from the ongoing 
researches such as sustainability of NGOs (Hayman, 2016), governance and accountability 
(Ebrahim, 2005; Coombes et al., 2011; Duncan & Schoor, 2015), challenges in relation to 
funding (Elbers & Arts, 2011; AbouAssi, 2013), political and regulatory enabling 
environments (ICNL, 2014; USAID, 2015), and domestic resource mobilisation (Fowler, 
2016).  
By understanding the dynamics in which NGOs operate and the decisions taken by 
practitioners, this study enriches the current body of literature in three ways. First, it provides 
a holistic examination of the impact of funding environments on the function of Ugandan 
NGOs. This broader set of dynamics is not readily available and can be used by organisations 
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such as USAID and CIVICUS to assess the health of the civil society sector in Uganda 
(Hayman, 2016).  
Second, it covers fields in which the existing research lacks detail and the focus is too 
narrow. For example, there is little survey-based research on the governance of NGOs in 
developing countries. This study provided an overview of the benefits of ‘good’ governance 
on organisation sustainability by focusing on responsiveness rather than control. Another 
under-researched field that emerged from the interviews was the importance of the human 
resources component. Human resources, whether paid staff or volunteers, are the main 
resource of NGOs to effectively implement projects and, therefore, the main concern of 
NGOs. This study showed how the scarcity and uncertainty of funding affected the 
performance of the staff and ultimately the projects. It also highlighted the adverse 
consequences of high staff turnover on the capacity of the organisations. Another important 
contribution to the existing literature is related to a broader way of analysing sustainability 
(Hayman, 2016; O’Brien & Evans, 2017) which includes internal capacity (financial and non-
financial resources), external context and the relationships amongst different actors. This 
study showed that financial sustainability is not crucial for the long-term survival and 
effectiveness of all types of organisations as some NGOs were able to effectively implement 
projects with little financial resources by articulating a variety of internal and external factors. 
However, such analysis should not detract from the importance of financial sustainability as 
an essential condition for organisational growth and the expansion of programme 
interventions.   
A final contribution of the study is the thoughts shared by practitioners on the topic of 
research. The analysis relies on primary data that provides a level of nuance and specificity, 
which is typically not found in the literature.
109
 This also adds the possibility of 
understanding better the actual point of view and revised concepts. This revision involved 
“re-seeing” and critically examining previous findings, which helped to refine the research 
and generate new ideas that were not originally considered. For example, NGOs that rely on 
small and stable community contributions are not necessarily less vulnerable financially than 
                                                             
109 As indicated by ICNL (2014), studying the NGO sector worldwide and related issues typically relies on 
secondary data because of the cost of collecting primary data. As a result, the geographical coverage and 
frequency of publications are still limited with the exception of the CSO Sustainability Index, which provides 
regular reports.  
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larger and donor-funded NGOs because they always drawn on small scale, and sometimes 
insufficient, revenue to carry out their activities (and limited in terms of their full potential). 
Thus, as mentioned earlier a reduction in revenue does not entirely reflect the degree of 
financial vulnerability. On the other hand, by sharing personal experiences and lessons 
learned – learning from experience – whether positive or negative, practitioners reveal “good 
practices” that suggest how and why different strategies work in different situations ( i.e. 
valuable information that needs to be documented). It is also important to note that the 
experiences reveal challenges and possible situations that others can learn from. For example, 
the success of different fundraising initiatives/options depending on the context where they 
are implemented in terms of resources available. In more crowded and wealthier 
environments such as urban areas the promotion of events as a fundraising strategy is more 
effective than renting out assets (e.g. laptops) where the market competition is stronger (e.g. 
internet cafe).  
In sum, this study hopes to expand the current knowledge about NGOs in developing 
countries and to provide practical insights to practitioners who might be facing similar 
dilemmas.  
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APPENDIX C 
Appendix C 1: Questionnaire 
1. Where you ever worried about your organisation’s finances or their financial 
sustainability? Or do you consider the NGO’s financial position to be sustainable and 
secure? 
a. If you were worried about finances, did you make any changes? 
2. If you experienced financial difficulties in the past, how did you respond? 
a. Did you anticipate the financial difficulties and act early? What did you do? 
b. Did you only react to the financial problems after it happened? [Surprised by it 
and caught unaware] What did you do? 
3. Have you ever experienced a large drop in your income? Could you please explain 
why and how it happened? 
a. Did this drop in income affect your programme activities and the community 
beneficiaries?  
b. How were they affected? 
c. If the programme was not affected why not? 
d. Did you reduce expenditure, and if so, which categories [e.g. staff and 
personnel cost; administrative cost; programme costs]? 
4. What did you learn from that experience? 
5. How did you intend to prevent that happening again and to reduce the negative effect 
on organisation’s work? 
6. Do you think that the reputation of organisation can help to protect against financial 
problems 
a. If so, in what way? 
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Appendix C 2: List of NGOs per method of data collection 
Purposive Sample Snowball Sample 
T01 T02 
T13 T03 
T14 T04 
T15 T05 
T16 T06 
T17 T07 
T18 T08 
T19 T09 
T20 T10 
T21 T11 
T22 T12 
T23  
T24  
T25  
T26  
T27  
T28  
T29  
T30  
T31  
T32  
T33  
T34  
T35  
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What students know is no longer the most important measure of an education. The true test is 
the ability of students and graduates to engage with what they do not know, and to work out a 
solution. They must also be able to reach conclusions that constitute the basis for informed 
judgements. The ability to make judgements that are grounded in solid information, and 
employ careful analysis, should be one of the most important goals for any education 
endeavour. 
(His Highness the Aga Khan) 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The aim of this research was twofold: first, to explore the concept of financial vulnerability as 
it applies to NGOs; and second, to investigate how NGOs respond to financial vulnerability, 
especially with regard to donor funding. This was done along with a thorough examination of 
the funding environment and the impact of financial vulnerability on organisations’ work. To 
derive practical lessons, the research adopted a holistic perspective on the Ugandan NGO 
sector by considering the system and how various aspects relate to one another (including 
government, donors, other NGOs, and communities). The research adds to the body of 
knowledge available to practitioners and other individuals involved in the NGO sector, 
especially in East African countries, and provides valuable insight into the financial 
challenges of NGOs and how these affect programme delivery and operations.  
5.1. CONCLUSIONS 
5.1.1. Specific conclusions  
The following conclusions are directly related to the research questions. 
5.1.1.1. The concept and measurement of financial vulnerability  
Financial vulnerability is a persistent and prevalent problem for NGOs in Uganda. Most 
organisations rely on grants, yet grant opportunities are uncertain. The problem is caused by 
uncertainty of funding flows and difficulty in accessing funding from international donors. 
Respondents frequently reported having some kind of financial concerns and shared their 
concerns about the continuation of donor funding, i.e. some guarantee that the project will be 
renewed. The inherent risks of sourcing funds pose various challenges to NGOs, as managers 
are not able to plan future expenditures and it is difficult to manage their cash flow volatility 
to cover the organisations’ current and future needs. However, financial vulnerability on the 
level of perceptions makes it difficult to distinguish objective risk from perceived and actual 
problems.  
The way in which financial vulnerability impacts on each NGO depends on the organisation’s 
expenditure and funding structure. Even large organisations that receive a relatively large 
amount of funding from donors complain about the way funding is provided, especially 
regarding the lack of support for core expenditures. For example, a large, human-resource-
intensive NGO that is reliant on a small number of foreign donors for its project funding can 
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be considered financially vulnerable. If funding flows from donors cease, the organisation 
will not be able to sustain its existing expenditures, including current staff salaries, unless it 
gets another donor. This is just one example. What the interviews illustrated very clearly is 
that financial vulnerability is varied and can take different forms. Also, an organisation can 
rightfully identify a huge risk and experience financial vulnerability, and if such a risk does 
not materialise, it will not be categorised as having experienced financial vulnerability ex 
post. Hence, the research emphasises that financial vulnerability is prospective and 
multidimensional.  
Because of the nature of the concept, financial vulnerability cannot be limited to ex ante or ex 
post accounting ratios based on financial records, as suggested by the bulk of the literature in 
this field. The development of measurement tools should include and capture the 
environmental challenges and prospective risks, given the actual organisational capacity and 
required needs (i.e. features and conditions). One should also not forget that the quality of 
financial data available in developing countries is poorer than in developed countries. Indeed, 
the data are not available for long time horizons and often have issues around possible 
measurement errors caused by misrepresentation,
110
 with many informal or small 
organisations in developing countries lacking robust and reliable financial management 
systems (see Chapter 1, Section 1.3.).  
While this research does not provide final answers and admits that it remains difficult to 
evaluate with accuracy whether an NGO is financially vulnerable based on financial data, the 
combination of empirical work presented helps to draw some conclusions about the structure 
of financial vulnerability and financial stability. As shown in the first and second studies 
(Chapters 2 and 3), diversification of revenue sources, ownership of resources in the form of 
physical assets, the availability of unrestricted income and flexible donor conditions provide 
resources and options in times of financial distress. However, according to the findings of the 
second study (Chapter 3), it is rather a combination of simultaneous conditions that 
determines the level of financial vulnerability. Both the first and second studies found that 
                                                             
110 On the one hand, the majority of organisations do not conduct annual financial audits and usually do not have 
proper accounts or audited financial statements, because of a lack of funding and a poor understanding of proper 
financial management by staff. On the other hand, larger and resourced organisations often report inaccurate 
numbers as they are under pressure to demonstrate efficiency to donors (USAID, 2015). 
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larger organisations and experienced leadership also contribute towards greater financial 
stability. 
5.1.1.2. The responses of NGOs to financial vulnerability 
Chapter 1 highlighted that very little research has been done on how NGOs respond to 
financial problems and how they protect themselves against future risks in developing 
countries. Following this, the research explored the strategies that can be effectively 
implemented to mitigate the impact of financial vulnerability. This was done through field 
work with NGO practitioners in Uganda. The findings indicate that despite the manifold 
challenges confronting these organisations, many of them have been resilient and proactive in 
finding solutions to their financial difficulties. They explore alternative funding sources that 
can help cushion them against the risk associated with reliance on foreign funding.  
In this research the diversification of risk as a strategy within an organisation is considered 
from three different perspectives. The first is the so-called strategy advocated in the literature, 
i.e. the diversification of revenue sources. The second relates to the diversification of project 
areas, i.e. multi-projects, for instance, the delivery of maternal and child health services 
through community projects related to HIV and AIDS. The third relates to the diversification 
of programmes in terms of programmatic scope (e.g. delivering of health services and 
research on diseases). Alongside widening their sources of revenue and the scope of projects, 
NGOs attempt to retain key staff, especially skilled and experienced individuals, by 
interlinking projects. 
The findings of the third study (Chapter 4) show that NGOs pursue greater self-reliance than 
before to reduce the pressure from donors (i.e. increase financial independence) because the 
existing patterns of support for local NGOs are not sustainable. This means that local 
resource mobilisation is essential for the long term sustainability of NGOs and their 
programmes. Most NGOs engage in some sort of alternative income-generating activities 
and strive to build reserves (i.e. generate unrestricted income) and income-generating assets. 
In contrast to the situation in developed countries, the earnings from such activities (e.g. 
renting out office space) do not raise concerns among the general public or government, as 
they are usually small and are used to pay for unfunded expenditures. As stated in Chapter 1 
(see Section 1.9.3) the Ugandan government allows NGOs to engage in any legitimate 
fundraising activity as long as they comply with regulation and pay the associated taxes.  
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According to the literature as well as the empirical findings of the third study (Chapter 4), the 
lack of resources and capacity are the main reasons why NGOs interrupt their services and 
implement strategic plans which render them financially vulnerable. The data shows that in 
the face of revenue shortfalls – as a result of, for instance, the termination of grants or a delay 
in disbursement of funds – organisations are likely to scale back their services and to reduce 
staffing, especially when activities need skilled individuals to continue. NGOs expressed 
particular interest in protecting themselves against such risks through the acquisition of land 
and assets (e.g. office equipment and premises). Such assets not only help organisations to 
save by cutting the cost of renting, but can also contribute to income generation.  
Furthermore, participants recognise their capacity limitations and seek to establish 
partnerships with other organisations, the government and local communities that can 
continue and replicate their projects. Project partnerships with local and national government 
are of particular importance, as they allow organisations to benefit from existing government 
infrastructure, enhance their reputation and ensure government approval for project 
implementation (see Chapter 1, Section 1.9.1 and Chapter 4). In addition to strengthening the 
capacity to deliver services, partnerships also help to gain visibility and garner the 
recognition and trust of donor agencies, government officials and the public in general. 
NGOs build their reputations by working with others and satisfying beneficiaries. As stated in 
the third study (Chapter 4), various donors allocate funding based on second-hand 
information from other donors. Thus, through networks and their reputation, NGOs can 
increase their access to donor funding, i.e. by applying in a consortium and providing 
references. 
The uncertainty of funding flows and the difficulty of acquiring sufficient resources to 
continue their projects led NGOs to change their project designs, improve efficiency on 
resource allocation and associated strategies to achieve project goals. The third study 
(Chapter 4) finds that many NGOs are using participatory methods by involving communities 
(i.e. in-kind and financial contributions). Moreover, the analysis provides evidence that the 
NGOs believe that the participation of communities and their contributions have improved 
their efficiency and effectiveness in terms of programme delivery. The participation of 
communities not only improves community responsiveness, but also the sustainability of 
programmes through a sense of ownership. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
172 
 
 
The development of annual work plans, strategic plans and fundraising strategies to mitigate 
future financial risks (see Chapter 4) also reflects interest in improving efficiency of resource 
allocation. It is very clear that NGOs are aware of the inadequacy of donor funding and the 
increasing risk associated in relying on external funding (and depending on donor priorities 
and their overall economic and social policies). NGOs have become increasingly aware of 
shifts in funding priorities and funding allocation mechanisms as well as the increased 
bureaucratic burden. Thus, managers start long-term planning and make careful assessments 
of the wider social and funding environment in order to identify opportunities and map out 
potential strategies that can help to stabilise income flows.  
In the light of these findings, NGOs develop a capacity development strategy, which is a 
wider concept than capacity building, to ensure sustainability of programmes (see Chapter 4). 
Capacity development includes the involvement of different individuals, groups, NGOs and 
the government that work together (i.e. collaborate) and articulate resources, skills and 
competencies to deliver services. This includes interventions that incorporate the strength of 
the system of the NGOs’ operations as a whole and not only capacity enhancement of a 
particular organisation (directly related to capacity building).  
5.1.2. General conclusions 
The initiative and success of any strategy depends to a large extent on an organisation’s 
internal governance. The third study (Chapter 4) found that active boards contribute 
positively to innovation and encourage organisations to explore new opportunities; this helps 
NGOs to respond effectively to the financial challenges they face.  
A leadership mindset thus determines the effective implementation of NGOs’ responses to 
their environmental challenges and opportunities. A few cases were observed where the 
board appointed executives with a specific combination of skills, i.e. experience, proactive 
orientation and business mindset, to drive the organisation strategically, and these had 
brought significant benefits to their organisations.  
Finally, the third study (Chapter 4) found that donors often have unrealistic expectations of 
NGOs and underestimate the constraints and burdens of the environment in which NGOs 
operate, where income flows remain precarious. As a result, organisations are often under 
continuous pressure, especially smaller NGOs who struggle to attract funding because of 
their limited organisational capacity and their low visibility. When it comes to funding, 
smaller organisations continue to lose out to more well-resourced organisations. On the one 
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hand, NGOs that receive extensive funding from donors are more likely to have sound 
financial management systems and better capacity. On the other hand, NGOs with little or no 
funding are less likely to have the capacity and resources to even apply for funding, and 
therefore they remain in a situation of low financial capacity to implement projects and build 
systems, which becomes a vicious circle.  
While some NGOs may be more vulnerable than others, appropriate coping strategies are 
relevant for all NGOs, even for the ones deemed financially stable, as Uganda has seen 
significant changes in the traditional funding mechanisms and policies, which increases the 
level of uncertainty of funding flows. However, the resource landscape is being reconfigured 
in a way that is advantageous to larger NGOs in Uganda. Larger NGOs are in a better 
position to access funding and have sufficient resources to mobilise domestic funding which 
is not the case with their local counterparts. NGOs with forward-looking managers will put 
protective measures in place and make changes in their ways of operating to protect their 
organisations against future funding problems.  
5.2. RECOMMENDATIONS 
In the light of the above conclusions and also taking into account the practical issues raised 
by participating NGOs, the following guidelines, which can in some cases help to inform 
future policies and programmes in the sector, are recommended. These recommendations do 
not purport to cover all aspects of the NGO sector in detail as some ideas are already being 
implemented (e.g. through the reform of Uganda’s NGO Act). In the discussion below the 
emphasis falls on the areas where the distance between current practices and solutions is 
greatest. 
5.2.1. Mechanisms to build up financial reserves  
The research shows that the majority of NGOs do not have any financial reserves (see 
Chapter 4). This poses risks to the viability and sustainability of the NGO sector. Donors are 
concerned about unspent project funds. NGOs are encouraged to spend the whole budget, as 
returning money to the donor is a sign that the organisation did not implement the project 
effectively. However, some fund providers allow organisations to keep the funds not spent 
and these can be used to build up financial reserves. It is recommended that where NGOs 
have donor funding balances, they should be able to consult with the donor and motivate for 
permission to retain a portion of unspent project funds.  
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The absence of financial reserves seriously affects programme delivery when the projects 
terminate (see Chapter 4). This is not surprising given the fact that funding is often restrictive 
and time-bound, which means that after the completion of the project, many NGOs – and in 
particular, small NGOs with low capacity – are suddenly left without resources to even retain 
staff. As a result of this, organisations are continuously under stress, especially in the last 
phase of the project. In order to build financial reserves, it is recommended that NGOs 
negotiate with donors and develop budgets (including a schedule for funding disbursements) 
that include a ‘hold’ fund111 out of the total amount approved at the end of the project. This 
fund is meant to be a reserve or an investment fund (e.g. for capital investment) with an 
underlying plan such as an investment plan, i.e. money that is set aside and made available 
upon successful completion of the project. This will provide NGOs with capital-secure funds 
that can be used to strengthen organisational capacity and ensure the required conditions to 
continue delivering services after the project terminates. In addition to the benefits accruing 
to the organisation, these funds also contribute to motivate organisations to implement 
projects well.  
5.2.2. Exploring partnerships with multinational companies  
Although projects of NGOs are being implemented with a greater degree of self-sustainability 
and improved efficiency through partnerships with other organisations, government and 
community participation, the Ugandan government and communities have a very limited 
financial capacity to contribute towards sustaining the financial sustainability of NGOs (see 
Chapter 4). However, the country is experiencing a change in economic structure as the 
mineral resource industry is creating numerous economic opportunities by attracting 
multinational companies and large foreign investments (see Chapter 1, Section 1.9.1). 
Government policies should exploit possible opportunities for strengthening ties between the 
private sector and NGOs. It is therefore recommended that the Ugandan government creates 
a strong legal framework and makes the required fiscal adjustments conducive to an enabling 
environment to promote corporate social co-responsibility in order to engage multinational 
companies and encourage social contributions. Past experience of successful resource-rich 
                                                             
111 This fund is different from an endowment fund or a contingency fund. While an endowment fund is an 
investment fund, the ‘hold’ fund can be used to cover costs after project completion and not necessarily to 
invest. A contingency budget is money set aside to cover unexpected project expenditure and therefore cannot 
be used in a discretionary way.  
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countries such as Australia and Zambia
112 shows that cooperative ventures can have a 
positive impact, especially in underdeveloped towns and settlements where such companies 
normally operate. Cooperative ventures or joint projects with NGOs can therefore be funded 
under the banner of corporate social responsibility.  
Considering the difficulty that NGOs, especially smaller and local NGOs, have in accessing 
funding from foreign donors, it is also recommended that NGOs target multinational 
companies specifically to establish partnerships by leveraging their local goodwill and 
involvement as well as their existing track record with social development projects. NGOs 
based in local communities are best placed to understand the needs and social norms of the 
towns and settlements where these multinational companies operate and they would therefore 
make the best partners for international corporates.  
5.2.3. Platforms for sharing information and scarce skills 
The research shows that many organisations have strategic plans and fundraising strategies; 
however, these plans are seldom executed (see Chapter 4). In fact, organisations find 
fundraising activities challenging and costly. The main causes are lack of financial resources, 
lack of expertise and, specifically, lack of qualified staff to write proposals and look for 
funding opportunities. This situation has been aggravated by the new funding vehicles that 
require NGOs to apply in partnership as well as to contribute pro rata to projects. Such 
requirements will move smaller organisations with poor networks to the back of the queue, 
regardless of their social development track records and the strength of their reputation in the 
community. Conversely, larger and well-resourced organisations would more easily adjust 
themselves to fulfil such new obligations. At the same time the Ugandan NGO sector offers a 
wide variety of active network groups and umbrella organisations (see Chapter 1, Section 
1.9.2) that NGOs can benefit from in order to coordinate fundraising efforts. It is 
recommended that NGOs share knowledge and information, and learn from each other 
through umbrella organisations and other shared platforms. Additionally, NGO umbrellas 
should consider offering fundraising services, for example, writing proposals and reports at a 
                                                             
112 See Social responsibility in the mining and metals sector in developing countries, available from 
www.industry.gov.au/resource/Documents/LPSDP/DEPRES.pdf; and Corporate social responsibility across 
Africa in mining sectors, available from http://www.africanreview.com/construction-a-
mining/excavation/corporate-social-responsibility-across-africa-in-mining-sectors.  
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low fee to other NGOs. Shared NGO platforms are also crucial for other stakeholders such as 
donors and government. By providing reliable information about NGOs and their work (i.e. 
reports, experience) donors will have access to cheaper and better information to assess and 
evaluate NGOs, which in turn could enhance the sector’s credibility, transparency and 
accountability. Such peer oversight and monitoring mechanisms could also help to reduce the 
risk of misreporting information. The platforms will facilitate the dissemination of relevant 
information from government and other regulatory institutions, i.e. information on legislative 
reforms in the NGO sector. 
Despite the increased competition for funding, NGOs, especially at grassroots level, tend to 
collaborate (see Chapter 4). Participants feel they are stronger in applying for funds as a 
consortium rather than as individuals. Collaboration with other organisations helps NGOs to 
gain visibility and to ensure sustainability of programmes. Furthermore, this is also the 
direction in which donors are moving with requirements of partnership for applications and 
asking for references from NGO partners. Given the weak capacity of NGOs in applying for 
funding, consortiums and cooperation could become increasingly important and need to be 
promoted on the appropriate platforms. This could help to reduce the cost of grant 
management and work related to applications, for example, having to hire staff, while also 
satisfying donors and promoting collaboration among organisations working in the same field 
without losing their identity and independence.  
5.2.4. Improve research on the ground  
The research shows there is a gap in the literature on the NGO sector in developing countries 
as a result of a lack of reliable and accurate data available (see Chapter 1, Section 1.3.2), 
which contributes to a lack of understanding of the sector and the challenges that NGOs face. 
As a consequence, financial reporting requirements, financial restrictions, development 
project evaluation and project management tools designed and proposed by donors are often 
inappropriate and even at odds with the objectives of the project. Further research and more 
conversations are necessary to improve such tools. 
Another issue identified in the research is that the mechanism of funding allocation, which is 
largely based on self-reported data and imperfect performance indicators, often does not 
capture the complicated project situation in the context of developing countries. Parallel to 
this, major international donors, in an attempt to improve their own staff capabilities, invest 
large sums of money in sending their staff to expensive management training programmes at 
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top universities in developed countries (Easterly, 2001). Such training seldom helps to expose 
or prepare donor staff for the developing country context. It is recommended that donors 
reallocate part of their budget to expose their staff to the social development and institutional 
context of the countries where they will be funding projects. Pertinent to the country case 
study of Uganda, it is important to note that Uganda has an excess supply of vibrant, young, 
educated and unemployed individuals who could be a valuable resource for data collection 
and field work (see Chapter 1, Section 1.9.1). The empowerment of researchers on the 
ground will provide practical evidence that will assist in the design of effective development 
programmes by obtaining more information on the needs and priorities of community 
beneficiaries and by developing, piloting and assessing new approaches to monitoring and 
evaluation.  
5.2.5. Strengthen recruitment of board members and managers 
Effective governance by NGO boards is rare in developing countries and board members are 
not usually actively engaged in the day-to-day operations (see Chapter 4). Participants 
acknowledged the lack of leadership and management skills and the role of such 
shortcomings in undermining the internal structure of the organisation (see Chapter 4). 
However, boards are supposed to provide strategic direction and support managers with their 
skills, network and experience. Furthermore, powerful boards can attract grants. It is 
recommended that NGOs should be governed by board members with specific strategic 
management skills and competencies to ensure that the organisations not only accomplish 
their missions efficiently, but also encourage new practices and devise coping mechanisms 
against financial challenges. A strong and experienced board can help to identify and assess 
risks, anticipate a crisis and prepare the organisation for the necessary adjustments. 
Managers with experience (see Chapters 2 and 3) and a business ‘mindset’ may positively 
contribute towards more innovative thinking and exploit new market opportunities, which 
will improve efficiency and strengthen the financial position of their organisation (see 
Chapter 4). It is therefore recommended that boards should select and appoint managers with 
specific entrepreneurial and management skills to steer NGOs.
113
 A careful assessment of the 
needs of an organisation in terms of human resource capacity can greatly improve the quality 
                                                             
113 This recommendation applies only to cases where managers are recruited. 
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of service delivery and performance of the NGO in the long term. However, some may fear 
that the original mission of the organisation may be compromised, but a board with absolute 
integrity will protect an organisation’s reputation.  
5.2.6. Planning and risk-mitigation strategies 
The research shows that organisations’ financial vulnerability is in fact often attributable to a 
lack of planning and the absence of risk-mitigation strategies (see Chapter 4). It is 
recommended that NGOs start planning and incorporating risk-mitigation strategies into 
their operations before reaching the point where they are desperate to survive. Strategic 
plans, analysis of current financial environment and risk-mitigation strategies can enhance the 
performance of NGOs in the long run. In the words of John F. Kennedy “the time to repair 
the roof is when the sun is shining" (quote from the State of the Union Address, 11 January 
1962).
114
 
5.3. LIMITATIONS 
Shortcomings of the data: Chapters 2 and 3 relied on secondary data from surveys conducted 
in 2002 and 2008. The survey data contained self-reported data for 2000 and 2001 and 2006 
and 2007. However, organisations may often report financial data strategically and many 
NGOs do not share their financial reports (Burger & Owens, 2013). In addition, the available 
data suffers from two limitations. One is the absence of sufficient and adequate accounting 
ratios to measure the financial volatility of NGOs, which restricted the analysis in Chapter 2. 
In addition, it did not include an expenditure breakdown for 2008, which restricted the 
analysis in Chapter 3. Given that, it was not possible to measure financial vulnerability based 
on decrease in total expenditure or to gauge the extent of the drop in each line of expenditure 
in the budget (i.e. detailed record-keeping accounting) to accurately evaluate the actual 
impact of a decrease in revenue on an organisation’s operation. The other limitation is that 
the absence of financial data over a longer time horizon limits how accurately financial 
volatility can be measured (i.e. 2001–2002 and 2006–2007 from the two surveys conducted 
in 2002 and 2008). The problem with data reliability and number of observations is likely to 
amplify measurement error, reducing the signal to noise ratio. 
                                                             
114 Available from: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=9082.  
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Heterogeneity of the NGO sector: The analysis incorporates a variety of NGOs. Because of 
the heterogeneity of the NGO sector this analysis thus includes a large range of activities, 
approaches and resource structures, and this variation makes it more challenging to identify 
patterns that hold across the various subsectors. Chapter 3 tried to address this issue by using 
QCA analysis. The technique of QCA is based on comparison of cases as combinations that 
respect the diversity of characteristics of NGOs and their heterogeneity, with regard to their 
different conditions and context, by using binary variables. However, it may be reasonable to 
work with a variety of NGOs rather than focus on a particular subsector, given that 
developing country NGOs frequently work across many subsectors, and it is therefore 
difficult to find sufficient data in one particular sector. Furthermore, many Ugandan NGOs 
work across a variety of subsectors and their accounting is often too weak to provide accurate 
information on the different project activities.  
Access to relevant and reliable data: The access to recent and reliable data on the NGO 
sector in Uganda was another challenge. The NGO Registration Board, the government 
agency responsible for government oversight, is weak and its mandate is restricted to 
registered NGOs (USAID, 2013; USAID, 2014).
115
 The State of Civil Society Report 
prepared by the NGO Forum (2016) was, to the best of this researcher’s knowledge, the first 
document containing updated and detailed information about NGOs (450 NGOs registered 
and non-registered). This report includes information about revenue structure, types of 
organisations, NGOs’ financial viability and sustainability. Unfortunately given that the full 
report became available only in June 2017 (deadline for submission of full research), it was 
only possible to access the summary of key preliminary findings. This research hopes to 
supplement the NGO Forum report with case studies of specific NGOs and their experiences, 
as both were prepared during the same time period. Case studies can portray issues and other 
aspects of the sector in more detail and useful lessons can be drawn from them and validated. 
Limited understanding of the area under research: The area under research is not fully 
understood by many individuals, including development practitioners who are based in 
developed countries. The understanding of the real issues by the public in general is limited 
and narrow, because of their unfamiliarity with developing country contexts. This constrained 
                                                             
115 There have been many earlier reports (pre-2010) such as World Bank (2004), Nyangabyaki, Kibikyo, Barya, 
Sokolowski and Salamon (2004) and Fafchamps and Owens (2009). 
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the debate and contributions to some degree, especially with regard to possible strategies and 
coping mechanisms, during the research period. A more informed understanding of the 
context in developing countries is needed to help improve the research in this field. 
Ultimately, the research relied mostly on the primary data collected by the researcher to 
present main findings and contributions, as it not only validates primary analysis but also 
provides greater understanding and detail of Ugandan practitioners’ experience based on 
personal empirical evidence. More research needs to be done to attend to some of the above 
limitations. 
5.4. RELEVANCE 
The research adds value to the current body of literature by offering a comprehensive 
measure of financial vulnerability as a multidimensional and prospective concept. This 
measure may allow greater insight into future studies on the determinants of financial 
vulnerability. Recent literature based on developed country NGOs (United Kingdom) 
recognises the multidimensional nature of financial vulnerability, as shown in the work of de 
Andrés-Alonso, Garcia-Rodriguez and Romero-Merino (2016). However, these authors still 
used a retrospective perspective to describe financial vulnerability, which it is argued here is 
not ideal. This thesis has highlighted the importance of anticipating financial vulnerability 
(see Chapter 1) to impede or at least mitigate the impact on delivery of critical services, yet 
future research still needs to identify variables that capture future financial risks to present a 
valid definition of a financially vulnerable NGO. 
The research is important for development practitioners, particularly in Uganda, because it 
provides practical cases and lessons from other practitioners in similar circumstances. 
Through the documentation and dissemination of personal experiences by practitioners in 
similar contexts, the research may create a sense of ‘solidarity’ among organisations facing 
the same situation and also provide a level of credibility. By realising that other NGOs share 
the same problem or difficulties, practitioners may be encouraged to continue and replicate 
strategies rather than letting things drift in their frustration. This is especially true for those 
practitioners interviewed in this research, who are also seeking solutions for their financial 
concerns. 
The research is also useful for donors to learn how their restrictions may hinder the activities 
of NGOs and can place at risk valuable organisations that serve communities.  
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Finally, the research also encourages governments to adopt policies that provide a supportive 
and enabling environment that improves NGOs’ capacity to deliver services. Specifically, 
this research highlights aspects or specific areas that government should focus on while 
monitoring service delivery and guiding policy decisions that will ultimately improve the 
system within which NGOs operate, such as passing adequate legislation to attract non-
traditional funding sources.   
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